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 From 1963 when it was filed to 1982 when the United States Supreme Court ruled on it, 
the important but understudied, civil rights and equal educational opportunity case of Crawford 
v. Los Angeles City Board of Education encapsulated and propelled the legal and political 
framework of an era.  This dissertation is the first full scale history of the case and the political, 
social, and legal discourse around it since 1991.  In this dissertation I argue that what began as a 
school desegregation lawsuit under the framework of a straightforward black-white binary, 
transformed dramatically over nearly two decades due to demographic and economic shifts in the 
city, as well the decision-making processes within two powerful institutional contexts at the Los 
Angeles City Board of Education and the courts.  These contexts, in turn, generated new political 
identities, ideologies, and actors through the process of various forms of decision-making during 
the struggle over school desegregation.  Los Angeles’ racial politics changed markedly by 1982 
because racial and ethnic groups managed to carve out political spaces and concessions from 
these two institutions, but the political coalitions in the city were characterized by a condition of 
fragmented diversity, marked by racial coalitions that emanated out of political fissures among 
and within racial and ethnic communities. 
However, these influential political and legal institutions created the context and the 
parameters under which these new actors could operate, delineating who would participate in the 
political and legal arenas over education policy generally, and Crawford specifically.  For 





participation of individuals and groups – as members of official committees or intervenors – over 
others.  On the ideological front, these institutions shaped the debate over the meaning of equal 
educational opportunity, compensatory education, bilingual/bicultural education, and de jure/de 
facto segregation.  These institutions also dictated and in some cases co-opted many 
transformative events and circumstances, including the student demonstrations of 1968 and the 




Introduction: Fragmented Diversity 
 
 In the summer of 1963, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed Crawford v. 
Los Angeles City Board of Education (LACBE), a class-action school desegregation lawsuit on 
behalf of Mary Ellen Crawford and Inita Watkins, two African American high school students.  
The ACLU called on LACBE to desegregate two neighboring, racially segregated high schools, 
David Starr Jordan High School located in Watts and overwhelmingly African American, and 
South Gate High School located in South Gate and overwhelmingly working-class white.1  
Mexican Americans in Los Angeles opted not to participate in the lawsuit, either as petitioners or 
co-counsels, because they believed that their educational goals differed from those of the African 
American community, though they shared some common educational concerns. 
 The origins of Crawford mirrored the broader and recognizable civil rights discourse in 
school desegregation cases in the North and South based on a black-white racial binary.  Arising 
out of Los Angeles’ demographic shifts, new political actors joined that lawsuit due to what I 
refer to as “fragmented diversity.” a condition in which ideological and political fissures between 
and within racial and ethnic groups give rise to unpredictable cross-racial coalitions.  For 
example, in a watershed moment of cross-racial collaboration in school desegregation lawsuits, 
the ACLU re-filed Crawford on behalf of African American children and children of “Mexican 
descent” in early July 1966.  Previously, African Americans and Mexican Americans addressed 
their respective educational concerns by filing separate class-action school desegregation 
lawsuits.  African Americans and Mexican Americans had demonstrated they each constituted 
distinct oppressed classes, which allowed them to file class-action lawsuits separately. 
 Unpredictable historical actors and cross-racial alliances developed out of the political 
and legal arenas debating school integration, but nonetheless, the board of education and the 
courts delineated the parameters of participation by allowing some actors and groups to join 
formally the integration debate while not allowing others.  While the Los Angeles school 




and again from 1966 to 1968, in March 1968 African American students from South-Central 
L.A. and Mexican American students from East L.A. staged simultaneous but separate 
demonstrations calling on LACBE and the Los Angeles City School District to improve their 
neighborhood schools by implementing curriculum that included their respective histories and 
cultures, by adding compensatory education programs, and by giving the two communities more 
input on educational matters.2  Each group enjoyed some short-term gains but more broadly, the 
1968 student demonstrations transformed the debate over school integration in Crawford to a 
debate about balancing school desegregation, compensatory education, and bilingual/bicultural 
education. 
 Crawford also exposed a lack of social and juridical consensus in California courts and 
federal courts on whether to confront racial segregation in schools, irrespective of whether 
segregation was de jure or de facto.  California courts beginning in the early 1960s ordered 
desegregation regardless of the cause of segregation.  In 1970, Superior Court Judge Alfred 
Gitelson found both de facto and de jure segregation in Los Angeles schools and ordered 
LACBE to desegregate, prompting a protracted fight over how to desegregate the increasingly 
diverse and increasingly racially segregated Los Angeles Unified School District as LACBE 
appealed the integration order claiming that school segregation was de facto and therefore the 
district had no responsibility to desegregate its schools. 
 Nonetheless, in 1976, the California Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court order, 
calling on LACBE to desegregate schools regardless of cause.  LACBE responded with a 
voluntary, part-time integration plan that the Superior Court subsequently rejected.  Later, 
LACBE submitted a hybrid plan with a voluntary-first phase of integration, and a mandatory 
back-up integration phase if necessary. 
 All along this complicated process, the courts and LACBE legitimized the claims of some 
individuals and groups, allowing them to serve on education committees and partaking in 
Crawford as intervenors.  By the late 1970s, LACBE’s makeup changed, with anti-busing 
members gaining control of LACBE and increasingly convincing politically moderate board 
members to also oppose mandatory integration strategies.  These board members in control of 
LACBE subsequently asked the court to end mandatory busing provisions.  California’s 
desegregation case eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, which found a 




plan that included bilingual/bicultural education for Non-English Speaking and Limited-English 
Speaking students, and compensatory education for racially isolated minority schools.  At its 
core, the uneasy and imperfect final integration plan represented a compromise that frustrated 
most integrationists and anti-busers but at the same time granted minority communities an 
opportunity to improve their educational opportunities. 
 From 1963 to 1982 when the United States Supreme Court decided the fate of Crawford, 
the Los Angeles school district had changed dramatically.  In the mid 1960s when the district 
conducted some of the earliest racial and ethnic censuses of its student population, white students 
represented the numerical majority, while minority students (African American and Hispanic) 
were about 40% of the student population.  However, in 1980, minority students represented 
two-thirds of the district’s population, and white students numbered less than 30%.  By 1980, 
many white Angelenos had fled the school district, some by moving outside of its attendance 
boundaries and others by matriculating their children in private schools, further contributing to 
their lower proportion in the district.  Some middle-class African Americans and Mexican 
Americans also had moved to the suburbs, but they remained within the boundaries of the district 
and therefore their children largely attended the Los Angeles school district.  Moreover, a new 
wave of immigrants from Mexico, Central and South America, and Asia transformed the 
demographics of the city, settled in densely populated minority communities, and in turned 
increased the representation of minority students in the district.  These recent immigrant groups 
voiced their educational concerns, sometimes clashing with the demands of the more established 
minority residents, and at other times forming unpredictable racial alliances with anti-busing 
proponents. 
 In “Fragmented Diversity,” I analyze the interconnected racial, political, legal, and 
cultural debates over school desegregation in Los Angeles. I use the idea of “fragmented 
diversity” to describe how the Los Angeles school desegregation case exposed the coexistence of 
racial segregation and diversity in Los Angeles, and made clear internal political divisions within 
minority communities over the issues of integration and equal educational opportunity.  These 
political fissures in turn provided opportunities for unpredictable and unlikely cross-racial 
coalitions.  LACBE, the integrationists, and the anti-busers formed the three main competing 
camps in the desegregation case.  These three parallel and overlapping though uneven stories – 




courts; and the streets.  Instances of cross-racial collaboration occurred at different stages of the 
lawsuit, and at the same time these three stories illustrate the deep political divisions between 
Los Angeles’ racial and ethnic populations that informed their respective ideas about school 
integration, and equal educational opportunity. 
The Protagonists 
 The Crawford v. Los Angeles City Board of Education lawsuit lasted from 1963 to the 
late 1980s.  The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) was founded in 1853 as the Los 
Angeles City School District.  The district’s area that covers 711 square miles includes much of 
Los Angeles County from downtown Los Angeles south to San Pedro, west extending into 
Pacific Palisades and Topanga, and north and northwest into all of the San Fernando Valley.  
Ventura County borders the San Fernando Valley along the Valley’s western edge and 
established its own school districts.  Along the eastern edge, Burbank, Glendale, Alhambra, 
Monterey Park, Downey, Compton, and Long Beach border the district and are outside of the 
Los Angeles School District’s attendance boundaries.  Even though Beverly Hills and Culver 
City are located within the Los Angeles County boundaries, these cities also set up their own 
school districts.  Additionally, the beach cities of Santa Monica, Manhattan Beach, Redondo 
Beach, and Palos Verdes Estates as well as Torrance established their separate school districts. 
 The district is governed by the Los Angeles Board of Education, which is composed of 
seven members who serve four-year terms, are elected in staggered elections every two years, 
and whose members formulate education policies.  The school board members select a school 
superintendent who implements those policies.  Until 1979, voters from the city of Los Angeles 
as well as from other areas served by the LAUSD outside the city’s boundaries voted for board 
members in district-wide elections every two years.  This format changed in 1979, when district 
voters began electing board members according to strict geographic sub-districts within the 
broader school district. 
 As one of the three main protagonists in the integration saga, the institution of LACBE, 
by some accounts, was politically liberal in the early to mid-1960s, but underwent a political 
transformation directly attributable to the integration debate.  The Los Angeles Times described 
LACBE member Georgiana Hardy and Ralph Richardson as the “liberal bloc,” for example.  




Jewel C. Chambers and Charles Smoot.  Lastly, Arthur Gardner and Hugh C. Willett were 
political moderates, who sometimes voted with Tinglof, Hardy, and Richardson, but were 
conservative on school integration through busing.4    Throughout most of LACBE’s history, its 
members had been mostly white and male.  Though all white in the early 1960s, the board’s 
racial composition began to shift very gradually in the mid 1960s. 
 The legal institution of the California court system, from the local Superior Court in the 
County of Los Angeles up to the California Supreme Court, comprises another key protagonist.  
The California courts, sometimes at odds over each other’s decisions, formally demarcated the 
boundaries of which individuals and groups had standing in Crawford and would directly 
participate in the hearings.  In the process, the courts constructed and defined political identities, 
ideologies, and actors and granted some of them legal recognition to partake in the lawsuit. 
 Integrationists represent yet another major group, and they sought two-way mandatory 
busing throughout the district, and possibly into adjacent districts under a metropolitan plan.  The 
integrationists include civil rights organizations, community leaders, and some LACBE 
members.  Some integrationists worried that bilingual/bicultural and compensatory education 
efforts would interfere with integration, while others believed that bilingual/bicultural and 
compensatory education could be part of a comprehensive integration plan. 
 Anti-busers opposed two-way, mandatory busing for integration, and many other 
mandatory integration strategies, and instead proposed voluntary integration strategies, including 
voluntary busing.  Anti-busers included anti-busing organizations, community leaders, and some 
LACBE members.  Many anti-busers also supported bilingual bicultural education and 
compensatory programs, which many anti-busers saw as a way to challenge mandatory busing 
efforts.  Although some individual LACBE members clearly either backed or opposed 
mandatory busing, LACBE’s majority position on mandatory busing changed over time while 
Crawford made its way up and down the California court system. 
 Forced into the political arena of the integration debate, minority communities grappled 
with integration and compensatory education, including bilingual/bicultural education.  The 
African American community and its leaders were at odds over integration, with leaders calling 
for mandatory busing, while many African American Angelenos demanding compensatory 
education and more community control and input in educational matters.  In 1966, Mexican 




from the community of East L.A. demonstrated and called for compensatory education and 
bilingual/bicultural programs, but not integration.  In response to the 1968 student 
demonstrations, however, some Mexican Americans contemplated busing their children out of 
neighborhood schools for a chance at better educational opportunities, irrespective of whether 
busing their children accomplished integration. 
 “Fragmented Diversity” represents a departure from civil rights and school desegregation 
history that has focused on the South and North and the prevalent but increasingly unreliable 
black/white binary as a trope for analysis of school desegregation cases.  African Americans, 
Mexican Americans, “Spanish surname,” and other racial and ethnic minorities were keenly 
aware of their unequal social statuses but were not powerless.  They confronted the urban crisis 
at its core by seeking to end educational inequality, sometimes through legal means and at times 
through grassroots mobilization.  Crawford v. LACBE (from now on Crawford) provides an 
opportunity to study race relations, with the student demonstrations of 1968 representing a 
formidable intervention intrinsic of grassroots mobilization that transformed the school 
desegregation case.  Although the East L.A. student demonstrations occurred in 1968, the issues 
they raised became part and parcel of the Crawford story until the very end.  By weaving 
together these two seemingly disparate stories within the historical arc Crawford provides, I 
show the changing, fragmented nature of Los Angeles’ racial politics in an increasingly diverse 
and segregated city at the end of the twentieth century, and demonstrate that powerful political 
and legal institutions constructed political identities, ideologies, and actors through the process of 
various forms of decision-making. 
Bridging California School Desegregation History and Brown vs. Board of Education 
 In “Fragmented Diversity,” I study school desegregation efforts that were vastly different 
from the North and South partly because Crawford was tried in the California state court system 
instead of the federal court system.  Additionally, Los Angeles was multiracial and multiethnic, 
and its enormous school district encompassed areas in the city proper as well as the suburbs.  
Beginning in 1963 and up to 1979, California courts were not restricted to ordering integration 
based solely on de jure segregation.  California courts required civil rights groups to demonstrate 





 California school segregation case law reveals a history of rulings against school 
integration based on a “separate and equal” doctrine established for more than two decades 
before Plessy vs. Ferguson.  By statute, the state of California mandated segregated schools as 
early as 1870, twenty years after statehood.  In 1874, Mary Frances Ward, an eleven-year-old 
African American, sued her grammar school in San Francisco because it denied her admission 
because she was black.  Ward v. Flood reached the California Supreme Court the same year.  
Twenty-two years before Plessy, the California Supreme Court espoused a “separate and equal” 
doctrine by ruling that a violation of Ward’s constitutional rights had not occurred because she 
was educated in a segregated Black school “on equal terms” and “at the common public 
expense” as white students.6  The California Supreme Court pointed to the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the “Federal Constitution” as the basis of its ruling. 
 School segregation also affected Asian Americans.  In Tape v. Hurley, Joseph Tape, the 
father of Mamie Tape, a Chinese American child born in the United States, filed a lawsuit 
against a teacher named Jennie M.A. Hurley, and the board of education and the school 
superintendent of the San Francisco Board of Education, seeking “admission in the public school 
of the district in which she resides.”7  After dismissing the board of education from the lawsuit, 
the Superior Court of the County of San Francisco ruled in Tape’s favor.  Hurley appealed the 
decision to the California Supreme Court.  After dismissing the superintendent from the lawsuit, 
the California Supreme Court entered a judgment in Tape’s favor against teacher Hurley.8  The 
Court declared that under the current law, a school could deny admission to Tape “only if she 
was vicious, or filthy, or that she had a contagious or infectious disease.  None of these things 
had been alleged.”9  The California Supreme Court concluded, “The legislature had not denied to 
the children of any race or nationality the right to enter the public schools.  Hence, the child had 
a right to attend the public school.”10  The California Legislature later enacted a statue ordering 
school board to separate Chinese and other Asian students from white students. 
 In 1924, Alice Piper, a Native American, sued the Big Pine School District, near Death 
Valley, in Ynio County, California, because it denied her admission to one of its schools.  Piper 
v. Big Pine School District challenged the 1921 California statute that permitted school districts 
to create separate schools for Indian children and children of Chinese, Japanese, or Mongolian 
parents.11  Although Piper lost her case, the court allowed her to attend the school because a 




Amendment.  Had a “separate but equal” Indian school existed in the district and near her, she 
would have been compelled to attend it.   In its ruling, the court reaffirmed the practice of 
“separate but equal” in California. 
 In Mendez v. Westminster School District in 1946, the Mexican American parents of five 
students filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging racial segregation in Orange County, 
California school districts, where students of Mexican descent were compelled to attend 
“Mexican schools.”  Senior District Court Judge Paul McCormick ruled in favor of Mendez and 
the other four co-plaintiffs in February 1946 on the grounds that segregating Mexican American 
students was unconstitutional and denied them equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.12  California had never enacted a statute permitting school districts to segregate 
Mexican American students.  However, the practice of segregating students of Mexican students 
had been unofficially institutionalized for various reasons in different ways, including creating 
separate “Mexican schools,” or by designating “Mexican classrooms” within schools populated 
by students from different racial or ethnic backgrounds.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed with Judge McCormick, but the basis for upholding McCormick’s decision did 
not include the equal protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead, the court’s 
ruling was based on the narrow grounds that an existing California statute allowing the 
segregation of Chinese, Japanese, and Mongolian children into separate schools did not extend to 
children of Mexican descent.  This particular statute, in fact, had been challenged and upheld in 
Piper v. Big Pine School District.  In 1947, the statutes authorizing segregation of Indian, 
Chinese, Mongolian, and Japanese students in California were repealed. 
 In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Brown vs. Board of Education 
that segregated schools were inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional.13  After the 
landmark ruling, the NAACP and other mainstream civil rights organizations continued their 
school desegregation campaign to other regions of the country.  Some well-known school 
desegregation cases occurred in Charlotte, Boston, Detroit, Chicago and Denver.  Significantly, 
the cases in Houston, Texas and Denver, Colorado challenged the black-white paradigm built in 
Brown due to the areas’ existing Mexican American population.  Yet, in most desegregation 
cases, civil rights organizations sought to integrate segregated African American and white 
schools.  Even in Pasadena, California, just a short distance north from Los Angeles, the basis of 




 The Crawford case was significant because it represented a debate over how to fulfill the 
mandate and spirit of Brown in a diverse and vast school district that educates students from 
different racial and ethnic backgrounds including African American, Hispanic, Asian, and Native 
American, among others, and spreads over 711 square miles.  Additionally, during Crawford the 
district’s demographics were constantly in flux due to out migration and increasing immigration 
to Los Angeles.   
 In 1963, petitioners in Crawford sought to integrate segregated schools in a racially, 
ethnically, and culturally diverse city, and the case demonstrated that segregation and diversity 
could exist simultaneously.  In its inception in 1963, Crawford sought to desegregate two 
neighboring schools, one black and one white.  Mexican Americans originally chose not to join 
the lawsuit.  By 1966, students of “Mexican descent” had joined Crawford.  In the mid to late 
1970s, mandatory busing for integration represented the focal point of contention in Crawford, 
with white Angelenos from across the social spectrum and the Los Angeles metropolitan region 
overwhelmingly opposed to it, while minorities were at odds over the issue.  Another important 
aspect of the integration debate dealt with meeting state and federal mandates to provide 
bilingual education to non-English speaking (NES) and limited-English speaking students (LES), 
which was a central demand in the East L.A. student demonstrations of 1968.  To combat the 
harms of racial isolation in hyper-segregated minority schools, the LACBE promoted 
compensatory education programs instead of integration. 
De Facto/De Jure Question 
 In 1963 Jackson v. Pasadena, the court ordered school desegregation regardless of the 
cause of segregation, in effect deeming the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation 
irrelevant.  Segregation harmed minority children, and the evil was inherent in segregation itself.  
California court decisions in the early 1960s and 1970s were more progressive than federal 
courts, and the remedies California state courts allowed were more expansive than federal courts.  
Civil rights organization did not have to prove de jure segregation or intent behind segregation 
and only needed to show segregation existed.  In other words, civil rights groups had to 
demonstrate “statistical segregation,” i.e. segregation in terms of the proportions, or 




 I argue that not only do de facto and de jure co-exist, they are symbiotic.  Instinctively, 
the California Supreme Court in its 1963 ruling possibly wanted to do away with the distinction 
because the two forms of segregation work together.  Yet, the distinction is not artificial per se.  
Instead, one form of segregation reinforces the other.  For example, I show in the story of 
Crawford that several city councils within the broader Los Angeles County passed resolutions 
opposing school integration, specifically attendance boundary changes to desegregate their 
racially segregated predominantly white neighborhood schools with minority schools.  This is de 
jure segregation emanating out of de facto racial segregation that possibly developed out of 
housing patterns based on de jure housing covenants.  Moreover, Proposition 14, an amendment 
to the California Constitution passed overwhelmingly by California voters in response to the 
Rumford Fair Housing Act of 1963 that sought to end racial discrimination in housing, 
exemplified de jure segregation.  Voters wanted to legitimize private de facto acts that included 
acts stemming from prejudice, racism, and discrimination in sales and rentals in housing, through 
de jure segregation via Proposition 14.  The California Supreme Court deemed Proposition 14 
unconstitutional two years later in 1966. 
 Moreover, racial politics influence judicial decrees on whether there are findings of de 
jure or de facto, even if the two forms worked together.  Distinction and findings are political 
and legal in nature and the question is therefore susceptible to interpretation that may not take 
into consideration how the two forms of segregation work together.  Additionally, distinguishing 
between de jure and de facto is not a moral issue.  If it were a moral question as Dr. King posed 
it in 1963, distinction would be irrelevant.  The distinction between de jure and de facto was 
necessary in federal cases, and it gave jurists an opportunity to focus on de jure or de facto 
instead of how de jure and de facto interacted. 
 In the early 1980s, the United States Supreme Court raised the standard of proof of de 
jure by adding the concept of “intentionality” to permit a remedy of mandatory busing in de jure 
segregation cases when it found California’s anti-busing Proposition 1 constitutional.  The idea 
of intentionality made the finding, or lack of finding, of de jure even more susceptible to federal 
interpretation, and the Court permitted de jure to exist as long as it was not an intentional de jure 
act.  Because the concept of de jure segregation is even more susceptible to interpretation, it is a 
political question as much as it is a legal question.  Although “statistical segregation” can show 




The Black/White Divide and the Urban/Suburban Divide 
  I draw upon the work of several historians who have analyzed the inner city, race 
relations, residential segregation, job discrimination, and suburbanization.14  Although I focus on 
Crawford and the 1968 student protests, my analysis includes an undercurrent that challenges the 
notion of a rigid urban-suburban racial divide.  While racial segregation existed, the actions by 
community activists in one area invariably affected communities throughout the Los Angeles 
County, not only their respective segregated spaces.  For example, even though the majority of 
San Fernando Valley residents were white, African Americans who lived in the eastern part of 
the San Fernando Valley undermined the idea of a solid urban/suburban racial divide, and 
questioned how their schools had become highly segregated educational spaces even though the 
majority of Valley residents were white.  In this light, I demonstrate how many white Angelenos 
actively segregated their children and themselves from minority children even when they lived in 
a diverse area. 
 My dissertation does not examine whiteness per se but about how the mandate of Brown 
played out in a diverse and vast school district.  The concept of whiteness partly helps explain 
the racial dynamics within the integration debate.15  The possessive investment in whiteness 
ensured “the unequal educational opportunities available to children of different races.”16  In Los 
Angeles’ desegregation case, civil rights organizations demonstrated that LACBE maintained 
“separate and unequal schools” by providing unequal funding along racial lines.  LACBE also 
had provided the mechanism of open enrollment that permitted white parents to transfer their 
children from desegregated schools to racially segregated, predominantly white schools.  Both 
policies undermined LACBE’s constant colorblind rhetoric.  The 1968 African American and 
Mexican American student demonstrators who experienced this inequality challenged LACBE’s 
investment in whiteness by calling for compensatory education programs that they believed 
would help equalize their educational opportunities in their respective schools. 
Los Angeles Urban History 
 It is important to contextualize Crawford, the 1968 student demonstrations, and the 
integration debate within a boarder history of Los Angeles. While school desegregation cases in 
the North and South based on a biracial framework were complex enough, in Los Angeles the 




complicated the school desegregation case.  In Los Angeles before World War Two, African 
Americans, Jews, Asians of Chinese and Japanese descent, immigrants of Eastern European 
descent such as Italians and Poles, and Chicanos and Mexican immigrants, shared communities, 
lived in overlapping neighborhoods, or lived in segregated neighborhoods very near or adjacent 
to each other,17 which translated into cases of cross-racial political alliances.  This changed after 
World War Two, as the postwar economic boom facilitated the growth of the suburbs. 
 After World War Two, whites from different ethnicities coalesced politically into one 
racial group along the color line, and moved out of the city and out into the suburbs in soaring 
and unprecedented numbers.  Whites enjoyed the privilege associated with residing in new and 
homogeneous communities segregated far away from densely populated minority communities 
in or near the city center, aided by low-interest home mortgages, wartime savings, and G.I. Bill 
benefits.  Early in the twentieth century, Los Angeles entered the first phase of suburbanization 
and residential segregation driven by developers and realtors.  In the postwar era, Los Angeles 
entered a second major phase of suburbanization and increased rigid housing segregation, but 
this time it was not only facilitated by realtors and developers but also by federal government 
lending practices. 
 By World War Two, the diverse population fragmented into increasingly racially 
segregated spaces, a condition exacerbated in the postwar economic and housing boom of the 
1950s.  After World War Two, whites from different ethnicities coalesced politically into one 
racial group along the color line, and moved out of the city in soaring and unprecedented 
numbers.  Whites enjoyed the privilege associated with residing in new and homogeneous 
communities segregated far away from densely populated minority communities in or near the 
city center, aided by low-interest home mortgages, wartime savings, and G.I. Bill benefits.  Early 
in the twentieth century, Los Angeles entered the first phase of suburbanization and residential 
segregation driven by developers and realtors.  In the postwar era, Los Angeles entered a second 
major phase of suburbanization and increased, and more rigid housing segregation, but this time 
it was not only facilitated by realtors and developers but also by federal government lending 
practices.  The city’s diverse but racially segregated population provided the background for and 
challenges to the debate over desegregating Los Angeles’ public schools. 
 Several Los Angeles historians have charted Los Angeles’ urban development, residential 




work, in “Fragmented Diversity” I present a comprehensive analysis of the effects of these 
historical developments on Los Angeles’ school desegregation case.18  Residential segregation 
had the effect of reinforcing racial and cultural pride in L.A.’s communities, particularly 
minority communities.  In “Fragmented Diversity,” I demonstrate that racial and cultural pride, 
exemplified by the student demonstrations of 1968, transformed the integration debate to include 
bilingual/bicultural education and compensatory education, and that the student demonstrations 
and the integration case in turn exposed internal political divisions and generated debates within 
minority communities over the meaning of equal educational opportunity, racial and ethnic 
identity, and cultural pride.  I build upon the work of historians who have studied segments of 
Los Angeles’ diverse populations, trace the divergent historical paths of different racial and 
ethnic groups, locate spaces of cross-racial collaboration, and document racial conflict.19  A few 
historians have discussed school integration and included Crawford in their work about Los 
Angeles, but Crawford was not central in their studies.20  In my work, I analyze Crawford from 
its humble beginnings, traced the case’s tumultuous history up and down the California court 
system, and concluded by scrutinizing the case’s complicated conclusion after United States 
Supreme Court intervention. 
African American Angelenos 
 Before World War Two, African Americans who had migrated to Los Angeles enjoyed 
relative autonomy in comparison to their Southern counterparts who dealt with Jim Crow laws.  
African Americans in Los Angeles freely associated with members of other racial and ethnic 
groups.  African Americans also lived in close-knit bourgeoning communities near or 
overlapping with other racial and ethnic communities and had access to housing opportunities 
that “were far less confined before the 1920s,” according to historian Scott Kurashige.21  But by 
the late 1910s and 1920s, historian Josh Sides explained, “a web of racially restrictive housing 
covenants” was ensuring the “hardening racial segregation” of the city.22 
 During World War Two, many African Americans migrated west, and into the Los 
Angeles metropolitan region in particular, to fill the needs of wartime production.23  African 
Americans endured increasingly scarce housing opportunities and higher population density in 
segregated neighborhoods.  During postwar suburbanization, and with new access to physical 




financing, whites moved to the suburbs away from the city center in every direction and pursued 
job opportunities that, by this time, were also moving to the suburbs.  African Americans 
remained in densely populated and segregated neighborhoods in South-Central L.A., and to a 
lesser degree in Pacoima in the San Fernando Valley, and Pasadena in the San Gabriel Valley. 
W.  As war production subsided and shifted into Cold War production, African Americans 
endured increased poverty, high unemployment, inadequate public schools, and rising crime.  In 
addition to structural problems directly affecting African Americans, they faced intimidation, 
prejudice and harassment at the hands of the Los Angeles Police Department, an organization 
that figuratively and literally ensured the confinement of the African American population in 
pockets of the Los Angeles region and maintained the racial segregation of neighborhoods by 
intimidation or by force. 
 In L.A. City Limits, Josh Sides asked: “Why did the end of de jure racial inequality not 
produce de facto racial equality in urban America?”24  This question is central to my work 
because the debates and confrontations over school desegregation at LACBE headquarters and in 
the courts, and the student unrest in minority schools, represented efforts to achieve racial 
equality through educational equality.25  I show that de jure segregation did not end but instead 
underwent a transformation culminating in courts sanctioning it by judicial decree as long as de 
jure acts were not “intentional” de jure acts. 
Mexican American Identity and Culture 
 The origins of the Mexican American story in Southern California extend much earlier 
than the Mexican-American War in 1848, but for brevity this event will serve as a starting point 
for the Mexican American story in Los Angeles.  Having lost the war to the United States, and 
surrendered what is now most of the Southwest and California under the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, Mexicans and their progeny would endure second-class citizenship in the newly 
acquired American territories.  In Los Angeles, this was no exception.  Relying on their history 
and culture, Mexicans and Mexican Americans pieced together an identity that developed into a 
community that changed across time as immigration increased as a result of the need of cheap 





Although Mexican Americans were Americans by birth, this proved immaterial before 
and after World War Two.  In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Mexicans and their children 
“returned” to Mexico, either voluntarily or involuntarily, through a repatriation process that 
developed out of racism, the economic pressures of the Depression, and from invitations from 
the Mexican government.  In 1942, in what is commonly referred to as a precursor to the Zoot 
Suit Riots of 1943, the Sleepy Lagoon Murder case reaffirmed the Mexican American’s second-
class citizenship.  After authorities discovered Mexican national Juan Diaz dead, the city 
rounded up over six hundred Mexican American youths based on their color and dress.  
Subsequently, twenty-two youths were tried.  An all-white jury convicted three for first-degree 
murder, nine for second-degree murder, and five for assault.  After an appeal process of almost 
two years, Judge Clement Nye dismissed all charges for a lack of evidence. 
 In 1943, the Zoot Suit Riots erupted highlighting anti-Mexican, and by extension anti-
Mexican American sentiment in the city.  White sailors from the Chavez Ravine Naval Base 
targeted and Mexican American youths dressed in the zoot suit, a popular dress inspired by 
musician Cab Calloway.  White sailors and Mexican American youth fought each other in the 
streets, and white marines and soldiers stationed in San Pedro joined the former “in roaming the 
streets of downtown, where they encountered, beat, and stripped Mexican American youths 
while police looked on.”26 
 After World War Two, East L.A. became overwhelmingly Mexican American, as whites 
across ethnicities moved out in all directions, particularly north, west and south.  The 
marginalization of the Mexican American community and culture continued after the war, as 
Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants became the focus of Americanization campaigns 
aimed at assimilating them.  In addition, in 1953, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) initiated “Operation Wetback” in which the INS reportedly deported over one million 
Mexicans but made targets out of anyone matching the targeted skin color.  In postwar Los 
Angeles, race and culture defined segregated spaces, and it is within this context that the ACLU 
filed Crawford in 1963. 
 In 1968, Mexican American high school students from East L.A. protested at several East 
L.A. schools clamoring for recognition of their culture and history, and in the process 
transformed the integration debate and Crawford, and challenged mainstream society.  This 




of Mexican American identity through other historical, cultural, and legal processes.28  In 
Chapter Two of my dissertation, I tease out a tension in the Mexican American community in 
Los Angeles defined by the confluence of Mexican history and culture and American citizenship.  
In 1968, Mexican American students in East L.A. asserted their American citizenship by 
challenging second-class education in their racially isolated minority neighborhoods by 
reclaiming their Mexican history and culture.  Crawford also provides an important case in 
which two distinct, legally recognized groups – African Americans and Mexican Americans – at 
first could not agree to file a class-action lawsuit together but jointly re-filed the class-action 
lawsuit at a later stage in the Los Angeles school desegregation case due to their common 
concerns and goals. 
Cross-Racial Coalition Building 
 Historians have grappled with cross-racial grassroots mobilization, and whether these 
collaborations were fleeting, failed to materialize, or created long-term political alliances and 
social change.29  My work represents a departure from adversarial Black-white-Brown racial 
politics, one the one hand, and the notion of long-lasting cross-racial coalitions, on the other.  I 
also dispute the notion that African Americans and Mexican Americans charted their historical 
paths independently from each other, and in the process missed opportunities to improve their lot 
when one group or both shunned cross-racial political alliances. 
 The school desegregation debate evoked disparate responses from the city’s largest racial 
groups, and exposed conflicting ideas about what constituted equal educational opportunity 
within these groups and their communities.  Although Crawford began as a quest to desegregate 
two extremely segregated schools, the desegregation case exposed adversarial claims of what 
comprised equal educational opportunity among African Americans, Chicanos, and whites.  
Moreover, as the case proceeded through the courts, it bared political factions within the African 
American, Chicano/Latino, white, and Jewish communities that changed across time.  In the 
African American community, for example, these factions did not spring up unexpectedly but 
were part of an internal struggle between middle-class African American liberals who espoused 
collaboration with whites, and working-class conservative African Americans who largely 




 In the late 1960s, many Mexican Americans in Los Angeles endorsed bilingual/bicultural 
and compensatory education programs.  However, Mexican American students joined African 
American students in the school desegregation lawsuit in 1966.  Additionally, the East L.A. 
student demonstrations of 1968 exposed deep political tensions within the East L.A. community 
among three groups: 1) vocal students and community activists who advocated for community 
input, and bilingual/bicultural and compensatory education; 2) students, parents and teachers 
opposed to the vociferous demonstrations but backing their goals; and 3) parents who began 
contemplating in earnest having their children bused to schools outside their neighborhood.  
Whites from throughout the city overwhelmingly voiced their contempt for the both the African 
American and Mexican American student demonstrations that took place in 1968, and 
erroneously fused the demonstrations with calls for school desegregation. 
 It was not until late in Crawford that Mexican American lawyers joined the ACLU and 
NAACP as co-counsels.  In Los Angeles, integration evoked a diverse and fragmented response 
from the Mexican American community, with the community never formally declaring its 
opposition to integration in the courts.  At the same time, by the late 1970s, a new wave of 
immigrants too voiced their concerns about integration and busing, and allied themselves for or 
against the busing issue in nuanced and unpredictable ways. 
Shifts in American Political Culture 
 The Los Angeles’ school desegregation case lasted almost two decades, from the 1963 
until 1982, with most of the legal wrangling occurring in the late 1970s.  It is imperative to 
understand Crawford within broader historical, political, social, and cultural shifts.31  It is within 
this shift, a response to the 1960s political turmoil and racial upheaval, that Crawford openly 
exposed the city’s racial politics.  The United States Supreme Court grappled with issues of 
school integration and mandatory busing in the seventies in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education (1971), and extended its desegregation ruling beyond the South into northern school 
districts in Keyes v. Denver School District #1 (1974), only to backtrack and begin setting limits 
on desegregation strategies by holding unconstitutional city-suburb busing plans in Detroit’s 
desegregation case, Milliken v. Bradley (1974).32  In the seventies, the national rightward 
political and cultural shift affected Crawford, detectable by tangible conservative political shifts 




 My dissertation ends in the early 1980s, an era defined by historians as the triumph on the 
national stage of white, Christian conservatism exemplified by the election of Ronald Reagan, 
and the continued economic downward spiral of cities, particularly in the Rustbelt.  In Los 
Angeles, however, minority communities undermined this national political trend and narrative 
by challenging the urban crisis.  Moreover, during Crawford Los Angeles underwent dramatic 
demographic changes and the city’s multiracial and multiethnic population transformed the 
desegregation case.  By the early 1980s, as immigration from Mexico, Central America, and 
Southeast Asia had increased, the desegregation case highlighted a paradox: the Los Angeles 
schools had become highly segregated within one of the most racially and ethnically diverse 
districts in the country.  Educational and residential segregation existed alongside diversity.  
Although not in par politically with middle-class Valleyites, many who were white, and other 
suburban communities in Southern California, minority communities in Los Angeles had 
managed to carve out concessions by the end of the long integration fight.  The city’s diverse 
populations and neighborhoods, including South-Central L.A., East L.A. and the San Fernando 
Valley, each had influenced the final integration order in tangible and important ways. 
Chapter Outline 
 In chapter one, I argue that civil rights organizations filed a class-auction lawsuit to 
desegregate two racially segregated schools to improve the educational opportunities for African 
American students, and to challenge LACBE’s colorblind ideology that undergirded separate 
and unequal schools in the Los Angeles City School District along race.  Civil rights 
organizations invited but failed to entice Mexican Americans to join African Americans in the 
lawsuit because Mexican Americans believed that their educational needs and concerns were 
dissimilar, largely due to their cultural differences and distinct historical experiences. 
 In chapter two, I propose that the separate African American and Mexican American 
student protests of 1968 and their aftermath illustrated an internal political struggle within the 
two communities over the meaning of their respective racial and ethnic identities and what their 
identifies meant in relation to educational equality.  More broadly, the student demonstrations 
irreversibly transformed the integration debate from a debate about implementing racial 
integration or compensatory education to one about concurrently addressing integration, 




desegregation and the curriculum changes the students sought largely would not affect 
curriculum in segregated, white neighborhood schools.  However, many white Angelenos 
chastised both African American and Mexican American students for challenging authority and 
seeking culture-based education.  The student demonstrations also revealed deep political 
divisions among three groups in the East L.A. community regarding education and the 
demonstrations.33  One group consisted of vocal students and “radical” grassroots organizers 
behind the demonstrations; another group included politically conservative students, parents, and 
teachers who preferred the status quo, opposed the student uprising, but backed several student 
demands; and a third group emerged comprised of Mexican American parents who, following in 
the footsteps of students of “Mexican descent” who joined the desegregation lawsuit in 1966,34 
began contemplating busing as a means of improving their children’s education, irrespective of 
whether busing accomplished school desegregation. 
In 1968, the ACLU amended the case to mandate district-wide school desegregation, 
instead of seeking to desegregate Jordan and South Gate High Schools only or only a small 
number of schools.  In chapter three, I argue that by calling for district-wide integration, civil 
rights attorneys sought to challenge racial segregation in the schools and in housing, and the 
structural mechanisms maintaining them, by trying to bring together students from the inner city 
with students from the suburbs therefore transgressing spaces defined and demarcated by race.  
In chapter four, I contend that groups partaking in Crawford, plus outside official and 
community groups, introduced their perspectives about integration seeking to influence LACBE 
and the courts, broadening the number of potential integration strategies, and in the process 
blurring the distinction between the city’s racial politics and an independent judiciary.  In chapter 
five, I contend that the intrinsic complexity of the Crawford case combined with a changing 
LACBE membership, the inclusion of intervenors, and the increasing demands and needs of a 
highly diverse student population and Los Angeles community, undermined and delayed 
integration efforts in Crawford at a pivotal juncture when expedience was essential. 
 In chapter six, I recount why Judge Paul Egly rejected an initial part-time integration 
program, but allowed LACBE to begin implementing a subsequent full-time, hybrid plan with an 
initial voluntary phase and a mandatory backup phase.  In this chapter I argue that LACBE’s 
integration plans would maintain many racially isolated minority schools segregated, placed the 




students.  In chapter seven, I make the claim that educational problems in minority communities, 
such as overcrowding, combined with the anti-busers’ takeover of LACBE and the enactment of 
an anti-busing California proposition in accordance with strict federal standards normalized 
segregation in Los Angeles schools.  Educational problems, including overcrowding, 
undermined minority community support for integration because they forced them to focus their 
attention on more immediate concerns.  The United States Supreme Court found the anti-busing 
proposition that all but outlawed mandatory busing constitutional by requiring petitioners not 
only to demonstrate de jure school segregation but also to prove that de jure school segregation 
resulted from intentional acts.  In the conclusion, I detail the United Supreme Court’s decision on 
California anti-busing Proposition 1 that largely marked the end of Crawford.  I also bring the 
stories of Crawford and its main historical personalities to a close.  At the end of the class-action 
lawsuit to integrate, integrationists and anti-busers believed that there were no winners in the 
protracted legal fight.  Anti-busers believed that they had won a Pyrrhic victory.  Fervent 
integrationists were disappointed and believed they had failed minority students.  In spite of the 
disappointment within the adversarial legal camps in Crawford and the final integration plan’s 
shortcomings approved by the Superior Court, the final, all-voluntary integration plan 
represented a precarious example of racial compromise in which the city’s largest racial and 
ethnic groups all influenced the plan’s framework in important and concrete ways. 
                                                 
1 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Jewish Congress 
(AJC) supported the ACLU’s efforts. 
2 The student demonstrations had clearly defined goals.  African American students from South-Central L.A. 
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4 Los Angeles Times, 25 November 1964. 
5 After Brown vs. Board of Education declared separate but equal schools unconstitutional in 1954, civil rights 
organizations throughout the country filed class-action lawsuits against local school boards demanding they comply 
with Brown.  Northern city residents and school boards believed that school segregation was a Southern problem 
and challenged desegregation mandates using different strategies, ranging from legal efforts to rioting.  For analyses 
of school segregation outside the South, see Davison M. Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle over Northern 
School Desegregation, 1865-1954, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005); J. Anthony Lukas, 
Common Ground: A Turbulent Decade in the Lives of Three American Families (New York: Vintage Books, 1985); 
Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars, New York City, 1805-1973: A History of the Public Schools as Battlefield of 
Social Change (New York: Basic Books, 1974); and Gary Orfield, Must We Bus?: Segregation and National Policy 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978).  For a study of African American political mobilization and civil rights 




                                                 
City (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).  For an analysis of the defeat of Jim Crow school 
segregation, see Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics In the Sunbelt South (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006).  For an examination of civil rights in Atlanta and the concept of “pragmatic civil 
rights,” see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the Long History of the Civil Rights Movement 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).  For an in-depth study of Detroit’s school desegregation case, see Joyce 
A. Baugh, The Detroit School Busing Case: Milliken v. Bradley and the Controversy over Desegregation 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011).  For a recent analysis of school desegregation in Baltimore, see 
Howell S. Baum, Brown in Baltimore:  School Desegregation and the Limits of Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2010).  For an examination of the Detroit public school system’s transformation from an 
exemplary system to a troubled urban district, and school desegregation and busing controversies, see Jeffrey Mirel, 
The Rise and Fall of an Urban School System: Detroit, 1907-81 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992). 
For a broad overview of American urban education politics from the 1980s to 1940, and beyond, see David B. 
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Chapter 1: Challenging Boundaries and Competing Discourses: The Origins of Mary Crawford 
v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, School Segregation, and the Civil Rights Movement in 
Los Angeles 
 
 In 1961 LaRee Caughey, from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), investigated 
a corporal punishment case in which a school administrator struck an African American thirteen-
year-old girl from Edison Junior High School, a predominantly African American school, with a 
wooden paddle because she had worn a skirt that did not cover her knees.  According to the Los 
Angeles Times, in retaliation, the girl “slapped a vice principal.”1  The girl’s mother asked the 
ACLU to investigate, and Caughey, the recently appointed ACLU Education Chairwoman, 
explored whether school administrators enforced corporal punishment equitably in minority 
schools and white schools. About her first visit to a “ghetto school,” LaRee Caughey remarked, 
“We began to look around and we began to realize that we did have segregated schools” in Los 
Angeles.2  This corporal punishment case led the ACLU to investigate the broader issue of 
school segregation in the Los Angeles City School District. 
After two years of LACBE inaction on school segregation, in August 1963, civil rights 
lawyers filed Mary Crawford v. Los Angeles City Board of Education (from now on Crawford), 
a class-action lawsuit on behalf of Mary Crawford and Inita Watkins, two African American 
high school students from Watts, demanding an end to de facto segregation and claiming the 
school board had knowingly and systematically established and maintained segregated schools.3  
As part of their strategy, civil rights lawyers sought to desegregate two neighboring high schools, 
David Starr Jordan High School, overwhelmingly attended by African American students and 
located in Watts, and South Gate High School, overwhelmingly attended by white, working-class 
students.  Civil rights lawyers opted to rely on a black-white racial binary model that dominated 
the civil rights movement in the South, East, and Midwest, as well as school desegregation cases 
throughout the country.  Subsequently, members of the Mexican American community declined 




from those of African Americans.  Mexican Americans wanted to pursue educational policy 
changes on their own terms.  Although Crawford began as an effort to desegregate two hyper-
segregated high schools, one black and one white, I argue that Crawford exposed and challenged 
broader racial and class hierarchies present in an increasingly racially and ethnically diverse but 
segregated city. 
 In this chapter, I chronicled the origins of Crawford, a case that lasted from 1963 to the 
early 1980s.  I explored the demographic changes in Los Angeles that transformed the city 
before, during, and after World War Two, with a particular emphasis of the changes in the 
student body of the district from the early 1960s to the late 1970s (see Chart 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 
and 1.5).  I also analyzed the unequal education opportunities of minority students, and the 
development of the city’s racially segregated schools and neighborhoods.  Long before 
Crawford, LACBE members listened to the concerns of many citizen and civil rights 
organizations, but failed to undertake immediate and unambiguous steps to end school 
segregation on a large scale, forcing established civil rights organizations to file the lawsuit in 
1963 and grassroots civil rights organizations to protests in the streets of Los Angeles and at 
LACBE headquarters.  
 
 
Chart 1.1.  Student Enrollment by Race and Ethnicity, and Percentage of Combined Minority and Caucasian 
Students Per Year in the Los Angeles Unified School District, 1966-1979.  In the early 1960s, LACBE did not 
conduct racial and ethnic student surveys claiming it operated under the idea of colorblindness.  By the late 1960s, 
student surveys were public and played an important role demonstrating segregation in the district and documenting 






Chart 1.2.  Student Enrollment by Race and Ethnicity, and Percentage of Combined Minority and Caucasian 
Students Per Year in the Los Angeles Unified School District, 1966-1979 (graph).  Source: Paul Egly, “Unfulfilled,” 
University of La Verne Law Review 31, no. 2 (2010): 268. 
 
Chart 1.3.  Racial/Ethnic Census – Los Angeles County, 1970-1990.  Source: State of California, Department of 
Finance, Demographic Research Unit, Revised Race/Ethnic Population Estimates: Components of Change for 
California Counties, July 1970 – July 1990.  According to the Social Explorer and U.S. Census, the population in 
Los Angeles County in 1960 was: 88.6% white, 10.5% Black, 0.3% Indian, 0.3% Japanese, 0.1% Chinese, 0.1% 
Filipino, and 0.1% “Other Races.”  They included Chicanos and Latinos under the white category.  Source: Social 





Chart 1.4.  Racial/Ethnic Census – Los Angeles County, 1970-1990 (by percentage).  Source: State of California, 
Department of Finance, Demographic Research Unit, Revised Race/Ethnic Population Estimates: Components of 
Change for California Counties, July 1970 – July 1990. 
 
 Official civil rights groups and grassroots organizations engaged in parallel, though 
uneven, struggles against school segregation that challenged the city’s racial, ethnic, and class 
hierarchy and the authority of LACBE, a bureaucratic entity that represented and defended this 
hierarchy.  In 1963, the all-white LACBE included two women and five men, voted into office 
by Los Angeles voters in districtwide elections (see Figure 1.1A and 1.1B).4  Civil rights 
organizations believed that equal education could best be achieved through racial desegregation, 
whereas LACBE members, basing their ideas on a colorblind ideology, believed that it could 
improve education for all students regardless of race and without desegregation, focusing instead 
on compensatory education in minority schools. 
 I also contended that the school desegregation issue divided Los Angeles’ minority 
communities.  The African American community debated whether desegregation or 
compensatory education would improve education in their community.  Mexican American 
community leaders rejected an invitation to participate in Crawford because they believed that 




their community.  Whites from across social classes overwhelmingly opposed school 
desegregation.  The Mexican American community’s rejection of Crawford had the effect of 
framing the early stages of the lawsuit along a black/white racial binary within a highly diverse 
but segregated city.  
 
 
Figure 1.1.A.  List of LACBE Members’ Tenure.  Every two years, Los Angeles voters elect board members to 
serve four-year terms.  Source: Board Secretariat, Los Angeles Unified School District, Los Angeles, California. 
 
 For years, many problems marred Los Angeles’ public schools, including segregation, 






Figure 1.1.B.  List of LACBE Members’ Tenure.  Source: Board Secretariat, Los Angeles Unified School District, 





American and Mexican American teachers, and a lack of guidance and counseling for minority 
students.  Although the Brown vs. Board of Education United States Supreme Court decision 
outlawed separate but equal facilities, enforcement at the local level was uneven according to 
region.  Thus, efforts to end racial segregation in public schools rested on the local civil rights 
and grassroots organizations willing to invest time (sometimes years, sometimes decades) and 
money and local government agencies. After the significant 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision, for example, the ACLU and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) joined local grassroots organizations to fight for school desegregation 
throughout the country.  Contrary to popular belief, the Brown decision signified not the 
conclusion in the struggle for school desegregation but a beginning to those efforts.  In Los 
Angeles, three parallel though uneven stories with a continually shifting cast of characters 
comprised the history of the desegregation debate: 1) the legal struggle in the courts between 
LACBE and civil rights organizations pressing for desegregation, later formally joined by anti-
integrationists and anti-busers; 2) the political struggle at LACBE headquarters, and 2) the 
grassroots story with civil rights and community groups demonstrating at LACBE headquarters 
and in the streets.  School segregation and educational inequality and other important issues 
including housing and equal employment opportunities all coalesced in the volatile integration 
debate of Los Angeles from the 1960s to the early 1980s. 
Although Crawford began as an effort to integrate two adjacent segregated neighborhood 
schools, the story becomes exceedingly more complex as the city developed into a more diverse 
and more racially segregated metropolis at the end of the twentieth century (see Map 1.1 and 
1.2). The desegregation debate in Los Angeles began much earlier than the filing of Crawford in 
1963, and was intimately tied to the development of patterns of residential segregation.  Watts 
and East L.A. developed into two highly racially isolated minority neighborhoods based on 
intricate and multilayered processes rooted in racial discrimination by private enterprise, federal 
lending practices, and individual choices, and out-migration from the city proper by whites from 
various national backgrounds during and after World War Two.  For example, South Gate 
developed into a white working-class community after it originated as a haven for non-minority 
migrants from different parts of the country. 
 Early in the first half of the twentieth century, Los Angeles was home to some integrated 




neighborhoods’ racial and ethnic diversity.5  This reality stood in stark contrast with what Eric 
Avila called the “set of racialized fantasies that depicted the region as a southwestern outpost of 
white supremacy.”6  He explained, “Local boosters ensured that their version of the city myth 
appealed to whites only and acknowledged the presence of nonwhite peoples only to the extent 
of their capacity to provide cheap but invisible labor.”7  During the Great Depression, many 
white Southerners migrated west, hoping to start anew while bringing their racial attitudes from 
the South.  Previously diverse neighborhoods gave way to increasingly racially segregated 
communities.  During World War Two, job opportunities in war production in Southern 
California enticed Black Southerners to migrate and settle in already segregated African 
American neighborhoods in south and central Los Angeles.8  However, the racial tension in Los 
Angeles did not result simply from southern Black and white migration.  During the first half of 
the twentieth century, though the overall population of Los Angeles increasingly became diverse, 
many communities became highly segregated along race and class, which in turn developed into 




Map 1.1.  Metropolitan Los Angeles.  The map depicts the vast Los Angeles County and surrounding counties.  





 Before World War Two, Watts was a very diverse community, but transformed into a 
hyper-segregated African American neighborhood during and after the war.  Eric Avila wrote 
that before World War Two, Watts “witnessed a diverse concentration of native Angelenos and 
newcomers to the region.  As of 1920, most Watts settlers were of European descent—Germans, 
Scots, Greeks, Italians, and Jews—but the town also included several blacks and Japanese.”9  In 
addition, Mexican railroad workers established a colonia, known as “Spanish Camp,” in Watts.10  
In the mid to late 1940s, the South-Central area of Los Angeles had already become a haven for 
African Americans who had moved West in search of better opportunities and away from the Jim 
Crow South, with many African American settling in Watts, a neighborhood adjacent to the 
white working-class industrial suburb of South Gate. 
 
 
Map 1.2.  City of Los Angeles and Incorporated Cities.  Source: Becky Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven, 15. 
 
 Early in the twentieth century, the Los Angeles Eastside community, commonly known 
as East L.A., closely mirrored Watts’ diverse populations, but developed into a racially 
segregated area after World War Two.  Although historically the neighborhood population had 
been extremely diverse, and had included Mexican Americans, Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, 




American after World War Two, proud of its cultural heritage and history after overcoming 
repatriation and deportation campaigns of the 1930s.12 
 During and after World War Two, many whites chose to move out of the city proper and 
into the suburbs, enticed by employment and housing opportunities available elsewhere and 
exclusively to whites.13  However, employment and housing opportunities often did not occur 
independently.14  In Los Angeles, during and after the war, suburbs developed around the 
aviation industry whose board members, working closely with developers, requested developing 
racially homogeneous white communities.15  Consequently, whites enjoyed economic and 
housing opportunities and privileges unavailable to African Americans and Mexican Americans 
because of their race.  As racial exclusion from housing and employment during the 1940s and 
1950s outside the city center continued, this translated to sections of the city proper becoming 
more racially and ethnically homogeneous and segregated from white communities.  In the 
postwar era, even though some African Americans successfully gained middle-class status and 
“fled” the inner city, they encountered entrenched racism and discrimination as much as poor 
African Americans.16 
Origins of the Struggle to Desegregate Los Angeles Schools 
As early as the mid 1920s, everyday people and community and civil rights organizations 
raised the issues of school segregation and racial discrimination against minority students and 
teachers before LACBE.17  Little-known organizations such as the Southwest Chamber of 
Commerce (SCC), the Home Protective League (HPL), and the League of Struggle for Negro 
Rights (LSNR) raised these issues as early as the 1920s and 1930s.18  In 1934, the LSNR levied 
several charges of racial discrimination against the board and submitted a petition with 600 
signatures from community members backing the hiring of African American teachers.19  
Emphasizing their statuses as citizens and taxpayers, the petitioners protested “the policy and 
practice of the Board of Education in the refusal to employ Negro school teachers in the 
secondary schools in Los Angeles.”20 The group also blamed the school district for the lack of an 
African American presence in school faculties, and the poor counseling of black students by 
white counselors at all schools.  Furthermore, the LSNR detailed how African American girls at 
Thomas Jefferson High School, then with an integrated enrollment, were segregated from their 




In 1934 and 1939, LACBE adopted a non-discriminatory policy in employment and a 
non-discriminatory policy for students respectively.22  Two largely unknown organizations, the 
Special Citizens Committee (SCC) and the United Democratic Club (UDC), urged the board of 
education to appoint the first “Negro” counselor at Jefferson High School in 1937.23  In 1939, the 
Personnel Division of the Los Angeles City School District submitted a study documenting the 
disproportionately low number of African American teachers in the district to the 
superintendent.24  In the early 1940s, the community surrounding Thomas Jefferson High School 
established the Citizens Committee on Schools (CCS); its members clamored for fifteen African 
American teachers, two African American counselors, and an African American principal.  They 
also asked for a halt to discrimination in hiring against African American applicants for teaching 
positions.25 The National Defense for Negroes (NDN) demanded fair hiring practices of African 
American teachers also in the early 1940s.26  However, in 1940, the Office of the Superintendent 
developed a manual for Americanization efforts in the district, often deemphasizing racial 
difference and strife but emphasizing democratic ideals, order, and obedience.27 
Ethnic organizations joined protesting against discrimination in the school district.  In 
1941, Ramon Welch, from the Spanish Speaking People’s Congress (SSPC), claimed that 
Spanish-speaking students and teachers endured discrimination in the public schools.28  In 1946, 
the Los Angeles Jewish Youth Conference (JYC/LA), under the sponsorship of the Jewish Youth 
Council (JYC), adopted a resolution urging LACBE to “eliminate segregation of young people 
on the basis of race or national origin” and “eliminate discriminatory references in school 
books.”29 In 1950, the Los Angeles City School District embarked in a human relations campaign 
with a wide focus ranging from the home, the family, and the classroom to rest of the world.30 
 By mid-century, debates about the relationship between race and education led to 
questions about record keeping and statistics on race.  LACBE defended its colorblind teacher 
hiring practices in response to requests from the NAACP to furnish proof that the board hired 
African American teachers.  The board could not furnish proof, and claimed: 
 It is the policy of the Board … to employ teachers on their abilities, regardless of 
race.  Since we have no policy of race distinction, we keep no records on the racial 
backgrounds of our employees.  We cannot tell … how many teachers there are of any 





Many white Angelenos disputed questions about minority hiring in the district.  They asked the 
board to hire teachers based on their “merits” and “qualifications,” “regardless of color, race, or 
creed.”  The colorblind, meritocratic argument veiled its effects: white privilege in hiring, and 
opposition to minority hiring.32  Edward D. Warren, President of the Los Angeles, NAACP, 
employed colorblind language in support of minority hiring, against racial discrimination, and 
white privilege in hiring.33 
Desegregation vs. Equal Educational Opportunity 
Leading civil rights organizations pleaded with LACBE to reach amicable solutions on 
several civil rights issues related to education before Crawford.  In June 1962, the ACLU’s 
Education Chairwoman LaRee Caughey made a moving plea in favor of school desegregation to 
LACBE.  “Today we are witnessing a nationwide crusade for equal rights.  The focus is on equal 
rights for Negroes and, following the lead of the Supreme Court decision of 1954, particularly 
upon equal opportunity in education,” she declared.34 She also argued that Los Angeles was a 
multiracial but segregated city in which “Negro,” “Mexican,” Oriental,” and white children 
attended segregated schools, thus emphasizing both the diversity and the extent to which 
segregation permeated the city’s diverse population.  She encapsulated what historians would 
decades later refer to as the “urban crisis.”  Though restrictive covenants were illegal, she 
declared that unemployment, a lack of access to good housing, and “isolation from other groups” 
regrettably resulted in “slums” and “ghettos.”35  Lastly, she criticized the Los Angeles in general 
and LACBE in particular for clinging to the notion of colorblindness.  In its long history, the 
school district never implemented a public racial census because it deemed it unnecessary, as it 
alleged to follow a colorblind policy of student attendance assignment based on their location of 
residence and not according to their race.  LaRee Caughey confronted the board and demanded a 
racial census to study whether minority children received equal education and document the 
degree of racial segregation in the Los Angeles City School District (LACSC). 
 Three months later, LACBE President Hardy acknowledged that civil rights efforts 
underway throughout the country extended into the arena of public education.  In response to 
LaRee Caughey, she asserted: “The Los Angeles City Board of Education is fully committed to 
the objective of equal opportunity for each student.”36  President Hardy and the rest of LACBE, 




accusation that the board had been complicit in the process, instead blaming school segregation 
on segregated housing patterns.  If the board pursued any integration efforts, it would be 
completely at its discretion, and not the decision of civil rights groups, minority parents and 
students, or judges. 
In the year before civil rights groups filed Crawford, they discussed with LACBE to end 
school segregation, to conduct student and teacher censuses, and to implement an equitable and 
unbiased teacher assignment policy.  These efforts culminated on June 7, 1962, when LACBE 
voted unanimously 7 - 0 to establish a three-member committee composed of LACBE members, 
the Ad Hoc Committee on Equal Educational Opportunities (AHC).37  Soon after, on July 1, 
1962, Mary Tinglof, then LACBE President, appointed Georgiana Hardy, Chairperson, Dr. H.C. 
Willet and Arthur F. Gardner to the AHC, with an additional eight community members making 
up the Citizen Resource Committee (CRC).38 
The creation of the AHC due to pressure from civil rights organizations elicited an 
immediate furor from anti-integrationists who unabashedly opposed integration either through 
busing white and black children or by the creation of new “arbitrary boundaries.”39  Others 
employed the powerful language of the civil rights movement to oppose desegregation.  Mrs. 
J.R. Bedsworth, of Whittier, who did not reside within the Los Angeles City School District 
boundaries, stated: “Transporting children out of their own locality in order to have a system of 
false integration seems to me to be as contrary to civil liberties as is banning a child from a 
school because of his race or creed.”40 
 Countervailing LACBE’s color-blind ideology in teacher placement, the Urban League 
(UL) presented to the AHC its own findings that demonstrated disproportionate assignments of 
“Negro” teachers to central and south areas of the city, and a disproportionate lack of their 
presence in Eastside, Westside, and San Fernando Valley schools.41  LaRee and John Caughey, 
board members of the ACLU and fervent integrationists, also expressed their concerns to the 
AHC.  As the chairperson of the AHC, Hardy disputed criticisms by proclaiming LACBE’s 
awareness of the lawsuits and the problems in minority schools.  She also wanted to convey to 
Angelenos from all walks of life that the board was being proactive in its efforts to solve those 
problems. 
Theodore Wright, from the NAACP, claimed that LACBE’s color blindness was a 




gerrymandering.42  Gerrymandering involved LACBE systematically drawing school attendance 
boundary lines in order to keep races separate.  Wright disputed the idea of a “natural boundary” 
line: “One street at a given point is not considered a natural or neighborhood boundary line, but 
because two other schools would be integrated at another point farther out on the same identical 
street, the street then becomes a natural boundary line ... of the boundary line manipulators.”43  
He alleged that “every one claims to be color blind, but in fact is extremely aware of color, as the 
boundary line system demonstrated.”44  Yet, Wright proclaimed confidence in the board and 
offered assistance.45 
 Dr. Lawrence Wilson, one of the eight CRC members of the AHC, asked Wright to 
elaborate on what he called “hot spots.”46  Wright identified Jordan High School, Jefferson High 
School, Manual Arts High School, and Marvin Avenue School, among others.  Referring to 
Jordan High School specifically, Wright stated: “Jordan has been sitting there like a powder keg 
for ten years, and I think that something should be done about that.”47  Wright also indicated that 
the conflict between African Americans and whites on the desegregation issue existed not in 
their respective racially segregated neighborhoods, but instead in “that area that might constitute 
what we call the border area between the white communities and negro communities.”48  In order 
to avoid problems at Jordan, Wright promoted desegregating Jordan High School by expanding 
Jordan’s attendance boundary westward, which would result in an increase of white students at 
Jordan. 
The Community Relations Conference of Southern California (CRCSC), another local 
civil rights organization, called on LACBE to end the cycle of school segregation.  Zane 
Meckler, the CRCSC’s Education Committee Secretary, told the AHC that school segregation 
occurred cyclically and sometimes due to in-migration.49  He also discussed ways to create and 
maintain new integrated schools.50  Meckler exposed examples of white Angelenos attempting to 
segregate themselves from African Americans, Mexican Americans, and other minorities.  For 
example, Meckler charged that the intention behind the proposed San Antonio Schools District, 
in south-east Los Angeles, “would create a sheltered white community in which the children of 
Huntington Park, Maywood, South Gate, and Bell, among others, would be beyond the pale, 
while the Negro children of the Florence and Firestone areas, right next door, would be omitted 
from such a district.”51  He also contended that two years earlier a portion of Monterey Hills 




sought to avoid exposing their children to the heterogeneous, socio-economic cultures of East 
Los Angeles.”52 
Examples of neighborhood secession as a means for self-segregation were not restricted 
to working-class whites in the south and eastern parts of Los Angeles.  Meckler accused the 
community of La Cañada of seceding from Pasadena so its white students would not have to 
attend Pasadena’s integrated John Muir High School.  In the San Fernando Valley, the new 
Sylmar High School had been constructed to handle school overcrowding at nearby San 
Fernando High School.  However, Meckler contended that the original school attendance 
boundaries for the two schools were such that Sylmar and San Fernando High Schools would 
have segregated student populations.  “In the drawing of the line which determined the southern 
boundaries,” he maintained, “we found out that the Sylmar High School…would be virtually all 
Caucasian, whereas the Pacoima section of the San Fernando Valley (which…is virtually a 
Negro ghetto) would entirely go to the San Fernando High School.”53  Community groups and 
individuals such as Meckler called these boundaries into question, and subsequently the board re-
drew the boundaries to create an “inter-racial” student body in both high schools.  Meckler 
echoed pleads from others to desegregate, asked for a student racial census, and asked LACBE to 
rethink its “color blind” ideas. 
Religious leaders and organizations, like their Southern counterparts, also offered support 
for school desegregation.  During the September 5, 1962 meeting of the AHC, Philip Glusker, a 
board member the Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation Council of Greater 
Los Angeles (JFCGLA), acknowledged racial segregation in the city schools and his full support 
to fund integration: 
In Los Angeles, I don’t suppose it would take the expenditure of any funds to recognize 
that we have here, as we have everywhere in the northern schools which are 
predominantly Negro schools, schools which are predominantly Mexican-American; in 
fact in the west part of the City, where my own children have gone to school up until 
recently, I would guess the school is about 95% Jewish.54 
 
Glusker emphasized the isolated, and segregated existence of racial groups - Blacks, Mexican 
Americans, Jews, and whites - and asked the AHC and LACBE whether they would simply 





A Possible Consensus on Desegregation 
On September 14, 1962, the NAACP, LACSD Superintendent Jack Crowther, and 
LACBE representatives appeared to have reached a consensus: they agreed that LACBE and the 
superintendent’s office did not deliberately segregate Los Angeles public schools.56  As a result, 
the NAACP announced it cancelled all scheduled picketing set for Monday, September 17 at 
Jordan High School, Freemont High School, Jefferson High School, Huntington Park High 
School, South Gate High School, Marvin Avenue Elementary School and Baldwin Hills 
Elementary School.  “For the present time,” the NAACP stated, “no further action will be taken” 
on desegregation.57  On September 15, 1962, Superintendent Crowther was “gratified” because 
the NAACP promised not to picket that Monday, the first day of school.  He commented that the 
meeting was “another example of the community good that can be accomplished when men and 
women of high purpose and goodwill … can gather around a meeting table and resolve these 
differences.”58  They all agreed on equal education and in educating students to reach their full 
potential. 
However, community desegregation efforts continued despite the tentative accord 
between the NAACP and the district.  Superintendent Crowther reported that in September 1962 
the NAACP attempted to enroll fifteen African American students at Baldwin Hills Elementary 
School, fourteen African American students at Huntington Park High School, and five African 
American students at South Gate High School, all “white schools.”59  The principals and the 
district registrar summarily rejected the transfers because they had not secured “the necessary 
[transfer] permits from the parent schools.”60  Crowther understood the rejections created the 
“impression” that the Los Angeles city schools “engaged in a program of actively segregating 
children by races,”61 yet he immediately countered this “impression”: “We in Los Angeles are 
concerned with only one thing, providing the best possible education for each child in this 
district regardless of his race, or creed, or color.”62  However, the desegregation efforts continued 
at Baldwin Hills Elementary. 
In L.A. City Limits, historian Josh Sides recounted an instance of temporary cross-racial 
desegregation efforts at Baldwin Hills Elementary, a moment of cross-racial collaboration for 
which Crowther failed to account as the parents of African American and Japanese children, 
organized by the NAACP, sent their children to enroll in Baldwin Hills Elementary.63  “When 




proved to be more than what the Baldwin Hills Elementary administration was willing to endure.  
Fifty minority students enrolled in Baldwin Hills Elementary within a week after the picketing 
began and the NAACP stopped picketing.65  This episode, however, was a fleeting, cross-racial 
victory.  For the next several months, LACBE and civil rights organizations awaited the AHC 
findings. 
Early Progress and Setbacks in the Integration Debate 
In early May 5, 1963, the AHC submitted an interim report to LACBE suggesting: 1) 
establishing a formal policy of providing equal educational opportunities to all students, 
regardless of their background; 2) human relations and compensatory educational activities; 3) 
compensatory education for low achievers; and 4) eliminating ethnic discrimination in the 
establishment of school attendance boundaries.66  Later in the month, LACBE adopted the 
interim AHC report by a vote of 5 – 2. 67  Georgiana Hardy, Arthur Gardner, Ralph Richardson, 
H.C. Willett and Mary Tinglof voted in favor, while Jewel C. Chambers and Charles Reed 
Smoot voted against it.  However, the adoption of the report did not translate to the adoption of 
the recommendations within the report. 
 School desegregation efforts enticed civil rights activists from the South to travel west in 
the hopes of improving education and civil rights.  One such individual was Marnesba Tackett.  
Tackett, the Chairwoman of the Education Committee of the NAACP-United Civil Rights 
Council (NAACP-UCRC), was born in Kansas City, Missouri in 1908.68  She became involved 
in civil rights organizing early in her life, becoming a member of the YWCA, local civil rights 
organizations, and later the NAACP.69  She often compared segregated schools in Los Angeles to 
the segregated schools of the South and her involvement in civil rights efforts, including sit-ins 
and other protest strategies there, gave credence to these powerful claims.70  Her dedication to 
school desegregation in Los Angeles began after she listened to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 
deliver a speech at the old Los Angeles Angels home, Wrigley Field, located in South-Central 
Los Angeles.71  Soon after, crediting Dr. King as the inspiration, she and others founded the 
United Civil Rights Council (UCRC).72 
The current AHC investigation into the district provided an opportunity for LACBE and 
civil rights activists to cooperate in developing ways to integrate the school system and improve 




called on LACBE to enact several policies conducive to integration including: 1) redrawing 
attendance boundaries; 2) transferring “Negro and other minority pupils” from overcrowded 
schools on “half-day” sessions to “under-enrolled schools populated predominantly by Caucasian 
children”; and 3) revising transfer and promotion procedures for teachers, counselors, and 
administrators “so that a more proportionate distribution of Negro and other minority personnel 
throughout the entire school system may be achieved, and so that qualified Negroes and other 
minority individuals may advance in professional status.”73  Some of Tackett’s demands 
coincided with some of the issues the AHC was examining at the time, so there was a real 
possibility that LACBE would consider her demands seriously. 
 The first test on whether LACBE was amenable to Tackett and other integrationists 
happened on July 18, when LACBE members engaged in one of the most vocal debates over 
two-small scale desegregation plans, while simultaneously backing compensatory education that 
included reducing class size, providing remedial instruction, and teaching English to non-
English-speaking (NES) students.74  In one plan, the school district would transport “for one full 
[school] year … 410 students between the schools of Fremont to Huntington Park, Jordan to 
South Gate, Manual Arts to Westchester, and in reverse, at the approximate cost of $200,000.”75  
In the other plan, the district would bus “75 students to and from each of the same schools, also 
for a period of one [school] year, at the cost of $40,000.”76  The small-scale plans would offer 
little desegregative relief in a district with about half million students, but the vociferous 
opposition to the plans illustrated the difficult political terrain against implementing any 
desegregation plan. 
Having attended an integrated school, board member Tinglof expressed her staunch 
support for the desegregation plans yet remarked: “I realize that it [desegregation] is not possible 
throughout the District.”77  She pointed to the limited desegregation possibilities through current 
transfers, noting that only five African American students transferred to South Gate High School 
under this plan.78  Board member Richardson expressed frustration at the AHC, LACBE and the 
Superintendent’s Office for not offering “a program which broadly and courageously attempts 
movement in the direction of affirmative integration.”79  Instead of the two integration plans, 
Richardson suggested an open enrollment program to alleviate segregation.80 
Board member Gardner opposed the limited integration plans, calling them tokenism, and 




equal educational opportunity than busing.81  Chambers supported compensatory education, but 
adamantly opposed “involuntary” busing plans.82  Chambers claimed desegregation efforts were 
“totally improper and illegal expenditure of tax money” and had “nothing to do with 
education.”83  LACBE members Willett and Smoot also opposed the limited desegregated plans 
outright.  Hardy, considered part of the liberal bloc by the Los Angeles Times, also opposed the 
desegregation plans.  Hardy stated, “I, personally, philosophically, do not believe, as Mr. 
Chambers has said, although perhaps for different reasons, in forcing young people to be 
transported out of their normal area of attendance, because I think they miss so much of their 
normal social life.”84  LACBE voted down both limited desegregation plans.85  Richardson 
presented an alternate motion calling for the AHC and the Superintendent’s Office jointly to 
develop “a specific program by which affirmative steps for the integration of our schools might 
be undertaken.”86  Richardson’s unambiguous motion further clarified which board members 
supported or opposed affirmative desegregation.  The motion lost by a 4 to 3 vote, with only 
Tinglof, Richardson, and Hardy in support.  The vote represented the LACBE majority’s 
undeniable rejection of affirmative school desegregation. 
In response to the board’s votes against the limited integration plans, Tackett led 
demonstrations against the board.87  Civil rights demonstrators marched through downtown to the 
board of education headquarters and protested during board meetings in large, sometimes 
overwhelming numbers, and launched hunger strikes.88  LACBE’s continued inaction on 
desegregation troubled Tackett, who, on July 22, criticized board members by name for their 
inability to have even the most basic understanding of the school segregation problem.89  She 
declared, “[A]s of last Thursday, Mr. Smoot and Dr. Willett didn’t know whether or not 
segregation actually existed in Los Angeles and Mr. Chambers didn’t know whether or not the 
opinion of the Supreme Court bound the city of Los Angeles to action.”90  Tackett introduced the 
possibility of court action in Los Angeles, and compared L.A. school segregation to segregation 
Southern-style.91  Tackett charged that a board’s recent 6-1 vote against transporting students for 
integration “without any substitute plan of action … tells us very clearly that Los Angeles, like 
Alabama and Mississippi invites action by a power superior to itself to make it respond to its 
obligation to provide integrated educational opportunities for its children.”92 
Roughly a week later, Tackett went before LACBE to offer examples of how LACBE 




Jefferson and Dorsey High Schools and Foshay Junior High (all in or near South-Central L.A.), 
resulting in overwhelming African American student bodies, and the shifting of white students 
from Los Angeles High School to Hamilton and Fairfax High Schools located in the L.A.’s 
Westside.  In the San Fernando Valley, she claimed the board transferred white students to 
“overcrowded” Monroe High School, while spaces were available at San Fernando High School 
“on the edge of ‘black’ Pacoima.”93  Tackett offered examples of LACBE’s complicity in school 
segregation, and at the same time she called on the board to rectify them.94 
The ACLU Files Crawford 
During the summer, while Tackett and the UCRC led demonstrations in LACBE 
headquarters and in the streets of Los Angeles, Elnora Crowder, an African American 
schoolteacher, civil rights activist, and member of Tackett’s NAACP-UCRC education 
committee, went around minority neighborhoods “like an Avon lady” searching for students to 
serve as plaintiffs against LACBE in a desegregation lawsuit.95  She found willing participants in 
Mary Crawford and Inita Watkins, two African American high school students from Jordan High 
School in Watts.  Crawford told Crowder, “I think my mother and daddy would file the suit 
against the board of education.”96  Civil rights organizations had found petitioners for the lawsuit. 
In light of LACBE’s inaction on desegregation, on August 1, 1963, the ACLU, with the 
backing of other organizations including the NAACP and the American Jewish Congress (AJC), 
filed Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education.97  In the lawsuit, civil rights lawyers charged 
that LACBE had willfully drawn and maintained racially segregated school boundaries within 
the district, and specifically Watts and South Gate.  The lawsuit was made of two component 
parts: 1) it required LACBE to “correct racial imbalance at Jordan High School” and 2) it sought 
to halt the expansion of Jordan High School to accommodate the increasing size of the African 
American student body.  Expanding Jordan High School, the ACLU charged, would reinforce 
the racial isolation of African American students in the area. 
LACBE members vehemently objected to this charge, citing natural boundaries, distance, 
and safety (due to existing railroad tracks that divided Watts and South Gate), and claiming that 
expanding Jordan would relieve overcrowding.  These rationales, however, veiled board policy 
that increased racial isolation.  As historian Josh Sides explained in L.A. City Limits, “Although 




racially mixed areas, allowing white students to attend white schools even when they lived 
farther away.”98  This policy combined with Los Angeles’ segregated housing patterns “created 
racial segregation as complete as any in the pre-Brown South.”99 
The ACLU contested the expansion by instead proposing that LACBE re-assign African 
American students from Jordan High School to South Gate High School. Simply expanding 
Jordan High that was overwhelmingly African American, the ACLU disputed, while nearby 
South Gate High School maintained a student body 97% white with spaces for additional 
students, was de facto segregation.  Five African American students, who had applied for an 
open transfer, attended South Gate out of a total of 1,800 students.  Changing the attendance 
boundary lines between Jordan and South Gate High Schools could have mitigated racial 
segregation in the two schools, but this suggestion drew a frenzied response from white working-
class parents, the mayor and the city council of South Gate.100 
LACBE and its legal representatives claimed to oppose Crawford because its remedy 
required uprooting “masses of children just because of the color of their skin.”101  LACBE 
employed the powerful language of the civil rights movement to counter pleads to desegregate 
two neighboring schools.  At the same time, LACBE’s plan to expand Jordan High School 
increased and reinforced segregation in a racially isolated minority school. 
Continued Activism against School Segregation in Los Angeles 
Civil rights demonstrations calling for school desegregation also happened soon after the 
ACLU filed the lawsuit.102  On August 8, 1963, a NAACP- and UCRC-led civil rights march 
against segregation in Los Angeles’ schools took place as planned.103  Demonstrators assembled 
and held a short rally at the First African Methodist Episcopal Church and marched through 
downtown Los Angeles.104 The marchers joined others at the LACBE headquarters to attend the 
day’s board meeting.105  Although the march proceeded without incident, the Los Angeles Times 
reported that the marchers “were preceded … by seven members of the Committee Against 
Integration and Intermarriage [CAII], carrying signs which read, ‘Civil Right for Caucasians,’ 
and ‘Save Our Neighborhood Schools.’”106  Outside the LACBE headquarters, the Los Angeles 
Times further explained, “Two Nazi pickets greeted the demonstrators at the … entrance of the 
Board of Education Building with signs reading, ‘We Can Prove the NAACP and CORE Are 




Inside the LACBE headquarters, an overflow crowd and electric atmosphere filled the 
auditorium.108  “Boos, jeers and cries of ‘smear’ resounded in the Board of Education hearing 
room … as the board defended itself against civil rights demonstrations demanding an immediate 
end to de facto segregation,” reported the Los Angeles Times.109 NAACP-UCRC Chairman Dr. 
Christopher Taylor stated, “We’ve listened to a lot of evasive talk … We’re tired of talk.  We 
want some action on de facto segregation and non-discriminatory hiring, upgrading, and 
placement of Negro personnel.”110  Tackett stated bluntly, “Some members are blind to believing 
us.  Others are playing politics [with the desegregation issue].”111  She praised Tinglof: “Those 
who claim there is no (school) segregation are wilfully [sic] blind.  But we want to make it 
known that we have one member [Tinglof] who is thinking right and acting right.”112  She singled 
out board members Chambers and Smoot as the main opponents of desegregation adding, “They 
oppose everything we ask for.”113 
National civil rights activists made their way to Los Angeles.  James Farmer, national 
director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and James Forman, executive secretary of 
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), participated in the march and then spoke 
before the board to condemn de facto segregation in Los Angeles schools.  Dr. Martin Luther 
King could not attend the march or the LACBE hearing and it remains unclear whether Roy 
Wilkins, executive secretary of the NAACP, attended the march or the meeting.114  Farmer spoke 
briefly and urged the board “to act at once toward elimination of de facto segregation.”115  
Forman followed stating, “We have suffered long.  We are determined, in our lifetime, to 
provide better things for our children.”116 
Well aware of the significance of King’s and Wilkins’ potential visit, board member 
Gardner had prepared a statement attempting to justify his voting record on school 
desegregation, and chastising the NAACP-UCRC’s efforts to end school segregation and 
discriminatory teacher hiring and transfers.  Gardner proclaimed that he had “followed with 
respect and admiration” the public careers of the two distinguished civil rights activists, “Mr. 
Wilkins in his years of advocacy and action to obtain equality for Negroes as a leader of 
NAACP, and Dr. King more recently for his program of non-violent action and Christian 
leadership in the elimination of Jim Crow philosophy.117 
Nevertheless, Gardner proceeded to offer conflicting ideas about civil rights activism.  He 




grassroots activism.  Gardner claimed, “But I am also troubled.  These respected gentlemen [Dr. 
King and Wilkins], by their presence here, lend their support to the cause of equality for 
Negroes, a cause to which I anxiously and with conviction give my allegiance.”118  “But they also 
… lend moral support to the most extreme and difficult demands made on us by local Negro 
leadership, demands which by implication give no recognition to the many other requests which 
have already been granted by this Board,” he added.119  Gardner again blamed residential patterns 
for school segregation and reiterated that LACBE had enacted policy towards ending de facto 
segregation, prejudice and racial discrimination and implemented compensatory learning 
programs in “Negro and Mexican-American areas of the District.”120 
 Gardner also addressed potential outcomes from boundary changes at Jordan High 
School.  He argued that changing attendance boundaries between Jordan and South Gate High 
Schools would lead to overcrowding at Jordan, no change at all, or more segregation at South 
Gate High School.121  He blamed the NAACP for seeking “to enjoin the needed improvements of 
facilities at Jordan until this imbalance is corrected” through Crawford.122  He also placed some 
blame on African American students at Jordan and their parents for failing to take advantage of 
transfer opportunities to South Gate High School.123  The relative quiet in the audience as 
Gardner spoke ended quickly, when Smoot began to speak.124 
 The Los Angeles Times described a sudden change in the atmosphere of the auditorium: 
Boos “multiplied during an anger-tinged speech” by Smoot.125  Emphasizing colorblindness, 
Smoot charged that the NAACP-UCRC attacked efforts to achieve “equal education,” pursued 
“reverse discrimination” policies, and opposed “the merit system in employment, opposed to our 
policy of treating all persons equally, regardless of their race or the color of their skin.”126 He 
added, “These champions of equality come here to lend their support to the demands of these 
organizations that the Negro race be given special status, special privileges, special advantages, 
over other races in this school system.”127  Smoot cited “reverse discrimination” as the crux of 
why he opposed school desegregation and race-based teacher placement.  He declared: 
While some of this type of Negro favoritism may be beneficial, it is, of course, reverse 
discrimination, and … it can be demonstrated that whenever favorable or benign 
discrimination is practiced by this Board … for a particular person or race, there is 





Smoot berated the rationale behind Crawford and found it “incredible and fantastic” that 
civil rights organizations would sue to halt the “expenditure of more than one million five 
hundred thousand dollars on Jordan High School for the purpose of providing new and 
outstanding facilities.”129  He charged that civil rights groups wanted LACBE to “gerrymander 
the school district on a racial basis.”130 
 John Caughey, a civil rights activist, educator, ACLU board member, and husband of 
LaRee Caughey, called on LACBE to “start moving and start the [superintendent’s] staff to work 
toward ending schools segregation.”131 Like Tackett, he reiterated that compensatory education 
was not synonymous with school integration.  “Without integration,” Caughey argued, 
“compensatory education is at most an effort to make separate education equal under the 1893 
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.”132  He added, “In the era of Brown v. Board of Education, 
compensatory this or that is not substitute for integration.”133 
LACBE member Richardson welcomed the desegregation lawsuit and “some exploration 
of the issues of Jordan in terms of how the administration and the Board may or may not see 
them, and in terms of how certain feelings are held by people in the audience.”134  While 
Richardson questioned whether investing and improving the campus of Jordan was a good idea, 
he acknowledged some merit in questioning the school’s attendance boundary because “with 
respect to the apparent oddity of boundary, Alameda being only a block or two to the east of 
Jordan High School, it is logical that people, such as Rabbi Lewis and those in the audience, 
would be concerned about it.”135  Gardner conceded that boundary changes might be needed to 
ameliorate racial segregation between Jordan and South Gate High Schools.136  Richardson 
submitted a motion calling for the superintendent to study school boundaries during the fall, 
which passed by a 4 to 2 vote.  The wording of the motion did not suggest that boundary changes 
would be implemented to desegregate schools but rather that any boundary changes, to be 
determined by the superintendent and subject to LACBE oversight, would be made to further 
equal educational opportunities.137 
Rumblings of Political Participation from Watts 
Members of the Watts community, the focus of Crawford, seldom participated in the 
integration debate.  However, on September 5, before the AHC formally presented its final report 




submitted a petition containing approximately 390 signatures in support of desegregation.  The 
petition partly read: 
We the undersigned, residents of Watts District encompassing the Jordan High School 
District, citizens and voters of Los Angeles, do hereby petition the Los Angeles School 
Board of Education to end all forms of segregation and defacto [sic] segregation in 
schools, specifically in the Jordan and South Gate High School Districts.138 
 
Talley reinforced her pleas by emphasizing her statuses of citizen and voter.  Her plea to 
desegregate schools was unambiguous.  For the first time, a small segment of the Watts 
community sent an unwavering message to LACBE in support of school desegregation. 
On September 5, 1963, in response to the Crawford lawsuit, Superior Court Judge Alfred 
Gitelson took an unprecedented step in the class-action desegregation case.  He signed an 
alternative writ of mandamus ordering LACBE to take affirmative steps to “correct any alleged 
racial imbalance at Jordan or show cause in Superior Court … why it has not done so.”139  The 
ACLU’s A.L. Wirin explained the writ’s significance: “This is the first writ issued in a case 
involving de facto school segregation in any northern or western state.”140  The Los Angeles 
Times surmised that the lawsuit to correct racial balance “represented a new tack taken by the 
[civil rights] organizations after they withdrew an attempt to block … the expansion of 
predominantly Negro [Jordan High School] if the board failed to correct the asserted racial 
imbalance.”141  The civil rights organizations’ next step would be to seek a “permanent and 
peremptory” writ of mandamus against the board, which would order the board to halt policies 
that created racial imbalance as well as compel the board to correct racial balance.142 
At a hearing the following day, Judge Gitelson clarified the intent of the alternative writ 
from the previous day and explained that he had made “no finding of fact” in the case but simply 
issued the writ as “a legal vehicle to bring about a hearing in the matter.”143  During the day’s 
hearing, Associate Superintendent Robert E. Kelly, substituting for Superintendent Crowther 
who was out ill, testified that “Jordan or any other school in a segregated area cannot be 
condemned on an educational basis.”144  “Preponderance of one race (at one school) is not 
harmful to school children,” he said in response to questioning by the ACLU’s A.L. Wirin.145  
However, Kelly also stated under oath that racial segregation could be “harmful to the human 
spirit,” but that no evidence existed demonstrating that “an integrated school provided 




In the fight for school desegregation at the grassroots level, CORE members voted to 
lend moral support to Jordan High School students if they decided to boycott the school when the 
fall term began.147  CORE stressed that the boycott would not be “CORE-initiated” but a show of 
support for Jordan students.148  CORE also announced its plans for a “massive” student march on 
September 19 that would begin at Wrigley Field and conclude at LACBE headquarters, as well 
as plans to engage in sit-ins at LACBE headquarters.149  At a board meeting that week, CORE’s 
Kenneth B. Fry presented ten demands to LACBE including “to end the evils of segregated 
schooling.”150  LACBE President Hardy asked Fry to present the demands after the AHC 
submitted its final report.151  In addition to CORE presence, Watts residents submitted another 
petition with 200 signatures asking the board to end school segregation.152 
The Second and Last Ad Hoc Committee Report 
Earlier efforts by civil rights organizations and leading integrationists such as LaRee and 
John Caughey the previous year had culminated in the creation of the AHC in June 1962.  
However, more than a year later, the committee had not proposed tangible plans to end school 
segregation or issued a conclusive report evaluating how to achieve equal educational 
opportunities for all students.  On August 29, the district staff under the guidance of 
Superintendent Crowther announced it would submit the long-awaited AHC report on September 
12, which was “expected to generate controversy” according to the Los Angeles Times.153  
Subsequently, LACBE would have two weeks to study the proposals.154  Afterwards, President 
Hardy promised that “the board will vote on the report, including proposed boundary changes.”155  
She added that recommendations to adjust high school attendance boundaries in the San 
Fernando Valley and West Los Angeles were forthcoming and that such recommendations would 
be effective in February 1964.156 
On September 12, 1963, the AHC released its final report.  The AHC found de facto 
segregation in the district but absolved LACBE from one of the most damning accusations: 
district gerrymandering.157  The official finding released LACBE from being complicit in school 
segregation.158  The ambivalence within and restrained tone of the report frustrated everyone.159  
It offered no concrete plans for integration and boundary changes, and did not propose busing, 
which frustrated African Americans and civil rights organizations.160  It called for further study of 




better publicity of the voluntary transfer program,” which frustrated opponents of desegregation 
and mandatory reassignment of students.161  
 The AHC report contained only four recommendations, which LACBE had no obligation 
to adopt.  The AHC recommended adopting a statement that established a “formal policy of 
providing equal educational opportunity for all pupils regardless of racial or socio-economic 
background, recognizing that equal opportunity is best achieved in schools which provided 
pupils an opportunity for interaction with persons of differing cultures and ethnic 
backgrounds.”162  The other recommendations included: creating a position concerned with 
“human relations” and “compensatory educational activities”163; expanding “intensified programs 
of compensatory education” in schools with “large numbers of low achievers because of 
differing socio-economic or cultural backgrounds”164; and implementing the rules of the State 
Board of Education regarding the “elimination of ethnic discrimination in establishment of 
school attendance areas.”165  The AHC found some validity in reports of counselors having “a 
tendency” to “give up” on students from disadvantaged areas.  The AHC recommended that 
teachers evaluate students by their performance in “individual tests, performance tests, teacher 
observations, marks and other criteria,” and not to rely solely on I.Q. testing.166 
Tackett and the NAACP Respond to AHC Report 
Later in September, community and civil rights groups’ representatives and twenty-six 
more “citizens” and “tax payers” spoke before LACBE.  A spirited Tackett asked the board to 
eliminate de facto segregation,167 this time by referencing the rationale behind Jackson v. 
Pasadena decision, in which the California Supreme Court ruled that school boards should seek 
to eliminate segregation “regardless of its cause.”168  In addition, she asserted, “The California 
State Board of Education has ordered school boards to overcome segregation caused by 
segregated housing wherever feasible.”169  Tackett then condemned LACBE for trying to 
relinquish the responsibility of desegregating schools to “business men, industry, the press, radio, 
TV, labor, anybody but the board of education” and for abdicating their “throne of leadership.”170  
She derided the notion of “choice” in education and claimed, “Education in these United States is 
not a matter of ‘choice.’  Children must attend school until age 16.  They must go where they are 
assigned, unless given special permission to do otherwise.”171  Tackett offered a scathing critique 




facto segregation from the Los Angeles school system,” she contended, “puts mildly our 
shattered hopes, misplaced confidence and deep disappointment in the accomplishments of this 
committee.”172 
 The NAACP charged that the AHC sometimes demonstrated a complete lack of 
understanding of an issue, and ignored any input from independent professionals, civil rights 
organizations and minority communities, but instead relied mainly on the official information 
and findings by school district personnel.173  Nira Hardon, representing the NAACP, L.A. 
Branch, criticized the limitations and deficiencies within the AHC report, in particular its failure 
to refer to Jackson, which called for every school board in the state “to achieve integration by 
positive action even where existing de facto segregation has not been the result of deliberate 
gerrymandering.”174  She and the NAACP also criticized the AHC report for not clarifying 
whether Brown v. Board of Education applied to Los Angeles.175  Hardon and the NAACP 
disapproved of the AHC’s lack of direction on policy matters within its recommendations, as it 
tended to refer numerous matters, such as boundary changes, for further study.  One particular 
idea in the report frustrated the NAACP: that “the committee makes the point that pupil 
movements should be voluntary rather than administrative.”176  This idea was critical because the 
AHC essentially recommended the board and the district to refrain from transferring students for 
desegregation purposes, and leaving attendance changes for desegregation at the discretion of 
parents in the district.  Against this background, LACBE voted to postpone voting to adopt the 
final AHC report by a 5-1 vote until the next regular meeting in early October 1963.177  Eason 
Monroe, ACLU representative and legal counsel, supported this delay “until all responsible 
appraisals of the report have been heard or received by the board.”178 
CORE Demonstrations in Support of Desegregation 
 CORE participated in several demonstrations in the fall of 1963 in an appeal to 
desegregate schools, and prepared by circulating flyers in L.A. schools, and at local colleges and 
universities, including Los Angeles State College (today’s California State University, Los 
Angeles) and University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA).179  For example, CORE staged a 
“sit-in fast” on Friday September 13, 1963 at LACBE headquarters.  In one of its flyers, CORE 
explained that the protesters “had given up food until the Board agrees to desegregate school in 




documenting the experiences of a group of seven CORE members who suffered the serious 
physical effects of fasting. The group’s leader, writer, novelist, playwright, and motion picture 
writer Martin M. Goldsmith, 49, stated: “Our eyes are getting very blurred … our vision is going 
… We’re all pretty wear and dizzy … we can’t say how much longer we can last.”181 
The relentless waves of CORE protests continued.  On a rainy September 19 day, CORE 
staged a demonstration march that began with a rally at Wrigley Field and ended at LACBE 
headquarters to protest “Alabama-style” segregation in Los Angeles.182  In a flyer circulated 
before the protest, CORE charged that LACBE was herding large numbers of “Negroes and 
Mexican-Americans into underequipped and overcrowded ‘ghetto’ schools.  Not only do these 
schools educationally cripple their students - - but by isolating America’s minority groups, such 
schools foster bigotry and intolerance!”183  In another flyer, CORE charged that LACBE was 
“disgracing this city in the nation’s eyes by maintaining a de facto segregated school system as 
ugly and as unlawful as the Jim Crow system in Birmingham, Alabama!” (see Figure 1.2).184   
After the rally at Wrigley Field, a group of about four hundred “shouting” and “singing” 
CORE members, high school and college students, and three ministers staged a five-mile march 
to LACBE headquarters where they joined five hunger strikers.185  The Los Angeles Times 
reported a large presence of high school students, declaring the march as “basically a youth 
demonstration,” with whites making up about 70% and African Americans about 30%.186  If the 
demonstration lacked a high degree of racial diversity, it did not lack geographical diversity.  
Students from several schools from throughout the city made their way to the demonstration 
even though school officials “had warned students that staying away from school to march would 
be illegal.”187 
 The demonstration did not end at the doorsteps of LACBE headquarters but continued 
when the demonstrators attended the day’s board meeting.  The Los Angeles Times described the 
pandemonium in the LACBE auditorium: “Eleven speakers, alternately cheered or booed by a 
noisy capacity crowd, addressed the  Los Angeles Board of Education … in the wake of public 
reaction to the board’s special [AHC] report on de facto segregation.”188  An ovation erupted 
from CORE members when Martin Goldsmith entered the board auditorium with the assistance 
of Fry and others to speak before the board.  He told LACBE to eliminate the “seeds of bigotry 





Figure 1.2.  CORE Pamphlet, 1963.  In 1963, CORE staged sit-ins calling on LACBE to desegregate the city’s 
schools.  CORE decried what it called a de facto segregated school system “as ugly and as unlawful as the Jim Crow 
system in Birmingham, Alabama!”  Source: Student Unrest Part I, 3/7/68 – 4/3/1968, Box 682, Student Unrest Files, 
Board Secretariat, Los Angeles Unified School District, Los Angeles, California. 
 
 He later stated that the “fast would continue indefinitely.”190  Jerry Farber, 28, Los 
Angeles State College English lecturer and the head of CORE’s education action committee told 
LACBE that “when you herd people off in a ghetto school – in a segregated school, you are 
putting them in serious trouble, and I would answer Mr. Chambers on the point that he raised.  Is 




all.”191  He referred to segregated schools in Los Angeles as a “disease” that educationally 
crippled thousands of students every year.192 CORE’s education committee chairman Kenneth 
Fry acknowledged the demonstrators and told LACBE: “[W]e still have this many people here 
demonstrating and using what they have learned in their classrooms about democracy to show 
those whom they have elected what they want.”193  Within this fiery atmosphere, neither CORE 
nor LACBE could claim impartiality and no one on either side of the debate was immune from 
criticism and condemnation.194 
South Gate 
 South Gaters, worried about the potential for redrawing attendance boundaries long 
before the AHC report, took preemptive actions to curtail such a policy.  On September 10, 1963, 
the South Gate City Council adopted a resolution protesting any attempt to change South Gate 
High School’s attendance boundaries and “to transport and exchange the students of the South 
Gate High School with those of other high schools.”195  That same month, South Gaters 
circulated two petitions objecting to school boundary changes as well.196  Floyd Wakefield, a 
resident of South Gate and chairman of the South Gate Education Committee (SGEC), submitted 
the petitions to LACBE on September 23.197  In one petition, with 12,302 signatures, South 
Gaters asked LACBE to “resist any proposed changes in the present attendance areas of our 
school district.”198  In the other petition, signed by 4,941, South Gaters declared that they would 
refuse to permit their children to “attend schools outside of their present attendance areas 
because of the hazards present in this industrial section.”199  In response to the AHC report, Don 
R. Sawyer, Mayor of South Gate, challenged the idea that providing “pupils an opportunity for 
interaction with persons of a differing cultures and ethnic backgrounds” would achieve equal 
educational opportunity, and ridiculed compensatory education as “spoon feeding” because it 
made it “unequal for the norm” and because “our Maker did not so design us to receive it 
[education] alike.”200 
A Fragmented Mexican American Community Responds to Crawford 
The Mexican American community declined the ACLU’s invitation to join the 
desegregation lawsuit, but the community’s rejection masked multiple and competing 
perspectives that largely rejected school integration as a means to improve educational 




Some Mexican Americans viewed assimilation as the way to make progress in American society 
but argued that assimilation and integration were incompatible.  Other Mexican Americans 
believed that the key to success was acculturation, or taking what they deemed were the “best 
aspects” of Mexican and Anglo cultures resulting in an individual who would find meaning in 
both.  Yet others embraced bilingualism, which partly translated to assisting non-English 
speaking students in racially isolated predominantly Mexican American schools learn by 
providing Spanish speaking aides to students.  There was a small numerical minority of Mexican 
Americans who supported school desegregation.  However, to many in the Mexican American 
community, desegregation was both unnecessary and incompatible with assimilation, 
acculturation, or biculturalism. 
For example, Joseph A. Vargas, chairman of the Minority Employment Advisory 
Committee of the California State Employment Service (MEAC/CSES) and Vice Mayor of 
South El Monte, argued, “The Mexican-American today does not face discrimination to the 
degree that the Negro does.”201  “But the fact is the Mexican-American people do not have a 
common problem and cannot be helped—but only retarded—by linking their situation to the 
Negro situation,” he explained.202 Whereas the NAACP and the ACLU deemed discrimination 
and racism as issues that could bridge divisions between African Americans and Mexican 
Americans in common causes, Vargas emphasized that the degree of racism and discrimination 
that each group faced forced them to work independently from each other. 
Marcos de Leon, head of Van Nuys High School’s (VNHS) foreign language department, 
similarly asserted that assimilation and ending de facto segregation were not immediate concerns 
of the Mexican American community.203  Instead, de Leon argued, educators had to develop new 
curriculum to meet the needs of Mexican American students, and discard outdated curriculum 
based on old assimilation and “melting pot” models.204  However, Mrs. Lillian Aceves, a 
representative of the bourgeoning Mexican American Political Association (MAPA), offered 
resounding support of integration.205  She told LACBE, “We would like to go on record as 
supporting racial integration emphatically.  De facto segregation stereotypes racial differences 
and also stereotypes the abilities of the minorities.206  She declared, “The continuation of de facto 
segregation does not prepare our children for a realistic world.”207 
 A group of Mexican American educators, including the aforementioned Marcos de Leon, 




(MAAHEC) to intervene in the integration debate on behalf of Mexican Americans.208  Though 
unaffiliated with LACBE or the district, this committee submitted recommendations to LACBE 
in response to the AHC September 12 report.209  The committee vigorously asserted that 
“assimilation” was “not the answer to problems of Spanish-speaking students and urged the 
Board of Education to consider Mexican-American problems apart from those of Negroes.”210  
The committee also contended that LACBE mentioned Mexican American problems “only in an 
incidental or secondary manner.”211  Defining acculturation as “the implementation of both 
cultures (Mexican and Anglo) to the greatest advantage possible in creating a personality who 
will find dignity in both,” the MAAHEC asked LACBE to make a commitment “towards 
acculturation of the Mexican child” instead of assimilation.212 
 Individual members from the MAAHEC offered several ways to resolve the educational 
problems facing the Mexican American student.  A proponent of bicultural education, educator 
Ralph Poblano bluntly stated that “the school boards must be made to realize that the problems 
of Mexican-American students do not necessarily stem from de facto segregation or inadequate 
school boundaries but from the curriculum.”213  School boards, instead, should consider the 
Mexican American student’s “cultural heritage” when developing a curriculum in which 
“English and Spanish complement each other as foreign languages throughout the elementary 
level.214  He also advocated respect for the Mexican American student’s vernacular, instead of 
“labeling it as a handicap.”215 
The AHC’s committee report brought to the surface the political fragmentation between 
and among different racial and ethnic groups in Los Angeles on school desegregation.  The 
report frustrated African Americans and civil rights groups because it did not call for concrete 
and immediate integration policies.  Several Mexican American community leaders suggested 
that school integration was not the answer to improve education for Mexican American students.  
Yet, the bourgeoning Mexican American civil rights group MAPA supported integration.  To 
date, MAPA was the lone Chicano civil rights group supporting school desegregation.216  South 
Gaters responded angrily to the AHC report, continued the community’s rejection of 
desegregation efforts, including school attendance boundary changes, because they believed 





AHC Report and LACBE Proceedings 
On October 3, 1963, LACBE resumed its discussion to adopt the AHC report, the 
beginning of a series of skirmishes that would extend into several weeks.  Before voting to adopt 
the full report and submitting it to the superintendent for review, LACBE members passed a 
motion to vote on each recommendation after the superintendent’s review of each 
recommendation.  As a result, each revised recommendation would be subject to another 
LACBE review, susceptible to amendments, parceling, splitting, or rejection.  Upon passing, 
LACBE would again refer the revised recommendations to the superintendent for planning 
strategies subject to LACBE oversight and review.  The policy to vote on each recommendation 
instead of the full report had the effect of bringing school desegregation efforts to a standstill.  
LACBE President Hardy took the extremely unusual step of withdrawing her September 30 
motion to adopt the entire AHC report, “with the understanding that a motion to adopt the entire 
Report as amended could be considered at a later date.”218 
The scrimmaging began innocuously enough, with LACBE not having to vote on the first 
five recommendations of the AHC report because “they had been adopted.”  The first five 
recommendations mirrored the first recommendations in the AHC interim report, which LACBE 
had passed by a vote of 5 – 2 on May 20, 1963.219  LACBE proceeded to discuss and vote on 
AHC Recommendation No. 6, “School Attendance and Boundaries.”  The recommendation 
called for an official report to LACBE of all school attendance areas at three-year intervals “or 
oftener as required by attendance considerations” that would “show all the factors involved in 
each boundary study.”220  The vague race-neutral language of the recommendation left open to 
interpretation what factors would be included in the study.  Tinglof, the lone board member who 
supported school desegregation wholeheartedly, noticed the ambiguity, and wanted to amend “on 
ethnic distribution in” to the recommendation.  Gardner opposed amending the motion because 
Recommendation No. 4 had already taken into account race as a factor in establishing or altering 
school attendance boundaries.  Most of the board agreed and rejected Tinglof’s amendment. 
In a patent attempt to halt the vote on the AHC recommendations, board member Smoot 
questioned the validity of the report, accusing the AHC of lacking “facts or findings” or “data” to 
support their first four recommendations.221  Smoot undermined his own criticisms of the AHC 
report when he vehemently opposed plans for a “pupil and racial census,” a systematic value-free 




student racial censuses “will prove that many charges of discriminatory practices are untrue, 
[and] that they would enable the Board to see what progress has been made with regard to equal 
opportunities for its employees.”222  Smoot also sought to neutralize the importance of a racial 
census by claiming that it would simply show residential patterns along race that were not of 
LACBE’s making.  Smoot claimed: 
Of course, the census will show that there are Negro teachers and Negro students 
scattered throughout the school system, but that a substantial number of Negro teachers 
teach in schools which serve neighborhoods composed of Negro residents, and that 
schools that serve Negro residents are made up of Negro student bodies.223 
 
Smoot worried that “the NAACP, the ACLU, American Jewish Congress and other similar 
organizations will undoubtedly jump to the conclusion that we discriminate against Negro 
teachers, and that we are maintaining policies designed to encourage segregation.”224  In a last-
ditch effort to affect the vote on a racial census, Smoot used the language of the civil rights 
movement with the objective of halting school desegregation efforts: “I move that no pupil shall 
be denied admission to any school on account of his race, creed, color, or national origin, nor 
shall any pupil be compelled to attend any school on account of his race, creed, color or national 
origin….”225  Richardson and other board members deemed Smoot’s motion irrelevant, and 
adopted the AHC School Areas and Boundaries recommendation by a vote of 5-2. 
A Numerical Minority of the San Fernando Valley Supports Ending School Segregation 
 While the white, working-class community of South Gate overwhelmingly opposed 
school integration, white and middle- and upper-class San Fernando Valley residents had, to this 
point, remained largely quiet.  In early October, a trickle of letters began to arrive at LACBE 
headquarters from Valley residents who supported school desegregation.  Mrs. Celia Karen, of 
Van Nuys, aware of the recent hunger strikes at LACBE headquarters, sought LACBE’s “active 
cooperation in seeing what can be done to alleviate the problem and help in the desegregation of 
our schools.”226  Another Van Nuys resident, Mrs. Mildred S. Simon, argued that education 
promoted the growth of the community and the nation, and asked: “And when we deprive such a 
large segment of our community as the negro youth from the best that is available, do we not 
weaken the whole structure?”227  A Van Nuys mother of four, Mrs. Ethel D. Schwarz, asked 
LACBE to “reconsider” the AHC report and “vote now to end de facto segregation in our 




believed that a vote in support of school desegregation was a vote “cast for the true democratic 
education of our children.”229  Betty Field, of North Hollywood, feared that LACBE’s “slow pace 
in trying to rectify the de facto segregation in the local schools will bring grief and violence to 
Southern California,” and asked the board to “move with deliberate speed to try to correct the 
present inequalities.”230  Revho Knox, of Reseda, protested “the ‘de facto’ segregation” present in 
the Los Angeles school district, and declared that LACBE “must not ignore the situation any 
longer, for both moral & practical reasons.”231  He blamed LACBE for ignoring integration plans 
submitted by Tinglof and asked LACBE to take “definite action” to end school segregation.232 
 A Valley parent, Sheila Getoff sent a letter to Maxine Mitchell, the principal of Bassett 
Street School, in support of faculty integration.  Her letter illustrated the limited opportunity of 
minority teacher placement at Bassett.  Getoff elaborated on her insights into what she noted as a 
lack or cross-racial understanding stemming from a lack of racial diversity in the school’s 
teaching staff.  “Due to reasons, such as segregated housing patterns, Caucasian children have 
relatively little contact (and that is often on a limited basis of having or observing Negroes as 
maids, etc.) with our Negro citizens,” she explained.233  She believed that “proximity and 
relationship” with African American teachers was of “inestimable value.”234  She concluded, “I 
am most hopeful that this is more than a ‘token’ move, and that there will be wholehearted effort 
to recruit qualified teachers on the widest possible racial basis.”235  An integrated faculty, Getoff 
believed, was not for integration’s sake but represented “education for democracy” in practice.236 
Some Valley organizations also supported school desegregation, and some of the most 
vocal were church groups.  The Board of Trustees of the Emerson Unitarian Church of Canoga 
Park agreed with Tinglof’s pro-desegregation position and advised that “steps must be taken to 
correct [the] situation.”237  The Emerson Unitarian Church was one of the first churches with a 
majority white congregation from the San Fernando Valley to demonstrate an unequivocal 
concern about school segregation.238  
LACBE Politics 
LACBE political alliances on what to do with the AHC recommendations and Crawford 
did not fit neatly into a liberal/conservative binary but shifted among progressive, liberal, and 
conservative members.  Tinglof represented the lone progressive, who sometimes received 




Tinglof but more often voted with the liberals of the board.  Smoot and Chambers, the most 
conservative members of LACBE, often voted in tandem and consistently opposed civil rights 
organizations’ demands. Although outnumbered, the duo had the power to halt, delay and oppose 
recommendations and motions relating to the AHC report, civil rights, and Crawford. 
 The issue of a racial census of teachers and district employees created some unusual 
political alliances on the board.  On October 7, 1963, Hardy put the teacher and employee census 
recommendation to a vote, a recommendation that would “make it routine to identify teachers 
and other personnel by race or national background after they are employed.”239  The board, by a 
5-1-1 vote, chose instead to delay voting on the motion, and to include it in its discussion about 
teacher transfers and promotions recommendation.  Three days later, LACBE revisited the 
teachers and employees census, while CORE staged a sit-it at the board headquarters.  Hardy 
pointed out that Dr. Leroy R. Weeks, of the Los Angeles Urban League, fully supported en 
employee census because “such statistics are essential for the efficient use of our resources and 
for the planning ministering and evaluating of program at the present time and under present 
circumstances[.]”240 
LACBE members debated over the teacher and employee census.  Chambers questioned 
the legality of “including the employee’s names on any record that included racial 
characteristics” and instead suggested gathering an employee’s racial background without 
identifying the employee.241  Willett would vote in support of the recommendation only as long 
as he had an opportunity to vote on the Superintendent’s procedure to implement it.242  Smoot 
offered a substitute motion that called for an employee to submit her/his racial background on a 
personnel card voluntarily.243  Gardner argued that a voluntary procedure would not be 
successful. 
Smoot’s substitute motion lost 5 - 2, with Chambers and Smoot the lone supporters.  
Willet submitted an amendment to the motion, which called for the Superintendent’s census 
procedure subject to board approval.  The motion to amend passed by a close 4-3 vote.244  But 
where did the third vote come from?  Tinglof voted with Smoot and Chambers because she 
feared that identifying a minority employee on a personnel card would make the individual 
susceptible to discrimination and “great damage.”245 Chambers opposed the census because he 
was worried about “the charges of discrimination that can grow out of it and also the fact that it 




motion because “there is a fine and logical historical precedent for not wishing to maintain ethnic 
records on the basis that such records could be used for discriminatory purposes.”247  He asserted 
that as times changed, needs changed, and that he could see how keeping a record of the racial 
identification of employees could insure against discrimination.248  LACBE members proceeded 
to vote on the full, amended motion. The amended motion passed 4-3, and ironically, worries 
about discrimination brought Tinglof, Smoot, and Chambers to vote together.  Tinglof feared that 
individual racial identification would place racial minorities in a precarious condition, subject to 
discrimination in hiring and placement.  On the other hand, Smoot and Chambers opposed the 
racial census for fear of “reverse discrimination.”  
LACBE took on the AHC’s Recommendation 2, which called for a racial and national 
background census estimate of the student body “school by school, in the geographic district area 
of each elementary district, without identifying the schools, but listing them by level” (emphasis 
mine).249  Hardy pressed for the motion because she believed it would be useful to “obtain 
information as to the percentages of pupils and teachers of different ethnic background in a given 
school.”250 Tinglof opposed the motion, pressing instead for a racial and national background 
census from each school to assist in identifying segregated schools.  Tinglof backed a school-by-
school racial census because it would provide data on the degree of racial isolation each school.  
The liberals on the board sided with the most conservative member, Smoot, and voted down 
Tinglof’s substitute motion 4-2, with Chambers abstaining.  LACBE then passed the original 
motion by a 4-3 vote, with Tinglof, Chambers and Smoot again voting in opposition.251 
 LACBE voted on one additional AHC recommendation that day, which would ensure 
that the recommendations 1 and 2 would become part of the public record “to show the 
distribution of certificated personnel in relation to the estimated ethnic background of students at 
each school, without identifying the schools.”252  President Hardy wholeheartedly supported the 
idea because “the only purpose in doing this was to inform the public so they may realize that the 
schools are making an effort toward integration and are being quite successful, more successful 
than the public in general realizes.”253  The motion passed 4-2. 
 While LaRee Caughey and the ACLU backed an employee racial census, they 
vehemently opposed identifying each individual employee by race, as Tinglof did.  LaRee 
Caughey too warned that including a racial, color, or ancestral “tag” for every individual 




individual a potential victim of discrimination.  “Much as we believe in the need for census 
information,” LaRee Caughey wrote, “we are diametrically opposed to the labelling [sic] of any 
individual by race.”254  Caughey added: “To require a staff member to indicate his race is an 
invasion of privacy, which many will see as an act of prejudice.”255  “If an agent for the school 
system makes the identification, there is room for error which could lead to a claim of damages,” 
she charged.256 
Like Tinglof, the LaRee Caughey sensed that a student racial census from each school 
would demonstrate which schools were segregated and which ones were not, and provide 
valuable information for LACBE to develop policy to ameliorate racial segregation and improve 
education to students from minority backgrounds.  Explaining the significance of a student racial 
census, LaRee Caughey argued that a census “in and of itself” would not produce integration” 
but would expose where segregation existed.”257  Repeated census taking, she continued, would 
“measure and chart the progress of integration.”258 “Made in the interest of equalizing education 
and employment opportunities,” LaRee argued, “they do not violate the spirit of anti-
discriminatory legislation.”259  Student and employee racial censuses were not only valuable but 
legal and promoted honorable goals. 
Although in full support of a student racial census, LaRee Caughey maintained that the 
city’s diverse population made it virtually impossible for agents of the school board to identify a 
student’s racial background correctly.  Identifying a student’s race would be difficult because the 
racial categories at the time, including “Negro,” Mexican American, Caucasian, “Oriental,” and 
“other” had their limitations.  “For this kind of recording,” Caughey argued, “the definitions of 
race would have to attempt greater precision than for the impersonal tally on the basis of 
appearance.  Would the district follow the rule of the South that one drop of Negro blood makes 
one a Negro?”260  She added, “Clearly, if the Board embarks on tagging individuals by race, it 
cannot do it only to Negroes.  It will have to go on to Spanish-Americans, Caucasians other than 
Spanish, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, other Orientals, Polynesians, and Indians.”261  LaRee Caughey 
wanted the board to develop a precise racial student census that was representative of the 
district’s (and by extension the city’s) racial and ethnic diversity. 
LACBE deliberations, including motions, amendments, substitute motions, and votes, 
provided an insight into the complicated, multifaceted racial politics in the board. Passing 




process of policy making on racial issues.  The motions that passed moved on to the 
Superintendent for research and planning subject to LACBE oversight and approval for approval.  
Broadly speaking, LACBE’s deliberations on the AHC recommendations represented a response 
to Crawford and to charges of discrimination from civil rights organizations, grassroots 
organizations, community groups, and concerned individuals from diverse racial and political 
backgrounds from throughout the L.A. metropolitan region. 
On October 10, CORE staged another “study-in” at LACBE headquarters as the board 
deliberated on more AHC recommendations.  Over three hundred organizers and students first 
met at the corner of Sunset Boulevard and Olvera Street at the “old plaza” (today’s Placita 
Olvera) and walked over to the board headquarters.  There, they engaged in a peaceful two-hour 
“study in” to protest what the Los Angeles Times’ Paul Weeks reported as “alleged de facto 
segregation in city schools.”262  The peaceful protests did not happen without incident, as Los 
Angeles Fire Department Captain Robert Landgrat confronted “Congress of Racial Equality 
leaders at the door as they marched up from the Old Plaza.”263  “There will be no sitting or 
standing on the corridor,” he explained, because it “would constitute a fire hazard” and “they 
would be violating the law.” 264  Jerry Farber of the CORE education action committee, asked 
Landgrat if he intended “physically to bar us?”265  Landgrat told Farber that the decision to 
remove them rested with school board security officers.  William Barron, chief security officer at 
the Board of Education, said that “his men would take no action pending a ruling from the 
board.”266  Undeterred by Landgrat, Farber told the student demonstrators, ‘“I’m going in.”267  
The students followed and filed in peacefully.  “None appeared to break from the ranks,” the 
Times reported.268 
 CORE’s peaceful protest lasted two hours, about the length of the board meeting that day.  
CORE members did not “block exits or aisles,” as Board President Hardy requested.  They made 
their demands known to the board and the city of Los Angeles.  There was some reaction from 
LACBE as a result of the demonstration but it was somewhat subdued.   ‘“I think we have to be 
flexible in this thing,” Hardy expressed later.269  ‘“There’s no reason to lower the boom just so 
we can flex some muscles,’” the Times quoted Hardy.270  Los Angeles Police Sergeant Robert 
Hayes, who was on duty at the time of the CORE protest, commented later that he had “no order 
to intercede” from LACBE.271  The following day, a school spokesman summarized LACBE’s 




demonstrate.  We ask only they co-operate in not creating a hazard.”272  However, the public 
niceties between CORE and the board were temporary. 
CORE’s demonstrations provoked a delayed but forceful response from LACBE four 
days later.  It was not a response to the 300 plus-student “study in” but rather to one of CORE’s 
blistering flyers critical of LACBE. Chambers called on CORE “to retract the following untrue 
statements contained in a bulletin circulated by CORE at many Los Angeles City Schools, 
Thursday, October 10, 1963.”273  Chambers also asked the superintendent to “see that a 
correction goes to the schools that have received the bulletin.”274  The motion passed 5 - 1, with 
Mary Tinglof the board member to cast a vote in opposition. 
On October 24, 1963, LACBE debated curriculum to develop “appropriate teaching 
materials which will depict the Negro and Mexican-American, as well as Americans of all 
religious and ethnic backgrounds, in a more positive light,” with the assistance of community 
leaders.275  The board passed the recommendation with a 5 -2 vote.  The board also passed a 
recommendation by the same vote, which called for “personal counseling” in areas that indicated 
a need because of “a different language, culture, or social economic status.”276 
 LACBE also dealt with another recommendations that sought to deal with two separate 
but related issues: 1) the relationship between I.Q. testing and culture, and 2) counseling to foster 
African American and Mexican American student potential.  The AHC recommended studying 
whether counselors paid too much weight to I.Q. test scores, which could impede a counselor’s 
ability to gauge a student’s future development and potential.  In the other half of the 
recommendation, the AHC suggested improving counselor training “on the human relations 
aspect” so that counselors could understand how culture influenced a minority student’s 
academic goals and personal needs.  Although the recommendation did not link the two issues, at 
its core, the recommendation sought to deal with how much counselor’s weighed I.Q. testing and 
a minority student’s academic potential.  LACBE passed the motion by a 5 to 2 vote. 
 LACBE concluded the day’s meeting by responding to CORE’s “study in” that took 
place two weeks earlier, which was a separate response to CORE’s flyer.  In a statement, Hardy 
expressed both the group’s right to demonstrate and the potential fire hazard that the “study in” 
posed.  Smoot lambasted CORE’s sit-in and accused it of making false statements about the 
city’s schools.  He added, “The inescapable conclusion is that CORE is consciously and 




repeat compulsory—pupil racial quotas within each of the Los Angeles City Schools.”277  Smoot 
rephrased in a misleading way one of CORE’s policy goals in politically advantageous terms. 
What CORE termed school desegregation, Smoot termed compulsory pupil reassignment to fill 
“racial quotas.”278 
 On the night of the October 24 board meeting, CORE staged yet another sit-in that lasted 
until 6:00 a.m. the following morning.  A group of sixty to seventy people with about half of 
them under eighteen years old congregated in the hallway of the LACBE headquarters.279  The 
activists sang, engaged in discussions, and danced.  At around 12:30 a.m., the number of 
participants increased to about one hundred.  A building security guard, who had no power to 
halt the sit-in, told Jerry Farber that “unless he took some direct action to stop the promiscuous 
activities which were being carried on primarily by juveniles in the group," he felt he was 
“morally obligated to make photographic records of these activities, [though] lacking the direct 
authority to do anything about stopping them.”280  Farber confronted the security guard, “play[ed] 
down the incidents down,” and said, “A little hand holding isn’t going to hurt anything.”281  
Farber, according to the security guard, promised to do something about it.  By 6:00 a.m., the 
activists left on their own accord.  CORE demonstrated in LACBE headquarters peacefully, 
without any major problems, and continued to further its message in support of affirmative 
desegregation in Los Angeles public schools, which precipitated the ire of some LACBE 
members and residents throughout Los Angeles.282 
Increasingly murmurs of opposition to school desegregation began to develop beyond the 
boundaries of the South Gate community and beyond working-class anger.  White Angelenos 
from different parts of the city and across class backgrounds began to coalesce in opposition to 
school desegregation in any form, while minority communities remained divided over school 
desegregation efforts.   
A Fragmented Movement 
Fragmentation on the school desegregation issue did not exist only among African 
Americans, Mexican Americans, and whites, but also within these groups. 
 The debate over how to improve the educational opportunities of African American children 
divided the African American community, with many African Americans clamoring for 




leaders stressing desegregation.  Many in the Mexican American community emphasized 
bilingual and bicultural education, while a numerical minority backed school desegregation.  The 
desegregation debate exposed social and political divisions within racial and ethnic minority 
neighborhoods.  
Civil rights organizations and African American church and community leaders fighting 
for desegregation on behalf of the African American community and other minority communities 
faced an unanticipated opponent in their efforts to desegregate Jordan High School and South 
Gate High School: the skepticism of the Watts community.  In an unusual but politically savvy 
effort, South Gate residents formed the South Gate Education Committee (SGEC), an anti-
integrationist neighborhood organization that conducted a survey of Watts residents’ ideas about 
desegregation in late November 1963.  According to the SGEC survey, 63% of Watts residents 
believed that “moving their children to schools outside the neighborhood would not help them 
educationally.”283  Most Watts residents, according to the unscientific but informative survey, 
preferred improving their neighborhood schools, as well as calling for “more library books, job 
training, and counseling.”284  The SGEC later presented their findings to LACBE. The SGEC 
used the Watts community’s own responses to undermine desegregation efforts.  Anti-
integrationists, such as the SGEC, began to reemphasize the ideas of “equal education” and 
compensatory education to oppose desegregation. 
The desegregation issue divided the Mexican American community, but the prevailing 
view within the community favored culturally based education instead of desegregation.  Many 
leaders believed bilingual and bicultural education that included Mexican American and 
Mexican history courses would improve the Chicano student’s education and self-identity.  
LACBE’s recent vote on AHC recommendations on curriculum and compensatory education 
likely provided the community a boost of confidence.  A small numerical Chicano minority 
believed racial inequality and unequal educational opportunity created a social and political bond 
between African Americans and Mexican Americans.  Overall, however, the Mexican American 
community prioritized bilingual and bicultural education programs over school desegregation. 
Scant information about the Hispanic San Fernando Valley residents’ attitudes about 
desegregation exists, but a mother of two of “Spanish surname” from the Valley who resided 
within the attendance boundaries of San Fernando High School offered some insights.  A diverse 




backgrounds, San Fernando High School faced bouts of violence and poverty according to Mrs. 
Sheila Rivera.  She linked these problems to the racial and ethnic makeup and socio-economic 
status of the community’s residents.  These circumstances prompted her to request a transfer for 
one of her sons, which the vice principal refused.  Rivera wrote, “I put my house up for sale … 
When the February semester approached we moved out and rented an apartment in another area 
where we have now been for a year.”285  She moved out of the San Fernando area (the city, not 
the Valley) so her son “could go one year to a school out of our area” away from the “terrible 
conditions there caused by the so called minority groups” at San Fernando High School.286  “It 
seems to me when a decent ‘white’ boy can no longer stomach the actions of some of the 
Mexicans and Negroes (and I’m sure some whites too) in his school he has just as much right to 
transfer as the poor negro that everybody is crying about,” she claimed.287  “My son cares nothing 
about the color of a persons [sic] skin but he got sick of fights, knives, & the like,” she 
concluded.288  Ironically, Rivera clamored for a more open transfer policy, the very existing 
transfer policy that civil rights organizations worried exacerbated school segregation by 
transforming previously desegregated and nominally diverse schools into racially isolated 
minority schools.  Rivera offered a glimpse of this process. 
CORE Responds to Smoot’s Condemnation 
“Sarcasm and tempers flared Thursday at the Los Angeles Board of Education meeting” 
on October 31, the Los Angeles Times reported, “when board members sparred with integration 
leaders” during an unusually tense board meeting.289  Thirty “youthful, singing demonstrators 
began an all-night vigil outside the hearing room,” as well, illustrating CORE’s increasing 
activism at LACBE. 290  CORE’s Kenneth Fry responded to Smoot’s very public condemnation of 
CORE’s scathing criticism of LACBE.  (Apparently, this condemnation and other criticisms 
against CORE had come from several board members through different media outlets.)  CORE 
believed the time had come to answer these charges as publicly as LACBE members had, and to 
stem “scare tactics” that were becoming politically advantageous for some board members.  Fry 
told the board: “In the last few days CORE has been subject to attack, criticism, and 
misunderstanding coming from Board members on television, on radio, in the press, and in open 





In an obvious reference to one of Smoot’s charges, Fry declared that, for example, “one 
week ago a board member insisted publicly that CORE wants racial quotas in every school in the 
system.”292  Fry asserted that Smoot’s allegation was “actually the kind of charge that is 
sometimes used as a rallying point, around which to mobilize a fearful and misinformed 
opposition.”293  He then confronted Smoot: “I suspect that after examination of the actual CORE 
demands … the board member may wish publicly to retract this charge.”294  Frustration and 
concern were palpable in Fry’s comments, but it was only the beginning.  Fry defended CORE’s 
goals and answered numerous allegations of misconduct against the October 24 “study in.”  Fry 
reiterated why CORE pursued desegregation:  
 Children who never see one another cannot possibly understand one another.  
These children grow to be adults who do not understand one another.  They go their 
separate ways—to separate neighborhoods—hiring only those they do understand—and 
each resenting what he imagines the other to be….  This is why we are demanding an end 
to segregated schools.295 
 
Some LACBE members criticized CORE’s “method” of expressing its concerns through 
demonstrations but Fry countered that the “method” was “simply through non-violent direct 
action: a refusal to be a part of an evil system.”296  To accusations that CORE used demonstrators 
as pawns susceptible to arrest, Fry scoffed but insisted that CORE members were not intimidated 
by the possibility.  Fry stated, “Believe me, we don’t want arrests … ”297 “They won’t do us any 
good.  They won’t do you any good.  They won’t do the school children any good.  But we will 
not be intimidated by the threat of arrest into silent assent to an evil system,” he declared.298  In 
response to the accusations that CORE took children out of school to participate in sit-ins, Fry 
explained the meaning behind the “study-ins”: “The students were here for a purpose.  They 
brought their homework and quietly and in an orderly fashion studied together just outside your 
door to show to you that students of all races can and want to study together.”299  Fry employed 
conciliatory and defiant language.  He asked for an understanding of the non-violent protests 
while calling the segregated school system a part of “existing social evils.”300 
Fry implored LACBE to end stall tactics.  “As a substitute for action you continue to 
come forth with studies, reports, surveys, and plans for more surveys—all of which serve to 
delay the required action” and commitment, Fry contended.301  After the meeting, the thirty 
youthful, singing CORE demonstrators began their all-night vigil outside the board hearing 




allegedly erupted leading to the arrests of three CORE members, Jerry Farber, Scott Van Leuven 
23, a student at UCLA, and Michael Robison, 21, a student at California College of Dental 
Training.  Two security guards were injured.303  In a November 6, 1963 letter from 
Superintendent Crowther to CORE/LA Chairman Mr. Earl Walter, Crowther wrote that “a series 
of incidents leading to the violence and subsequent arrests for assaults on our staff were direct 
provocations in an attempt by CORE demonstrators to circumvent reasonable regulations.”304  
Crowther informed Walter that the arrests and an alleged past theft charge forced the school 
district to implement a new policy, by which a planned all-night sit-in on November 7 was 
permitted to take place “only in the lower hall of the Administration Building.”305   
 On November 7, LACBE continued to adopt, amend, and modify AHC 
recommendations.  A more important story developed during this meeting.  Board members 
began debating whether or not the AHC had completed its work and was still necessary.  
Gardner called for the adoption of the AHC report, except for the preface.  Chambers presented a 
substitute motion, which called “that the Report … be received as evidence of completion of the 
Committee’s assignment and that Committee be dismissed.”306  Smoot amended Chambers’ 
motion but overall the message of the motion and the amendment was clear: dismiss the AHC.  
The full board voted on both motions and amendment and all fell by a 4-3 vote.  The board 
rescheduled a vote on Gardner’s original motion for November 18, 1963. 
 On the same day, LACBE created the Urban Affairs Office (UAO) “to deal directly with 
racial issues, school dropouts and alleged discrimination against minority group employees or 
students,”307 an office the AHC recommended.  Crowther appointed Sam Hamerman, a 
coordinator of youth opportunities for the schools and former high school principal, to lead the 
UAO.  LACBE granted the new office an operating budget of $65,000 for the first year. 
On November 18, CORE attended the board meeting.308  Around 5:00 p.m., LACBE 
adjourned the meeting early because a disruption reportedly broke out in the auditorium, which 
LACBE attributed to CORE.309  According to the Los Angeles Times, forty-two CORE members 
“suddenly burst into song” during the board meeting.310  The Daily Signal, a local newspaper 
from southeast Los Angeles, derided CORE’s tactics and defended LACBE, reporting that the 
board had done everything possible “short of complete surrender to the most wild demands to 




 By November 21, CORE’s demonstrations and disruptions of earlier school board 
meetings had heightened the discord between CORE, and LACBE and Superintendent Crowther.  
After CORE disrupted the last meetings, Crowther contacted the district’s legal counsel to ask if 
the district had any legal authority not only to bar CORE from board meetings but also arrest 
CORE members who disrupted those meetings.  Counsel advised LACBE that such school board 
disruptions “not only constituted a criminal act … but … can be enjoined in a civil action 
instituted by the Board of Education.”312  LACBE could seek an injunction to bar CORE from 
meetings and if any CORE member violated the injunction, “they would be held in contempt of 
court and subject to fine or imprisonment or both.”313  In a November 21 memo, Crowther 
recommended LACBE to take drastic actions against CORE, including filing an injunction, and 
directing district security officers to arrest anyone who disrupted board meetings.314 
Dr. Richardson, hardly a conservative board member, introduced a motion that made 
individuals who disrupted board meetings subject to arrest, a motion specifically targeting 
CORE.315  The motion passed overwhelmingly by a 6 - 0 vote, with Mary Tinglof abstaining.  
Tinglof explained that “although she did not like disruptions at Regular Board Meetings, she was 
sympathetic to CORE’s cause and that she thought they could be reasoned with rather than it 
being necessary to seek an injunction.”316  President Hardy also expressed sympathy to CORE’s 
cause, “but she did not like to see them act illegally.”317 
In late November, LACBE issued rulings favoring the South Gate community’s anti-
integrationist stance.  LACBE would not redraw school boundaries between Watts and South 
Gate and would not bus South Gate children out of the area.  LACBE pointed to the district’s 
“open enrollment” plan as a strategy to desegregate schools.  Historian Nicolaides detailed the 
board’s limited open enrollment plan: “While black and Latino children were free to attend 
schools in South Gate and Huntington Park, only thirty-four transfers were made available at the 
high school level, with similarly small numbers at the middle schools.”318  LACBE’s limited 
transfer policy demonstrated its lack of commitment to desegregation, and provided a clear 
example of the disconnect between its pro-integration rhetoric and its limited integration efforts. 
Renewed Demonstrations and a LACBE Busing Plan 
Individuals and civil rights and community groups renewed desegregation efforts.  The 




schools operating on a half-day schedule to vacant slots in full-day white schools.319 CORE 
resumed demonstrations against the board, which it halted in light of President John F. 
Kennedy’s assassination. 
On December 16, Arthur H. Silvers, CORE/LA Chairman, justified CORE’s renewed 
demonstrations.  He also framed school segregation in broader structural terms by associating 
LACBE to forces that built, generated, and maintained segregation in housing and schools.  
Silvers asked LACBE not “to draw school district boundaries to conform to racially restrictive 
housing boundaries in the city” because “it is not the obligation of this Board to protect the 
interests of realtors, builders and lenders whocollaborate [sic] to maintain segregation in 
housing.”320  CORE declared that “this Board has only one obligation, to protect the interests of 
all the children of this city - - including the Black and Mexican-American children.”321 
Silvers alleged that board members were unaware of the need for immediate changes322  
He declared, “Discrimination daily eats away at the basic fiber of ghetto children, destroying 
their initiative and self-respect.”323  “At the same time,” he argued, “segregation twists and warps 
the minds of the children outside the ghetto, teaching them to hate and fear those who are 
different from themselves.”324  He railed against a board “redistricting plan,” which would do 
“little or nothing” to desegregate the school district.325  In sum, Silvers urged the board to 
develop and implement policies to desegregate schools, create equal educational opportunities, 
and warned that CORE membership was ready and willing to resume nonviolent demonstrations. 
 The UCRC’s request to transport minority elementary students attending half-day 
sessions in overcrowded schools to less crowded white schools gained momentum in the board, 
resulting in a highly charged discussion over implementing such a plan.  A debate over a 
$678,000 plan to transport minority students attending crowded and half-day session to less 
crowded white schools spiraled into “accusations of prejudice against one Board … member and 
criticism of school staff personnel.”326  The accusations were directed at board member Smoot 
because he accused the board of bowing to “political pressure” from outsiders including the 
NAACP.327  He argued that the money could be used for other endeavors, including the 
“construction of an entire elementary school.”328  Board member Richardson disagreed, said 
Smoot should be “ashamed” for his remarks, and reprimanded Smoot: “You don’t believe in 
putting Negro children into white schools.  That’s your problem.”329  Gardner, Willett, and 




bowing to political pressure.330  Richardson, in fact, advocated for a spring semester trial run to 
reduce half-day sessions.331 
 LACBE voted 4-3 for a busing plan to transport minority children out of overcrowded 
schools to white schools but reduced funding from an estimated $678,000 to $80,000.332  The 
board voted against a more ambitious program by the same vote.333  Marnesba Tackett assailed 
the plan as “woefully inadequate” and called the trial plan “less than tokenism.”334  To show the 
disparity between black and white schools, and why a more considerable desegregation plan was 
necessary, she detailed the gaping discrepancy between “Negro” schools and white schools on 
half-day or double sessions.  “Nearly 50% of the Negro schools have half-day or double 
sessions, while only 16% of the white schools have them,” she explained.335  And while the 
district had reduced double sessions by 50% districtwide over the past five years, she continued, 
“During this same period, double sessions have increased 21% in the Negro community.”336 
Tackett also ridiculed the recent LACBE boundary change program developed in early 
December because “many of these boundary changes were in either barren areas having no 
population or in industrial areas having no residential population.”337 
She pointed to a contradiction in the board’s rationale for cordoning off a white 
residential area from Jordan High School.  “A white residential area immediately adjacent to 
Jordan High … was bypassed under the pretext that a traffic-signaled intersection at Alameda St. 
is too dangerous for high school students to cross,” she contended.338  “Nevertheless, elementary 
pupils are safely crossing Alameda only a few blocks away,” she added.339  Taken as a whole, 
Tackett sought to show LACBE treated African American and white students differently and 
unequally, condoned separate and unequal as the double-sessions statistics showed, and 
privileged the desires of whites, as the different attendance boundaries treated Alameda Street 
differently.  The high school attendance boundary demarcated Alameda Street as the boundary 
line that precluded white high school students from attending Jordan High School, while another 
attendance boundary did not include Alameda Street as a boundary line, thus permitting white 





LACBE Responds to the Mexican American Community and the Mexican-American Ad Hoc 
Education Committee Demands 
 LACBE never formally responded to the demands of Mexican American organizations 
including the Mexican American Ad Hoc Education Committee (MAAHEC).  Board members 
believed that it could improve the education of minority students through compensatory 
education programs.  On December 23, the board acknowledged receiving several telegrams 
from individuals and organizations, which called for implementing the MAAHEC suggestions.  
 As with school desegregation, Tinglof supported motions and policy changes that could 
improve the education of Mexican American students.  In one motion, Tinglof called for a 
“criteria of balanced faculties, in terms of age, experience, race, national background, sex and 
special skills.”340  The board voted down the motion by 5-2, with Tinglof and Richardson the 
only supporters. 
  However, Tinglof did not relent and submitted another motion calling on the district to 
consider a teacher’s knowledge of the “predominant language.”  Under this policy, for example, 
in a given school “having a predominantly Mexican-American population,” the district would 
take into consideration a teacher’s knowledge of the community, its leaders, its cultural heritage, 
and “an ability to raise levels of aspiration” for hiring and assignment.341  She introduced another 
motion that called for Spanish as an elective for non-academic students, the development of 
Social Studies units “to include history and literature of the Southwest, Spain, Mexico, and Latin 
American countries,” and “English oral language programs of enrichment in kindergarten and 
elementary grades.”342  The first motion passed by a 7 to 0 vote, while the latter passed by a 6 to 
1 vote, with Chambers the lone dissenter.  Tinglof wholeheartedly supported school 
desegregation but also voted on compensatory education programs to further the education of 
Mexican American students.   In a sense, she had little choice but to fulfill the immediate needs 
of African American and Mexican American students in their respective neighborhood schools, 
which usually divided African American and Mexican American communities and political 
groups on the school desegregation issue.  She introduced, supported, and sought the adoption of 
policy that benefitted either or both African American and Mexican American students. 
 Before the calendar year ended, LACBE finalized a vote on the motion to adopt the 
amended and altered AHC report and dismissing the AHC.  Willett offered a more nuanced 




dismissal.343  The motion passed overwhelmingly by a 6 to 1 vote, with Richardson the lone vote 
in dissent.  A committee that had offered much promise, and had evoked frustration and anger 
from both sides of the desegregation debate, had come to an end.  The committee had had no 
executive power, and no authority to implement any of its recommendations, which were subject 
to the whims of LACBE, and now rested on Superintendent Crowther’s desk for planning and 
implementation. 
In early February 1964, at the behest of President Hardy’s December 30 request, LACBE 
proudly published staff report Actions Taken by the Board of Education on the Report of the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, in which the superintendent’s office outlined 
the 27 AHC recommendations, which the board had procured.344 The superintendent’s office was 
not going to implement the amended AHC recommendations, but instead submit “statements,” or 
plans to implement them.  These plans too would be susceptible to LACBE politics long before 
implementation could take place.  The wheels of change turned slowly, further frustrating civil 
rights organizations and leaders in minority communities. 
Momentum to Develop Racial Censuses 
In February 1964, political pressure to develop student and employee censuses grew.  
LACBE previously had declined to develop public student and teacher racial censuses because it 
believed they were unnecessary.  When information was available, LACBE had claimed that 
“such figures [were] not to be made public nor [were] they to be given to any outside groups or 
individuals.”345 LACBE kept racial statistics of the student population secret and went to great 
lengths to keep the information inaccessible to the public.  For example, when the California 
School Boards Association (CSBA) asked LACBE to join it to develop ways to solve “ethnic 
imbalances” in California schools by filling out a survey of the racial makeup of students and 
teachers in L.A. schools,346 LACBE referred the issue to the superintendent.347  A week later, 
Superintendent Crowther recommended to LACBE to “respectfully” decline participating in the 
CSBA’s efforts.348  In a March 6 letter, Hardy formally rejected CSBA’s invitation and reiterated 
the superintendent’s recommendations.349 
 While the racial and ethnic student and teacher data compiled by the superintendent’s 
office remained veiled in secrecy, the Public Information Office of the Los Angeles City Schools 




employment opportunity.350  The board’s public statement contained a glaring omission: a policy 
on de facto segregation.  In response to this omission, CORE requested that LACBE appoint a 
committee to meet with CORE’s educational committee to discuss solutions to segregated 
schools.351  CORE’s response paled in comparison to LaRee Caughey's, who challenged the 
board’s efforts of compensatory education because the strategy fit “the outworn doctrine of 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) rather than that of Brown v. Board of Education.”352  She asked the 
board to provide evidence that demonstrated how the board had dealt with and planned to deal 
with de facto segregation and fair hiring practices, as it was almost ten years since the 
momentous Brown decision.  LACBE denied LaRee Caughey’s request.353 
In late 1963, LACBE made transfers available to minority students.  The Los Angeles 
Times reported the lackadaisical response to student transfers requests from parents and 
guardians: “Parents are reluctant to transfer their elementary school children from ‘home’ 
schools to others outside the immediate neighborhood.”354  Out of a possible 4,410 new permits 
among 81 “open schools,” parents requested only 28, a mere 0.63 percent.355  Some in the civil 
rights community charged that LACBE did not publicize the program.  However, the Los 
Angeles Times offered the likeliest reason why minority parents did not take advantage of 
transfer: parents had to provide their own transportation to their children.356  Parents who 
transferred their children to a school outside of their neighborhood either had the time and 
financial capacity or endured financial hardship. 
 Individual African Americans seldom corresponded with LACBE about school 
desegregation but on February 12, 1964, Mrs. B.L. Singleton from South Central L.A. wrote a 
conciliatory letter that conveyed a deep distrust of two board members whom she did not name 
but were clearly Chambers and Smoot.  She did not blame the board for creating school 
segregation.  She appreciated the board’s plan to transport African American children from 
overcrowded minority schools into white schools with empty slots.357  Although she considered it 
only a temporary solution to school segregation, she called it “a definite step forward.”358  Of the 
two “troublesome board members,” she wrote, “I think there are [sic] a member or two … who 
denies that ‘de facto segregation’ exists.  I fail to see how in all honesty they can say this with a 
straight face.”359  She joked, “It gives me great hope to know these members are in the minority.  
I guess that is a big joke because they can cause more trouble than the rest of the board put 




neighborhood, and consequently my children attend a predominant Negro school (half-day 
sessions mind you),” she communicated.361  She added, “I am a strong believer that there is no 
such thing as separate but equal education.  I believe that children must associate with each other 
regardless of race, not so much on a social level as on a [sic] educational level.  This in its self 
[sic] is part of education.”362  She placed most of the blame for unequal education and segregated 
schools on segregated housing patterns, and offered some silent prayer, but warned: “If it 
[segregation] is not corrected, not only does the child suffer, but the city, county, state, and the 
nation, will also suffer.”363  Singleton expressed that schools could provide a potential space for 
cross-racial interaction, even as race and class kept Angelenos in segregated neighborhoods. 
 On May 14, 1964, LACBE and the Los Angeles City School District commemorated the 
Brown v. Board of Education decision of 1954.  LACBE highlighted its equal educational 
opportunity policy but completely avoided the school segregation issue.364  President Hardy went 
so far as to claim that “the Los Angeles School Districts have not imposed racial segregation on 
their students.”365  Hardy reiterated the board’s commitment to finding “new ways to improve our 
educational programs and ensure that the educational needs of all our students are met”366  
Superintendent Crowther reaffirmed the board’s policy of equal educational opportunity. 
Open Housing 
In 1963 W. Byron Rumford, the first African American member of the California State 
Legislature, introduced Assembly Bill (AB) 1240 to prohibit discrimination in housing on the 
basis of race, creed, color, sex and religion.  The California Legislature, with pressure from 
Democratic Governor Edmund “Pat” Brown and civil rights demonstrators staging sit-ins and 
hunger strikes, adopted the bill the same year into California law as the Rumford Fair Housing 
Act.367  In 1964 and in response to the Rumford Act, the California Real Estate Association 
(CREA) proceeded to sponsor an initiative and circulated petitions for a state constitutional 
amendment with the dual purposes of repealing the Rumford Act and forever barring 
government efforts to stop discrimination in the sale, lease or rental of property.  The John Birch 
Society and the Republican Assembly were fervent supporters of these efforts.  The initiative 
received over one million signatures, even though less than half that number was necessary to 




At the height of the civil rights movement, California voters placed anti-civil rights legislation on 
the ballot. 
 LACBE was not immune to the political skirmishing associated with the Rumford Act 
and Proposition 14.  The Los Angeles Times described the atmosphere at a board meeting 
focused on Proposition 14: “A flurry of emotion erupted Monday … between Arthur F. Gardner 
… and member J.C Chambers over action of the State PTA urging a ‘no’ vote on Proposition 
14.”368  Chambers also engaged Dr. Richardson in a short but sharp exchange of words when 
Chambers protested that some PTAs were using school grounds to mount an anti-Prop 14 
campaign.369  Richardson countered by commending the state PTA for recommending a “No” 
vote on the proposition and proclaiming that the recommendation was “one of the most 
courageous steps taken by the PTA.”370  “I feel this is an improper use of school facilities,” 
answered Chambers, and contended that the PTAs should acquire a Civic Center permit any time 
it had Proposition 14 on its agenda.371  Before the scuffling could continue, LACBE President 
Gardner adjourned the meeting. 
Californians passed Proposition 14 by an overwhelming 2 to 1 margin at the same time 
that they overwhelmingly voted for Lyndon B. Johnson, a supporter of civil rights.372  The 
Rumford Act and Proposition 14 were diametrically opposed pieces of legislation in the debate 
over “open housing,” an issue intimately linked to school segregation.  If property owners and 
renters were free to discriminate and to reject African Americans, Mexican Americans and other 
minorities who offered to buy or rent in a white neighborhood, then segregated public 
neighborhood schools would be a “natural” outcome.  Consequently, the ACLU, the NAACP, 
and other and other civil rights organizations set Crawford aside, and began an arduous legal 
fight to eliminate Proposition 14 from California law.  Crawford would have to wait.373  
Correspondence to LACBE regarding school desegregation all but ceased.374  In early 1965, the 
cause of school desegregation lost one of the most fervent supporters, board member Mary 
Tinglof, who decided not to run for reelection.  After a primary and a runoff election, Reverend 
James E. Jones, a member on the advisory board of the UCRC, prevailed, replaced Tinglof, and 
became the first African American to serve on LACBE. 
As civil rights organizations challenged Proposition 14, there was a relative lull in the 
desegregation debate.  In February 1966, Mr. David Ziskind, Chairman of the CRCSC 




and compensatory education.  Undaunted by the lack of progress in school desegregation, 
Ziskind highlighted some of the organization’s principles relating to public education, among 
them that: 1) education was a basic human right and an important instrument of individual and 
social change and 2) the goals of education applied equally to all human beings.375  Ziskind 
proposed that LACBE help students reach their full potential, to recognize individual and 
cultural differences in the student population, and to create a sensitive environment that would 
bring together people of different races, religions, backgrounds and social classes.  Ziskind 
argued that all students suffered under these conditions, not only minority students attending 
racially isolated minority schools.  Quality, integrated education, “as opposed to desegregation,” 
could counter the negative effects segregated schools inflicted on all students. 
While Tackett and the NAACP-UCRC equated school desegregation with equal 
educational opportunity, and compensatory education programs in minority neighborhoods with 
“separate but equal” education, the CRCSC’s Ziskind proposed that integration and 
compensatory education programs were not mutually exclusive strategies, and that combining 
them would achieve quality education for minority students in the district.376  Ziskind stated, “We 
believe, therefore, that throughout every school district programs of integration must be 
accompanied by massive programs of ‘differential education’ or what has been known as 
compensatory education” (emphasis mine).377  The CRCSC disagreed with Tackett and the 
UCRC-NAACP over how to improve education in Los Angeles, highlighting the political 
fragmentation among civil rights organizations that backed different desegregation strategies. 
Middle-class white parents from the Crenshaw area of Los Angeles also backed 
desegregation, and their story remains one of the untold stories of Los Angeles’ desegregation 
saga.   Crenshaw parents of white and middle class backgrounds complained to LACBE about 
racial imbalance and increasing racial segregation of its schools, as white families continued to 
flow out of the area.  They detailed recent stories of two increasingly segregated minority 
schools, Dorsey High School and Audubon Junior High School.  Lee T. Coleman, a member of 
the Board of Directors of Crenshaw Neighbors, Inc., (CN), a community organization fighting to 
maintain racial balance in their neighborhood schools, referred to the condition as an ongoing 
“crisis.”378  He and CN worried about the dropping white enrollment at Dorsey High School, in 
which the white enrollment had dropped below ten percent.379  (In 1964, whites made up about 




Coleman and the 750-member CN asked LACBE to stabilize the existing integrated 
schools in the Crenshaw area with “unquestionably strong educational programs” to secure white 
enrollment.  Coleman recounted some of Dorsey’s recent history, which included a quick 
succession of new principals, “waves of disciplinary problems” that included incidents of 
violence, transfer requests, and acrimony between the community and school administration.  
Coleman faulted LACBE for not intervening more forcefully to deal with the problems at the 
school and to help stop white student flight.  He implored LACBE to develop an integration 
policy that would slow or halt the out-migration of white students by the beginning of the 1966 
academic year.380 
 Donald L. Loughery Jr., representing a group of Crenshaw High School parents, believed 
integration was central to the welfare and development of children.  He asked LACBE to 
integrate its schools so that the student body in each “would reflect proportions which would be 
approximately equal to the racial proportions “ in Los Angeles.  Laughery offered an insightful 
overview of the demographic transformation of Dorsey High School, from a majority white 
school to a racially segregated African American school.  He recounted: “In the specific case of 
Dorsey High, the school was  imbalanced in favor of Caucasian students until the late 1950’s, 
when a trend toward integration began.  The school has moved much too far toward re-
segregation in favor of Negro students by now.”381  Laughery pressed for a limited number of 
recommendations to alleviate segregation and improve educational opportunities, including 
designating Dorsey a magnet school to improve the education at the school as well as attract 
white students.  These efforts, Laughery hoped, would promote a “healthy intermixture and 
interaction among all races which neighborhood integration has failed to achieve.”382 
 Mrs. Katherine Cohen, representing a group of Audubon Junior High School parents, 
pleaded for LACBE intervention to stop Audubon from becoming yet another minority 
segregated school.  She demanded LACBE adopt and implement an integration policy “without 
delay,” to implement a student-transfer integration policy, and a human relations program to 
promote integration and to bring together parents, student, and all school personnel.383  In 
addition, she asked LACBE to consider the Crenshaw area and its surrounding communities to 
serve as testing grounds for a pilot integration program.384 
 Whereas Laughery and Cohen remained hopeful that LACBE would help to “stabilize” 




keep their children in Crenshaw area schools, Olive Walker, another Crenshaw-area parent, 
underscored how increasing racial segregation in area schools forced her to make some difficult 
educational choices for her children.  Four years earlier, Walker had moved from an integrated 
area to Crenshaw, at a time when “both the schools and the neighborhood were integrated.”385  
“However,” she noted, “it [Crenshaw] has steadily become a minority area in terms of schools,” 
causing her “great concern.”386  Walker implored LACBE to adopt an integration policy because 
she believed that integrated education prepared her children “for the kind of adult world they will 
face.”387  She wanted them exposed to “the ideas, point of view, and the culture of other 
minorities and the majority group.”388  Walker enrolled one of her two children in private school.  
If the schools continued on a path toward segregation, Walker expressed contemplating 
transferring her children to schools out of the area or sending both to private schools.  Her case 
in point exemplified how some parents valued an integrated education.  However, without an 
existing desegregation policy and plan, or plans to “stabilize” the racial demographics of a 
school before it became a racially isolated minority school, LACBE inaction forced parents like 
Walker to leave increasingly segregated, minority schools, thus aggravating the school 
segregation problem.  Her case in point exemplified how a numerical minority of white parents 
who valued an integrated education became unwilling participants in school and residential 
segregation. 
 As many civil rights organizations fought Proposition 14 in the courts, others continued 
to press LACBE for school desegregation.  In April 1966, Magdalene O’Rourke, of the UCRC’s 
Education Committee to which Tackett belonged, asked LACBE to direct Superintendent 
Crowther to implement a comprehensive “Master Plan to Abolish Defacto Segregation in the 
Public School System” using various desegregation techniques including but not limited to 
busing, pairing, and boundary changes.389  In early May, 1966, Mrs. Mary Tinglof Smith, former 
LACBE board member and now the education chairwoman for the Community Relations 
Conference of Southern California (CRCSC) condemned both de jure and de facto segregation 
before LACBE.390  She backed recent ACLU, UCRC, Sunland-Tujunga Human Relations 
Council, Neighbors Unlimited,391 and Crenshaw Neighbors presentations condemning increasing 
de facto segregation throughout the district.392  Additionally, she pointed out yet another pattern 
of increasing racial segregation in Los Angeles schools: “[A]s parents withdraw and transfer 




have their children attend resegregated schools.”393  “Thus,” she added, “school segregation often 
is promoting residential segregation… .”394  According to Smith, this problem required LACBE 
to intervene by developing and promoting a district-wide integration plan.395 
 LACBE ignored Tinglof Smith’s and community pleas for school desegregation.  On the 
very day of Tinglof Smith’s presentation, Reverend James E. Jones introduced a resolution for 
voluntary bus transportation “for elementary school students on double or short sessions to 
relieve overcrowded classrooms” starting on September 1966.396  Although limited in scope, a 
few students would avoid overcrowding and experience a desegregated educational setting.  The 
board defeated the motion 4 – 3.  Jones, Hardy, and LACBE President Richardson voted for it, 
while Chambers, Gardner, Smoot, and Willett together defeated it.  The vote defeating a limited 
voluntary desegregation strategy represented a crucial victory for anti-integrationists on the 
board and throughout Los Angeles. 
 In June, the United Civil Rights Council (UCRC) continued its criticism of LACBE, but 
this time it presented its grievances before the State Board of Education.  Besides denouncing 
LACBE for failing to counter segregation, the UCRC challenged funding for LACBE’s 
compensatory education programs.  It asked the State Board of Education to withhold “approval 
of $13 million in federal aid designed to continue compensatory education for 70,000 low-
income area children at 145 schools” because such funding would allow LACBE to avoid 
confronting school segregation.397 
LACBE had an ally, Parents for Better Education (PBE), a group that favored 
neighborhood schools and opposed busing for racial balance and integration.398  Its spokesperson, 
Laurel Martin, praised LACBE for its unwillingness to “capitulate to the demands of those 
agitators and pressure groups who link all educational failures with the geographical location of 
the school room.”399  Martin added, “Segregation is irrelevant to education.”400  Tackett and 
others disagreed. 
Crawford 1966 
 In early July 1966, the ACLU took an unparalleled step when it amended Crawford on 
behalf of students from two separate racial minority backgrounds: African American and 
“Mexican descent.”401  In the amendment on behalf of “13 Negro youngsters and five children of 




segregation in schools under its jurisdiction,” and expanded the scope of the lawsuit beyond 
segregation in Jordan High School and South Gate High School.402  The ACLU contended that 
segregation existed at Jordan High School as well as sixty-six predominantly African American 
elementary schools, thirty-four “nearly all of Mexican descent, and two where the great majority 
of the youngsters represent both.”403  Additionally, the ACLU claimed that fourteen junior high 
schools and eight high schools were segregated, “but did not specify as to race.”404  This 
amended filing was a watershed moment of cross-racial collaboration but went almost unnoticed, 
as it received very little media coverage.405 
Whereas in the original filing of the lawsuit, the ACLU and other civil rights 
organizations sought to halt the expansion of Jordan High School because it would perpetuate 
racial segregation, the amendment cited the board’s existing open-transfer policy for 
“perpetuating” racial imbalance and the board’s construction policies for “worsening” it.406  The 
ACLU elaborated on both claims.  The board’s transfer policy permitted “Caucasian children 
living in largely Negro neighborhoods to attend other schools.”407  As for the board’s 
construction policy, the ACLU claimed that LACBE chose “sites for new schools in 
neighborhoods where the predominance of the children are from one race, not on neighborhood 
boundaries or in mixed areas.”408  Furthermore, the ACLU accused the board of rejecting several 
desegregation strategies including redrawing school attendance boundaries.  The ACLU asked 
the court to issue orders that would bar LACBE from assigning students to attend segregated 
schools, end the transfer system, and require LACBE to choose construction sites that would 
help alleviate school segregation.409  Civil rights lawyers now prepared for the daunting task of 
challenging LACBE, an entity with an almost endless access to funds for any lawsuit. 
At the beginning of the 1966 school year, Tackett continued her fight for school 
desegregation and condemned the board for its continued lack of initiative to desegregate 
schools, for refusing federal money to fund a lunch program for underprivileged students, and for 
rejecting a state tax override for the latter.410  In addition, she charged that LACBE refused 
additional funding available through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) for 
“creative, imaginative, innovative educational projects that would make Los Angeles one of the 
demonstration centers of this country in overcoming de facto segregation and its companion, low 
quality education.”411  She accused LACBE of engaging in a double standard in its relationship 




desegregation in order to keep the federal government out of the issue, yet the board willingly 
accepted federal funding for compensatory education programs because it favored this policy 
over desegregation.412  Tackett tempered her criticism, however, by conceding that “some 
progress in teacher placement and promotion” had occurred, that the board had redrawn 
attendance boundaries in the city of Gardena that “favored integration” and adopted integrated 
textbooks.413  “By the same token, you have selected many new school sites where integration is 
impossible,” she claimed.414  She denounced LACBE compensatory education programs: “After 
three years of Compensatory Education L.A. style, ghetto children show no improvement on 
national tests.”415  “The basic problems in our schools are the Board of Education and School 
Administration,” she asserted, warning that the UCRC was prepared to do something about both 
“problems.”416 
In 1966, the California State Supreme Court struck down Proposition 14 as 
unconstitutional.  On appeal, the United States Supreme Court ruled in May 1967 that 
Proposition 14 was unconstitutional, therefore restoring the Rumford Act of other anti-
discrimination legislation.  Civil rights activists won a major court battle.  Proposition 14 and the 
legal fight to overturn it demonstrated that civil rights and “majority rule” in California were at 
odds.  Civil rights organizations could refocus their energy on Crawford.  In a related legal 
matter, Attorney-General of California Thomas C. Lynch ruled that “the $35 million earmarked 
by the 1966 [California] Legislature is to be spent in poverty areas and should be used to 
promote school integration.”417  The Los Angeles School District would receive about $21 
million.418  
On January 16, 1967, the Los Angeles City School District (LACDS) revealed the 
previously undisclosed racial and ethnic survey, which the State Board of Education had 
compelled it to conduct.  The statistics were compelling, but the district’s interpretation painted a 
rosy picture of the district’s racial demographics.  “The report revealed that the distribution of 
Spanish surname and Negro students is about equally divided in the system’s Unified District,” 
reported the LACDS through the district’s own Public Information Office.419  Although 
conceding that “the survey confirmed that the distribution of minority group students in schools 
usually reflect[ed] residential patterns of the community,” the district failed to report, though the 
statistics demonstrated, the highly segregated nature of the attendance boundaries, which 




A close look at individual schools at any level and in any area, and the aggregate student 
populations by level in any area revealed the racially segregated nature of school boundaries and 
areas.  At the elementary school level in the East area, 74.9% of students were of Spanish 
surname, with 18.2 “Other white,” and 3.2% “Negro.”421  The Valley, regardless of the region -- 
North, East, or West -- was by far the most racially segregated region of the Los Angeles School 
District.  In the Valley East region, 89.9% of elementary students were “Other white,” 8% were 
Spanish surname, and only 0.3% were “Negro.”422  In the Valley-North, 76% were “Other 
white,” 16.2% were Spanish surname, and 6.2% were “Negro.”423  In the Valley-West, the most 
racially segregated region in the school district, 94.8% of the students were “Other white,” 4% 
were Spanish surname, and 0.2% were “Negro.”424  The West region of the Los Angeles School 
District was one of the most desegregated regions of the district, with a population of 45.7% 
“Negro,” 41.7% “Other White,” and 6% Spanish surname.425  Birmingham, Canoga Park, 
Chatsworth, Cleveland, Granada Hills, Grant, Reseda, Taft and Van Nuys High Schools had a 
combined total of 19 “Negro” students.426  The statistics for teachers, administrators, and other 
certificated personnel in the San Fernando Valley were even more staggering and revealed the 
highly segregated nature of the district’s employee hiring and assignment practices.  “Other 
whites” occupied these positions of influence from 94.1% to 100%.  Overall, the report showed 
that the student population as a whole was diverse, but that patterns of residential segregation 
reflected the city’s deep social and geographical fragmentation along race and class. 
 In the summer of 1967, the Caugheys and the ACLU, and Tackett and the NAACP-
UCRC, and other civil rights organizations renewed desegregation efforts and opposed 
compensatory education.  In early June, LaRee Caughey emphasized the necessity for school 
integration over compensatory education programs, referencing a recent report by the United 
States Civil Rights Commission.  “Negro children,” LaRee Caughey quoted the commission’s 
report, “suffer serious harm when their education takes place in public schools which are racially 
segregated, whatever the source of such segregation may be.”427  According to LaRee Caughey, 
the commission also found that “Negro children attending desegregated schools that do not have 
compensatory education programs perform better than Negro children in racially isolated schools 
with such programs.”428  The commission also found that “compensatory education programs … 
are unlikely to improve significantly the achievement of Negro students isolated by race and 




compensatory education, this time pointing to the recent findings of a civil rights commission.  
On July 6, 1967, the ACLU’s John Caughey reiterated the ACLU’s efforts to desegregate public 
schools, pointed out LACBE inaction on the issue, and expressed concern over increased 
segregation.430 
 On behalf of the UCRC, Tackett asked LACBE again to “state your [desegregation] 
policy clearly and unequivocally” and end school segregation.431  Mr. Curtis Moody, Executive 
Director of the CRCSC, reminded the board of his organization’s pro-integration stance.  
Following the speakers’ presentations, board member Reverend Jones presented a motion that 
would compel LACBE to state and implement a clear and unambiguous desegregation policy.  
He moved: “THAT this Board of Education set as its goal a policy of complete desegregation 
and work toward this goal at all level and divisions of the system, and further that the staff be 
directed to devise and execute such plans as rapidly as possible.”432  Board member Julian Nava 
seconded the motion.  However, Gardner moved instead to refer Jones’ motion to the district’s 
Personnel and Schools Committee “for review and study, and hearings if necessary.”433  The 
alternate motion passed by a 6 - 1 vote, with Reverend Jones casting the lone vote in 
opposition.434 
In October 1967, LACBE informally endorsed an “explicit policy” of racial integration 
and asked the Personnel and Schools Committee to prepare it.435  In response, Santa Monica’s the 
Evening Outlook published a story in opposition to desegregation and busing but in defense of 
neighborhood schools.436  Nava, a member of the Personnel and Schools Committee, proposed a 
three-prong strategy towards integration.437  However, Gardner, too a member of the committee, 
contested such plans as too costly.  Reverend Jones, the chairman of the committee, stated that 
“the board should first adopt integration as policy and then explore various means of achieving 
it.”438 Marnesba Tackett, the Los Angeles Times reported, agreed with Jones’ cautious 
approach.439 
 In late October 24, the Personnel and Schools Committee completed its investigation on 
how to approach a desegregation strategy.440  On November 6, in connection with the 
committee’s findings, Reverend Jones announced that he would present a motion on November 
20 in which LACBE would reaffirm Directive 1 of the AHC, which called for ensuring equal 
educational opportunity for all students and recognizing that equal opportunity was “best 




cultures and ethnic background.”441  The motion also included the board’s equal employment 
opportunity policy.  The reaffirmation of AHC Directive 1 did not offer a new desegregation and 
implementation strategy, but the language of equal educational opportunity reaffirmed LACBE’s 
intentions to continue implementing compensatory education programs.  On November 16, 
Garner successfully passed a motion delaying a vote on the Jones motion until December 18, 
rather than voting on it on November 20. 
 On December 18, 1967, LACBE planned to vote on reaffirming its school desegregation 
and equal educational opportunity policy, but postponed the vote for three days, as integrationists 
from civil rights and religious groups,442 and anti-integrationists and anti-busers443 sparred over 
Reverend Jones’ motion.  Finally, on December 21, 1968, LACBE voted on Reverend Jones’ 
motion to reaffirm Directive 1 of the AHC.  LACBE received much correspondence for and 
against the motion.  Reverend Jones implored LACBE to take seriously the Ad Hoc Committee’s 
Directive 1, Policy of Providing Equal Educational Opportunities for All Pupils from its 1963 
report.  Among other recommendations, he called for the board’s unequivocal support for his 
motion to endorse Directive 1, which included setting up programs to avoid segregation and 
discrimination, improving student discipline, educational and vocational counseling, teacher 
placement, transfer and promotion, and better educational opportunity.  The motion included 
reaffirming the policy that no employee would be subjected to discrimination in hiring, teaching 
assignments, employee benefits, and job transfers based on their race, religious creed, color or 
national origin.444  Reverend Jones added that LACBE set as a goal integrating the district at “all 
levels and divisions” and instruct “the staff to develop every feasible technique and program to 
accomplish this goal.”445  To call attention to the urgency of desegregation, Reverend Jones 
pointed to the findings in a 1967 student racial survey of the district, which revealed “that the 
schools in the Los Angeles School System, especially in the mid-city areas are more de facto 
segregated than they were when the pronouncement of 1963 came forth” and asked the board to 
reaffirm the AHC Directive No. 1.446 
LACBE passed Jones’ motion by a 5-2 vote.447  However, on the same day it approved 
Jones’ motion, LACBE added a rider, which instructed the superintendent to report to LACBE to 
obtain explicit permission before implementing any measure to fulfill the integration policy.448  




of any desegregation effort, whether it originated from LACBE or by a court order, as well as 
halt or stall implementation of current desegregation policy.449 
 The adoption of the Jones’ motion was also significant for the outpouring of opposition 
that it evoked from the larger white community of Los Angeles.  Additionally, the vote 
represented the first instance in which the first African American and a Mexican American 
member voted together in support of a desegregation and equal educational opportunity policy.  
However, the 1967 vote also illustrated LACBE’s lack of resolve, as four years had passed since 
LACBE adopted an identical policy in response to the original Crawford lawsuit in 1963.  For 
the past four years, LACBE had failed to implement any viable desegregation plans. 
 The South Gate City Council had previously passed a resolution opposing busing, and as 
a response to the most recent LACBE de facto segregation policy, other city councils passed 
similar resolutions.  On January 16, 1967, the Vernon City Council passed an anti-busing and 
anti-desegregation resolution, declaring its opposition to “the unnecessary inter-school 
transportation of school children from one area to the other within the Los Angeles Unified 
School District.”450   While affirming its support for compensatory education programs, the 
council asked LACBE to rescind its new policy on de facto segregation. 
 Also in January, the Daily Signal, a South Gate newspaper, reported that Jones, a backer 
of desegregation and the architect of LACBE’s policy reaffirming equal educational 
opportunities and recognizing de facto segregation, opposed busing.  “I am not now, never have 
and never will be as a parent, private citizen, or member of the board of education, in favor of 
involuntary busing for purposes of integration,” the paper quoted Jones.451  Board member Nava 
told the paper he preferred integrating through programs such as Area Program for Enrichment 
Exchange (APEX), “where students move to different areas on a voluntary basis for specific 
classes.”452  Increasingly, the discourse over desegregation revolved around voluntary busing 
versus involuntary busing, even though LACBE’s new policy on de facto segregation did not 
refer to busing.453
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concluded that opponents of school desegregation were “expressing themselves primarily in terms of fear,” with a 
basis on the belief that “Negroes are unclean, immoral, inferior, vicious, and on the whole second class human 
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the district.  The crux of their research focused on the following whether “de facto” Mexican American segregated 
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Chapter 2: Diverse Waves of Protest: Black and Brown Student Activism Transforms the 
Integration Debate 
 
 In a special meeting on March 4, 2008, the Los Angeles Board of Education (from now 
on LACBE) granted formal recognition to Sal Castro, a former Lincoln High School social 
studies teacher and Chicano education advocate, and students instrumental in the student 
demonstrations of 1968 for their “OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP AND COMMITMENT TO 
EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE.”1  Forty years after the student demonstrations, Castro and several 
East L.A. student leaders, as well as the hundreds of students who participated in demonstrations 
commonly known as the Blowouts, received formal recognition for their courage in protesting 
educational inequality in Los Angeles by demanding improvements to minority neighborhood 
schools.  In 2009, LACBE voted to name a new middle school after Sal Castro, a school that 
opened on June 5, 2010.  In 2011, Castro and historian Mario T. Garcia published Blowout!: Sal 
Castro and the Chicano Struggle for Educational Justice, a testinomio about the life and times of 
Sal Castro.2 
While the school board officially recognized Castro and many Chicano students 
influential in the walkouts, and East L.A. and South-Central L.A. schools whose students 
participated in the demonstrations, the school board did not officially recognize any individual 
African American students whose participation in student demonstrations was also instrumental 
in 1968.3  One such student was Floyd Benton, an African American Thomas Jefferson High 
School pupil who spoke before LACBE after some of the early student demonstrations had 
occurred.  On March 7, 1968, before a large crowd in the LACBE auditorium, Benton told 
school board members, “We are mad and we don’t want to hear people tell us to wait.  You 
people better start jiving and get serious … because nobody is playing around here today.  We 
don’t want a little no more—we want a lot now.”4  Benton made his declaration before a raucous 




parents, and community organizers, a supportive white teacher from a South-Central L.A. high 
school, and Chicano students and activists from East L.A. in attendance. 
Jeering ensued after Benton spoke, prompting LACBE President Georgiana Hardy, 
following an unsuccessful attempt to restore order, to adjourn the meeting.  As the distressed 
board members fled through a back door to avoid a vocal barrage from the crowd, Reverend 
James E. Jones, the first ever African American elected to LACBE, told the crowd, “You asked 
for a black administrator.  No later than Monday you will have a black administrator at 
Jefferson.”5  His comments were in response to one of the demands Benton presented to LACBE 
asking for an African American principal.6  As LACBE members walked out of the auditorium, a 
Brown Beret went to the microphone and warned the board: “If you walk out today, we will walk 
out tomorrow.”7  African American and Mexican American students and their communities 
voiced their disapproval of the unequal educational opportunities in their respective 
neighborhoods. 
 In the spirit of recognizing Benton, other African American students, and Chicano 
students who demanded educational reform in 1968, this chapter highlights the separate but 
overlapping student demonstrations in South-Central L.A. and East L.A. in 1968 and the 
demands and contributions each group made toward educational justice.  The response from the 
communities to student and community activism varied.  During the following months, with the 
exception of some community leaders, the South-Central L.A. community remained largely 
silent in response to the student unrest at Jefferson High School and other South-Central L.A. 
schools.  However, East L.A. student demonstrators faced opposition from inside and outside 
their community, a backlash that highlighted the political tensions present within the Chicano 
community.  
Many African American students from South-Central L.A. and Chicanos from the barrios 
believed improving the educational opportunities in their respective racially isolated 
communities represented a worthwhile investment towards enhancing the conditions in the urban 
environment.  There is scant but important documentation showing that African American and 
Chicano student organizers planned to carry out demonstrations simultaneously, and even invited 
students from the Los Angeles Westside (from now on the Westside) to join them, which 




A study about L.A.’s racial and education politics during the second half of the twentieth 
century would be incomplete without an analysis of the Watts Rebellion.  This chapter examines 
the nearly non-existent response to the 1965 Watts Rebellion from LACBE.  After the social 
unrest, LACBE did very little to improve education in the inner city.  LACBE missed an 
opportunity to enact immediate policy to help improve education in the inner city, generally, and 
South-Central L.A., specifically. 
More broadly, in this chapter, I argued that the student protests in South-Central L.A. and 
East L.A. transformed the integration debate from a debate about implementing racial integration 
or compensatory education to one about concurrently addressing integration, compensatory 
education, and bilingual/bicultural education.8  The demonstrations also represented an 
alternative vision to integration, a legal struggle that brought about a cross-racial coalition of 
African American and Mexican Americans.  The racial politics of the education debates also 
underwent a transformation in which a black-white framework was compellingly replaced by a 
multiracial, largely black-brown-white framework, as the demonstrators obliged LACBE to 
change school curriculum that took into consideration the racial and ethnic backgrounds and 
histories of the district’s diverse student body.  In this chapter, I include the 1965 Watts 
Rebellion as a precursor to the 1968 South-Central L.A. and East L.A. student protests, and show 
that LACBE did nothing to improve education in the inner-city in spite of the social unrest and 
the McCone Commission report’s analysis that clearly identified neighborhoods in South-Central 
L.A. and East L.A. as suffering from low educational achievement. 
In 1963, civil rights groups supporting racially integrating the city’s schools in the Mary 
Crawford vs. Los Angeles City Board of Education extended an invitation to the East L.A. 
community to join the desegregation case, which Chicano community leaders refused.  Rather 
than seeking integration, Chicano leaders preferred compensatory education programs in the 
form of educational and physical improvements to their neighborhood schools and 
bilingual/bicultural education.  In 1968, East L.A. students made numerous demands stressing 
compensatory and bilingual/bicultural education, demands that closely mirrored the community’s 
rationales for declining to participate in Crawford in 1963. 
In March 1968, thousands of African American and Chicano student demonstrators from 
South-Central L.A. and East L.A. high schools participated in some of the city’s most vocal 




illustrated city’s racially fragmented nature, even instances where the communities shared 
common concerns.  While Crawford made its way through California’s court system, on the 
ground African American and Chicano students and their supporters demonstrated for better 
education at several high schools and at the board of education headquarters on their terms.  I 
placed the student demonstrations within the broader context of the school desegregation story.  
My work is also a direct response to teacher and education activist Sal Castro who called for 
more work about the South-Central L.A. student demonstrators.9 
The 1968 East L.A. student protests have become synonymous with Chicano cultural 
pride.  Mario T. Garcia and Sal Castro’s Blowout! and a recent film have secured for the 
Blowouts an important standing in the city’s racial and civil rights history.  However, the African 
American South-Central L.A. student demonstrations have remained largely unnoticed with only 
scant work analyzing the events at South-Central L.A. schools.  The Chicano community’s 
rationales to reject the civil rights lawyers’ invitation to join Crawford in 1963, based on cultural 
differences as opposed to similar experiences and struggles, largely formed the basis of separate 
African American and Chicano student protests five years later.10  While East L.A. students 
insisted on Mexican American and Mexican history, and bilingual and bicultural education, 
Jefferson High students demanded a “Negro” principal and “Negro” history.  The number of 
demands also accounted for one obvious difference.  African American students presented only 
four main demands, while the East L.A. student demands numbered over twenty at first.  The 
small number and specificity of the African American student demands made their approval or 
rejection more expedient.  In the long run, the large number of demands from East L.A. students 
produced a back-and-forth between the students, on the one hand, and the board and the 
superintendent, on the other.  East L.A students also had to contend with a divided student body 
and backlash, from inside and outside their community.  The separate student demonstrations in 
South-Central L.A. and East L.A. demonstrated that diversity and residential segregation 
coexisted in Los Angeles and led to wholly separate calls for educational change from minority 
students. 
In this chapter, I detailed the backlash to the student unrest from within and outside of 
South-Central L.A. and East L.A. communities.  In an effort to disassociate themselves and their 
communities from the student protests, some African Americans and Chicanos too condemned 




respective communities.  Student protesters, particularly from East L.A., met with much 
resistance from their fellow students, teachers, school administrations, and many outside the 
community.11  Chicano and other “Spanish surname” teachers from East L.A. schools had 
reached middle-class respectability and, like their counterparts in Jordan High School, had a 
choice: to support or denounce the student demonstrations.  While, some African Americans felt 
uneasiness towards the South-Central L.A. protests, many remained largely quiet. 
Outside the affected minority communities, many white Angelenos who opposed 
integration failed to recognize that student demonstrators’ calls for compensatory and 
bilingual/bicultural education represented an alternative to integration.  Focused solely on the 
students’ race and ethnicity, many white residents voiced their concerns, frustrations, and fears, 
and mocked LACBE for listening to and being lenient on the demonstrators.  Often, white 
Angelenos threatened to wield their political clout and oust board members who did not 
acquiesce to their demands.  Ironically, white Angelenos often criticized the very board of 
education that protected white neighborhood schools by persistently avoiding serious 
consideration of school integration and busing. 
The Watts Rebellion and LACBE’s Response 
 On August 11, 1965, a police incident involving a white police officer, a traffic stop, and 
the arrest of members from a single African American family sparked immediate outrage and 
one of the city’s major cases of civil unrest, the Watts Rebellion of 1965.  Long held beliefs of 
discrimination and harassment at the hands of police officers within the African American 
community transformed a single traffic violation into a full-scale weeklong episode of violence, 
destruction, and death.  The civil unrest resulted in thirty-four deaths; over one thousand injured; 
almost four thousand arrests; and one thousand buildings either damaged or destroyed.  So 
widespread was the rioting, looting, and property damage, that the California National Guard had 
to intervene and assist an overwhelmed police department.  I argue that in spite of the 
widespread devastation in the city, LACBE did nothing supplemental to improve education in 
South-Central L.A. in response to the rebellion because it viewed the unrest largely as a sign of 
broader societal problems, and because LACBE members were convinced that the existing 





The Watts Rebellion forced LACBE to take emergency measures to ensure the safety of 
students and teachers, and to assist the National Guard.  LACBE shut down sixty-eight 
elementary schools, twelve junior high schools, and seven high schools, among them Jordan and 
Jefferson High Schools, both located in South-Central L.A.12  LACBE permitted the National 
Guard to use the district school buses to transport soldiers to the distressed areas and allowed 
eighteen schools in the riot-torn areas to station soldiers.13  Colonel Raymond J. Kopecky, of the 
146th Air Transport Wing of the California Air National Guard stationed in Van Nuys, thanked 
LACBE for permitting the use of its school buses.14  Although Los Angeles City School District 
Superintendent Jack Crowther authorized reopening eighty-four schools in the curfew areas on 
August 19, he ordered twelve to stay closed because the California National Guard remained 
stationed there.15 
 However, LACBE ultimately opted to do nothing new in response to the Watts Rebellion, 
and instead relied on existing plans to implement compensatory education programs.16  
Superintendent Crowther reaffirmed the district’s commitment to compensatory education 
programs, which he claimed had been established long before the Watts Rebellion.17  As 
suggestions to improve education in minority areas poured into the district, Crowther asked for 
calm and reminded the board and district personnel to “keep in mind the entire picture of the 
many programs and stepped up resources that have already been put into operation in our 
educationally disadvantaged area.”18  In other words, he deemed additional, immediate programs 
and resources in response to the Watts Rebellion unnecessary.  Crowther noted that the district 
was preparing to use forthcoming funds from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA) and the Economic Opportunity Act, and proceeded to submit compensatory education 
programs for consideration to LACBE.19 
The McCone Commission 
 At the state level, the Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, also known as 
the McCone Commission named after politician and former C.I.A. director John McCone, 
studied the underpinnings of the rebellion.20  LACBE member Reverend James E. Jones served 
on the commission.  In its report, the McCone Commission highlighted the centrality of 
education in American society as “the keystone of democracy.”  The committee explained that 




aids in the elimination of barriers of race and religion” and held “the greatest promise for 
breaking the cycle of failure which is at the core of the problems of the disadvantaged area.  
Hope centers on education.”21 
 The commission compared educational attainment in disadvantaged minority areas with 
affluent areas in Los Angeles, and found a shocking gap in educational attainment.  Watts and 
Avalon, which consisted of overwhelmingly African American populations, and Boyle Heights 
and East Los Angeles, predominantly Mexican American areas, ranked “least favorably in the 
county with respect to the following criteria: family income, male unemployment, education, 
family status, housing, the ratio of youth and aged to productive adults, and the status of youth in 
terms of neglect and delinquency.”22  By comparison, these disadvantaged areas’ statistics 
contrasted substantially with Pacific Palisades, Westwood, and Brentwood, predominantly white, 
affluent areas, which had the most favorable rankings “relative to the remainder of the county” in 
the same criteria.23  Achievement test scores for students in disadvantaged areas were lower in all 
subjects and at all grade levels under study.  Roughly 80% of the national fifth grade population 
achieved higher reading vocabulary scores than fifth grade students in the minority-
disadvantaged areas under study.24  Fifth-grade students in the studied advantaged areas ranked 
in the nation’s top nineteenth percentile in reading vocabulary, while citywide, students ranked 
in the top forty-eighth percentile.  The McCone Commission found that eighth and eleventh 
grade students in minority disadvantaged areas fared worse, with the latter’s scores ranging from 
the bottom twenty-seven to thirty-four percentile in reading vocabulary.25  The McCone 
Commission also revealed that about two-thirds of students who entered three high schools in 
“predominantly Negro areas” in South-Central L.A. dropped out before graduating from high 
school.26  These dropout rates constituted the highest dropout percentage in the forty-five senior 
high schools.27  The commission concluded that the low reading and writing levels of students in 
disadvantaged areas “is far too low for them either to advance in school or to function effective 
in society.”28   
Despite these distressing statistics, the McCone Commission’s overarching conclusions, 
however, placed blame solely on the students for their low educational achievement, blamed 
their educational shortcomings for de facto segregation, and virtually absolved the school system 
from any responsibility for low educational achievement in minority schools.  The commission 




Negro schools contributes to de facto segregation in the schools.  In turn school segregation 
apparently contributes importantly to all de facto segregation.”29  Therefore, the McCone 
Commission concluded, “We reason, therefore, that raising the scholastic achievement might 
reverse the entire trend of de facto segregation.”30  The McCone Commission did not propose 
school desegregation to combat de facto segregation, but rather proposed compensatory 
education to ameliorate segregation.  The McCone Commission members believed that 
compensatory programs such as an “Emergency Schools Literacy Program” and a permanent 
pre-school program beginning at age three would improve educational achievement in 
“emergency schools.”31  In spite of the commission’s findings and recommendations, LACBE 
did not implement any new immediate, compensatory education programs in addition to federal 
compensatory programs in the planning stages. 
Student Demonstrations, Outspoken Community Activists and Fleeing Board Members 
 There is only scant evidence suggesting that African American student activists from 
South-Central L.A. and Chicano student demonstrators, community activists, and their 
supporters, including United Mexican-American Students (UMAS) and the Brown Berets, 
coordinated the student walkouts.  I argued that the walkouts at Jefferson High School and 
predominantly Chicano high schools were completely separate endeavors, as their wholly 
distinctive demands illustrated.  The multiple waves of demonstrations represented the 
desperation of minority students for improved education.  Although the African American and 
Chicano students did not explain their sentiments about public education within their respective 
neighborhoods together, they clearly asserted some similar frustrations, hopes, and goals while 
pointing out underlying forms of prejudice, discrimination, and racism that affected the 
educational opportunities and aspirations of both groups. 
  In 1968, African American and Chicano students took on the task of demanding 
educational improvements in their respective racially isolated neighborhoods.  The 
demonstrations did not begin smoothly.  On March 1, 1968, approximately 500 student protesters 
walked out of Woodrow Wilson High School, which had a predominantly Chicano student 
population, located in El Sereno about seven miles northeast of downtown Los Angeles.  
According to teacher Sal Castro, students walked out because of the cancellation of a school 




that the students “attempted to stage a massive walk-out,” but were “prevented by locked gates 
and helmeted policemen who were standing by,” as well as by “a human chain of senior high 
students” who blocked the front door.33  The El Sereno Star recounted that some mothers 
controlled the small unruly group and “successfully ordered their children back to classes.”34  
Although it appears the students walked out of their classrooms but not out of the school 
grounds, the short-lived demonstration did not happen without incident.  Students threw 
“garbage over the fence and several teachers were hit by flying debris,” and there was a small 
scrimmage between students and police, but it quickly ended.35 
 Student protests quickly spread over the next two weeks to several schools.  On March 5, 
high school students from South-Central L.A. and East L.A. staged simultaneous protests at their 
racially segregated schools.36  At Thomas Jefferson High School, about “700 of the school’s 
1,900 predominantly Negro students boycotted the cafeteria … and assembled on the athletic 
field.”37  One the same day, students from James Garfield High School, located in East L.A.38 
also staged a massive walkout involving roughly “2700 of the 3750 predominantly Mexican-
American students,” an astounding estimated 72% of the student body.39  Sheriff deputies and 
police officers confronted the students, arresting a sixteen-year-old student and two other 
eighteen-year-old youths for failure to disperse.40  The wave of student demonstrations continued 
the following day. 
On March 6, African American students from Jefferson High School, and Mexican 
American students from Garfield High School, plus two more high schools with predominantly 
Chicano student populations staged more protests.  About 400 Jefferson High School students 
“congregated in the athletic field … and conducted an all-day boycott of classes,” reported the 
Los Angeles Times.41  The Jefferson students based their concerns on issues that specifically 
affected African American students and made demands that took into consideration their culture 
and history. Throughout the day, a “large group” of students, parents and school administrators 
met in the school library to discuss the students’ grievances,”42 which began with “cafeteria 
conditions” on March 5 but by March 6 had extended to the “dress code, restrictions on Negro 
youths wearing their hair in ‘natural cuts,’ the ‘insensitivity’ of teachers, performance of 
counselors, hiring of more Negro administrators in the area and guarantees against reprisals 




On the same day, emphasizing their cultural and neighborhood pride, Chicano students 
staged major walkouts at three predominantly Chicano high schools: Garfield High School, 
Theodore Roosevelt High School, and Abraham Lincoln High School.44  Unlike previous 
protests, students and the police clashed at Roosevelt.  About 250 Garfield High students 
boycotted classes and marched from campus to Atlantic Park, carrying signs emblematic of their 
desired policy changes and identity.  Signs such as “no more fences around the school” “smaller 
classes,” “strike now,” and “Chicano power” translated into Chicano demands for educational 
equity.45  Although members of UMAS, a college-student activist group consisting of students 
from college campuses around the city, “urged the high school youngsters to return to classes,” 
students marched back to Garfield “where other students were urged to join them, and about 100 
returned to the park for more discussions.”46  Garfield Principal Reginald Murphy called “an 
impromptu assembly,” where he read a list of student demands.  Some student leaders “urged an 
end to the boycott” during the assembly.47 
At Roosevelt High School, an estimated two to four hundred students out of a student 
body of 3200 gathered in front of the school after noon recess, according to the Los Angeles 
Times.48  Vice Principal Ted Siegel alleged that students left classes “at the urging of outsiders, 
including members of the Brown Berets, a militant Mexican-American group.”49  The crowd 
walked to Evergreen Park, returned to the school “to urge other students to leave classes,” and 
the subsequent crowd assembled on the sidewalks.50  The students purportedly “began hurling 
objects at passing motorists.”51  The police arrived and declared “an unlawful assembly,” 
attempting to clear the sidewalks and break up the crowd.52  Violence reportedly ensued, and a 
police officer was hospitalized.53  The police took numerous youths into custody and placed one 
fifteen-year-old under arrest in connection with the injured officer.54  The Roosevelt 
administration dismissed classes, and the student demonstrators soon left.55 
Students at Lincoln High School also staged a walkout on March 6.  Roughly five 
hundred students “left classes … and paraded 10 blocks to the school district’s area offices.”56  
There, two East L.A. secondary and elementary school superintendents, Stuart Stengel and 
Herbert Cadwell, met with the demonstrators and discussed student demands “over a public 
address system.”57  Stengel “promised to set up a meeting of community groups, administrators 




organizers would have the opportunity to voice their grievances.58  The demonstrations 
increasingly gained the attention of school administrators, and continued the following day. 
 After the simultaneous demonstrations at four high schools on March 6, students at yet 
another Los Angeles high school staged a walkout on March 7.  Students protested at Belmont 
High School, “a racially mixed school,” according to the Los Angeles Times’ Richard West and 
David Larsen.59  Four Mexican Americans carrying picket signs urged students to walk out of 
classes, and demonstrators stoned two police cars upon their arrival.60   Police Chief Tom Reddin 
later claimed, “Non-student agitators were ‘particularly evident’ during the outbreak [at 
Belmont].”61  When police officers with “riot sticks ordered all youths back into their 
classrooms,” the skirmish was over.62  “Nine non-students but only one student were arrested at 
Belmont,” recounted The Los Angeles Times.63  “One was charged with inciting others to riot and 
nine with refusal to disperse,” The Los Angeles Times added.64  Furthermore, the newspaper 
reported that “roughly two hundred students” at Garfield High School “cut morning classes” and 
gathered at Atlantic Park.65  This walkout at Garfield was relatively peaceful and proceeded 
without incident.66  The pattern of wholly separate student demonstrations along race and culture 
also played out during a LACBE meeting on March 7.  
It was a LACBE meeting like no other.  On March 7, 1968, six days after the first signs 
of student unrest, and following the protests at Belmont and Garfield high schools earlier that 
day, LACBE held a meeting to appraise the student demonstrations.  Board member Dr. Julian 
Nava, who was the lone Mexican American on the board, played an important role in this 
meeting.67  During the meeting, Dr. Nava introduced a list of student demands, a Brown Beret 
pamphlet, and an anti-walkout flyer by a Mexican American student organization.  The 
documents demonstrated splits among the Chicano students regarding the walkouts, and 
divisions within the Chicano community. 
 Authored by the Blowout Committee, the list of student demands with the glaring 
headline, “NO MORNING WALKOUT!!!” included demands numerous and sometimes broad in 
nature (see Figure 2.1).68  The top two demands called for establishing a mandatory reading 
program and improving the student-teacher and student-counselor ratios to 20:1 and 150:1, 
respectively.69  Curricular demands included teaching minority contributions to U.S. history and 
culture; offering “more languages and different advanced classes” like Latin and political 




also demanded, “Students with non-academic majors should be allowed and not discouraged, but 
encouraged to take academic courses.”  Students also advocated for bilingual teachers who could 
“communicate with more ease.” 
 To improve the well being of students, the student demonstrators asked for group 
counseling and the “Revival of child-welfare (knowledge of personal problems of children),” 
where “workers should be able to work in the evening and be able to speak fluently the language 
spoken at student’s home.”  Demands also included the abolishment of “all forms of corporal 
punishment,” where students were “not to be swatted at anytime [sic] for any reason”; and that 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Blowout Committee, Student Proposals, 1968.  In 1968, students from several East L.A. schools staged 
protests calling for changes in curriculum and improvements to their racially isolated neighborhood schools.  
Source: Student Unrest Part I, 3/7/68 – 4/3/1968, Box 682, Student Unrest Files, Board Secretariat, Los Angeles 





“Restrooms should remain open during schools hours.”  Furthermore, students called for the 
elimination of grade requirements for student officers, plus revisions to I.Q tests “to include 
knowledge of all community cultures” and to allow “a 10% lee-way [sic] for students from 
communities with different knowledge source material.”  Finally, they wanted restroom repairs, 
food inspection, a P.A. system, and the enforcement of “the same building standards for all races 
and communities.” 
 Chicano student activists wanted the dialogue with LACBE to continue.70  They asked to 
meet with board members at Hazard Park the following day or at a nearby school district office.71  
LACBE agreed that board members “not instructed by the Board and not to exceed three” could 
meet unofficially at Hazard Park with the “student representatives of several high schools” and 
listen to their grievances.72 
After six days since the early rumblings of student unrest, law enforcement officials had 
become increasingly concerned about the demonstrations.  During the March 7 meeting, LACBE 
listened to Los Angeles Police Department Police Chief Tom Reddin’s assessment of the student 
walkouts, and then declared its support for the use of courts and police force to halt any future 
demonstrations.73  Warning that, “We might be headed for some type of major confrontation 
between disruptive elements and the City of Los Angeles,”74 Chief Reddin called attention to 
school disturbances involving “persons who do not have a child in attendance at that particular 
school.”  He voiced concern about students “becoming pawns of professional agitators,”75 likely 
referring to the Brown Berets and possibly the Blowout Committee.  (The Blowout Committee 
was the central planning unit of the Chicano student demonstrators that combined the ideas of 
the student leaders from several district high schools participating in the Blowouts.)  According 
to Reddin, students lacked awareness of their circumstances and, as “pawns,” did not understand 
why they rebelled against LACBE, the school district, and the police.76  Reddin recommended 
developing policy to deal with student demonstrators and organizations that might plan future 
demonstrations.77  In response, LACBE members unanimously passed a resolution “directing 
School Superintendant Jack P. Crowther to seek such injunctions against outsiders who refuse to 
leave school property when ordered” and encouraging “the Superintendent to make use of the 
law to seek injunctive relief whenever he feels it necessary.”78  In other words, LACBE 




demonstrations.  The regular meeting concluded, with a special meeting scheduled to begin soon 
after. 
Immediately after Reddin’s appearance, the LACBE auditorium began to fill with student 
activists and their supporters, whom local newspapers identified as Jefferson High School 
students79 and a “predominantly Negro crowd” of roughly two hundred young people.80  
Individuals from the crowd wanted to voice their qualms to the board, but President Hardy 
refused due to a scheduled meeting with the Unified District Teacher Negotiating Council 
regarding teacher salary proposals.81  Suggesting “they could have their say at a special meeting” 
on Monday,82 Hardy “asked the crowd to leave so that teachers arriving for the salary discussion 
would have room in the 189-seat auditorium.”83 
However, “none of the young people rose to leave,”84 according to Los Angeles Times, 
even after Hardy called the subsequent special meeting to order.  During the Pledge of 
Allegiance, “about three-quarters of the youths remained seated and refused to recite the 
Pledge.”85  The board called roll, and the chairman of the Unified District Negotiating Council 
called the meeting to order.86  What followed was a break with protocol that many board 
members agreed on and would later regret.  LACBE minutes document that Mrs. Barfield, a 
member of the negotiating council “called attention to the large number of students and adults … 
in the audience” and stated that members of the negotiating council were “willing to relinquish 
their time … to hear presentations from those persons who wished to be heard.”87  President 
Hardy opposed this idea and referred to Board Rule 21 requiring twenty-four hours advanced 
notice to speak before LACBE.  Dr. Nava then proposed a motion waving the rule, and after 
Reverend Jones seconded the motion, the board voted six to one in favor.88 
 The first two speakers called on LACBE to improve educational opportunities at 
Jefferson High School, whose student body was overwhelmingly African American.  The board 
permitted a “Jefferson High white teacher and a Negro student speak for a total of five 
minutes.”89  African American Jefferson High School student leader Floyd Benton then faced 
LACBE members and told them “they had better do something for Jefferson students.”90  Max 
Kleinmintz, an English and speech teacher, called on the board “to appoint as administrator ‘a 
black man who will be able to relate to the students.’”91  He emphasized, “I feel he should be 




and Kleinmintz called on LACBE to improve education at Jefferson by, among other things, 
placing an African American administrator. 
 President Hardy wanted to return to the special meeting’s business on faculty salaries, but 
board member Dr. Ralph Richardson and other board members granted an individual the Los 
Angeles Times described as “a bearded member of the Brown Berets”93 to speak on “the 
condition that if there is further disturbance the meeting will be adjourned.”94  Although the 
details about what happened next are very sketchy, it culminated in LACBE members abruptly 
adjourning the meeting and walking out of the boardroom.  The Los Angeles Times reported that 
when a “Brown Beret and a companion advanced to the microphone, [Hardy] adjourned the 
meeting.”95  The newspaper summarized the meeting’s dramatic end this way: “Two hundred 
young persons broke up a meeting of the City Board of Education and sent most board members 
fleeing out a rear door Thursday as a climax to a day of boycotts, arson and the stoning of police 
cars at schools attended by minority groups.”96  According to LACBE minutes, an unidentified 
young man “addressed the members of the Board concerning a situation at John Marshall High” 
but because “there was further disturbance in the audience, the President requested the roll to be 
called to adjourn the meeting,” and LACBE approved by a 6-1vote.97  As the other board 
members filed out of the boardroom, Reverend James E. Jones, the lone African American board 
member, promised to appoint an African American administrator at Jefferson high School.98  As 
the board members continued to walk out, the Brown Beret did not waste the opportunity to 
speak further.  He warned LACBE: “If you walk out today, we will walk out tomorrow.”99  With 
these words, the meeting ended, and the crowd “left the board room in an orderly manner.”100 
On March 8, Lincoln High School students, yelling “Walkout! Walkout” and “Blowout!  
Blowout,” walked out of their classes, with college students and the Brown Berets aiding in their 
efforts.101  In Blowout! Mario T. Garcia and Sal Castro explained they day’s event: 
The media … were there … The police were also there, but in a nonthreatening way.  
They knew, or maybe I told them, that we were going to march to Hazard Park, and they 
agreed to escort us there.  It became a big parade.  They controlled the traffic to allow the 
kids to cross the streets.  They even let me sit on top of an unmarked police car and be 
driven to the park.102 
 
According to Garcia and Castro, other high schools and junior high schools joined the March 8 
walkout, totaling fifteen schools and including city and county schools “all the way from 




Fernando Valley school, North Hollywood High, participated.  “White kids walked out in 
sympathy from schools such as University High and North Hollywood High,” Garcia and Castro 
wrote.104  “I even heard that some elementary students in East L.A. did their version of the 
walkout.  These may have been the youngest brothers and sisters of the older kids,” they 
explained.105  They estimated that about 20,000 students protested in one form or another in the 
student walkouts.106  
After the walkout at Lincoln and other East L.A. schools, an estimated 500 to 700 student 
protesters gathered at Hazard Park.  LACBE followed through with its promise to meet 
unofficially with student representatives there, with board members Richardson and Nava in 
attendance.107  Speaking before the crowd, Richardson stated, “To the extent that you have 
dramatized the problems, you have me.”108  Moctesuma Esparza, a walkout leader, told 
Richardson that the students would only negotiate with the whole school board.109  Nava, for his 
part, promised no disciplinary action against walkout participants as long as violence did not 
occur.110  City Councilman Ed Roybal also attended the rally.  Some tense moments developed 
when the police began to close in on the crowd, with student leveling some verbal jabs at the 
police.  Garcia and Castro wrote that Roybal asked the police to leave, declaring, “We don’t need 
the police here.  We can take care of business ourselves.”111 
Teacher and Community Support for Jefferson High School Student Protesters 
Following the raucous board meeting of March 7, Jefferson High School students held 
meetings.  They conducted one meeting at the school gym and another in the school library with 
none other than LACBE President Georgiana Hardy.  When demonstrations took place in 
Jefferson High School on Friday, March 8, 1968, the administration dismissed school early.  
School administrators later decided to close the school on March 11 and 12 as a matter of public 
and student safety.112 
On Saturday March 9, before school administrators decided to close Jefferson High 
School on March 11 and 12. Jefferson High School Faculty President John Herrod and teachers 
Max Kleinmintz and Ralph A. Wright made efforts to have students return to classes without 
police presence.  It was their opinion that “the progress made toward getting the students to 
return to class will be negated should policemen be sent to the campus.”113  Many other Jefferson 




faculty voted in support of one of the boycotting students’ central demands.  By a vote of 46-33, 
the Jefferson High School teachers voted to support hiring a Black principal who was qualified 
and whom “the Board of Education and the Area Supervisor will support” to replace Dr. Frank 
B. Snyder, who was on “illness leave” indefinitely.114  The Jefferson High School teachers also 
sought improvement in students’ education and in school facilities, having submitted numerous 
recommendations to the board.  They asked for additional teacher aides from the community, 
three more counselors (college and vocational counseling), ten more teachers, a psychologist, a 
human relations expert for faculty, an academic dean, and more clerical help for offices and 
teachers.115 
To improve student-teacher relations, the Jefferson High School faculty insisted that 
teachers gain an understanding of the “Black culture” through “weekly afternoon dialogues”; a 
program called “Project Live-in, where teachers should go home with children and vice versa”; 
retreats; and teacher workshops to “ensure community understanding.”116  They suggested that 
teachers willing to work extra hours should be paid on what they referred to as "“on a 
professional level.”117  The faculty also recommended reductions in class size to twenty-five 
students, and that students have the freedom “to leave campus at noon.”118  To improve teacher-
administration communication, the faculty offered the creation of a review board “made up of 
faculty and students to hear student and/or parent grievances”; faculty meetings to have “Negro 
history” workshops; and time allocated “for teachers to talk and solve problems.”119 
 Over the weekend, African American pastors — some of the most revered members in 
the African American community — also lent vocal support to the Jefferson High School 
students.  They called on LACBE to fulfill Reverend Jones’ promise of placing “a Negro 
principal” at Jefferson High by the following Monday, and linked the plight of the African 
American and Chicano student protests.  Reverend Lloyd Galloway, Pastor at the Lincoln 
Memorial Congregational Church, sent a telegram to the board to “take action today March 11th 
supportive of the commitment Rev. James Jones, your minority member, made to the Negro and 
Mexican American communities,” to “appoint a Negro principal at Jefferson High School.”120   
Suggesting that the appointment of an African American principal would prevent future 
demonstrations, Galloway asserted, “You can save the militant action of the community from 
erupting if you will acknowledge the actions of Mr[.] Jones to be in the best interest of the Los 




needs.”121  Some pastors sent impassioned telegrams to the board in support of keeping the police 
away from schools. 
In light of the school closures, LACBE enforced a “planned program of readmission” at 
Jefferson High in order to regain a sense of control over the students, restore a degree of order, 
and prevent future demonstrations.  Students who desired to return to Jefferson High after the 
school reopened had to maneuver through a bureaucratic process in which the board required 
parents to sign a letter indicating they understood “that the school must operate under the control 
of the school staff in order to provide the kind of educational experiences you want.”122  To 
LACBE, the signatures symbolized a promise that “we will have the cooperation [of parents and 
students] necessary to operate a successful educational program.”123  The board further stipulated 
that identification cards “will be issued to all students who are readmitted with the signed letter, 
and only students with such signed identification cards will be permitted on the school 
grounds.”124  Theoretically, students whose parents chose not to sign the forms could be rejected 
from taking classes at Jefferson. 
The student unrest compelled LACBE immediately to schedule a special meeting for “the 
purpose of receiving presentations regarding student unrest”125 and a regular meeting for 
Monday, March 11.126  The jam-packed meetings included “a tumultuous, three-hour session 
attended by nearly 200 students and parents in the board’s chambers.”127  Another three hundred 
people listened to the board meeting on loudspeakers outside the building.128  At the special 
meeting, Superintendent Crowther told LACBE members about a pending “administrative intern 
program to give minority persons experience in school administration, such program to be 
financed with funds from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.”129  Crowther 
recommended allotting fifteen positions to the Division of Secondary Education for training.130  
In many ways, the student demonstrations elicited the enactment of this policy, which gave 
individuals from minority backgrounds an opportunity to become part of a school’s 
administration.  This policy would be effective as soon as the State Department of Education 
approved it.  Representatives from the Blowout Committees of all five schools directly affected 
by the Chicano student demonstrations attended the board meeting.131 
 The student demonstrators prompted other students to speak out about educational 
problems in their schools.  At this meeting, for example, members of the Roosevelt High School 




discipline problems specific to Roosevelt High School students.  To address reading 
comprehension problems specifically, the Roosevelt student council committee recommended a 
mandatory reading program.132  The RHSCC alleged that the students’ reading problems “related 
to their particular cultural and/or bi-lingual backgrounds” was the greatest problem.133  The 
committee suggested numerous solutions, translating some of the broad solutions offered by the 
Blowout Committee into narrow recommendations.134  The Roosevelt student council 
committee’s efforts exemplified one of the notable effects of the student demonstrations. 
All five schools directly affected directly by the Mexican American student 
demonstrations had representatives from the Blowout Committees of each school before the 
Board.  Belmont High School had one representative.135  Students from Alexander High School, 
from Los Angeles’ Westside, and John Marshall High School, from the “north side.”  Three 
Hamilton High School students who were not listed as speakers for the special meeting 
submitted a letter of grievances.  Spencer Eth, representing the Community Advisory Committee 
to the Principal, Milt Friedman, a member of the Hamilton High School Student Awareness 
Club, and Rich Rosen, United Student Movement representative, explained, “Madame President 
and Board Members, Hamilton High School has a rapidly growing interest in the academic 
demands of our fellow high school students at Lincoln, Garfield, Jefferson, Belmont, and 
Wilson.”136  The Hamilton students, keenly aware of educational inequality between Hamilton 
High School and East L.A. schools, wrote, “The student body of Hamilton recognizes its good 
fortune in having a superb faculty and excellent facilities, but we refuse to allow this fact to 
interfere with our moral responsibility to assist our brothers.”137 They concluded, “Hamilton must 
be officially represented, not yet as speakers, but as fellow students interested in maintaining 
inter-school awareness.  A victory for one is a victory for all.”138  The Hamilton students believed 
that the East L.A. student demonstrators and their supporters also represented their interests in 
some way.  They indicated that they had concerns that the “superb” faculty and “excellent” 
facilities could be in jeopardy in the future and that the substandard education and poor 
educational facilities could become their problems within their Westside neighborhood schools 
too.  For those reasons, a few Hamilton students wholeheartedly supported the East L.A. 
protests. 
Considering the presentations by students, teachers, community organizations and others, 




continued.”139  Nava proposed holding a special meeting at Lincoln High School “to hear further 
statements from students and people in the [East L.A.] community.”140  Although Reverend Jones 
seconded the motion, board member J.C. Chambers challenged it by arguing that “the Board 
should not hold meetings in schools because this would cause a disruption of classes” and that it 
was “contrary to Board rules to listen to students without the permission of their parents.”141  
Reverend Jones countered and said he did not object to “holding a meeting of the Board 
elsewhere if all the proposals from all the different groups are taken into consideration.”142  
Board President Hardy agreed with the motion to meet with students, parents and community 
groups.  After much political maneuvering by Chambers, the board passed the motion by an 
overwhelming margin of six to one.143 
At the regular meeting that took place on March 11 after the special meeting, it became 
evidently clear that Chicano students did not all agree on direct action as a strategy to effect 
educational policy, even though many agreed with the demands themselves.  Public vocal 
demonstrations divided the community.  Garfield High School Student Strike Committee 
representative John Ortiz decried police intervention during student demonstrations.  Eliciting a 
standing ovation from students in attendance, Ortiz argued, “We will not have a special session 
of the board until the police are removed from the campuses.”144  Lincoln High School student 
Robert Rodriguez seconded the demand.145  Taking a different perspective on the demonstrations, 
Lincoln High School Student Body President Leonard Gomez claimed that he and other student 
body presidents supported the student demands but opposed the walkouts. 
 By the end of the day’s board meeting, LACBE had agreed in principle to two student 
demands.  First, the board agreed to hold a special meeting at Lincoln High to further examine 
the challenges East L.A. students faced in the classroom.  Second, it agreed to consider granting 
“amnesty” to students from the Eastside schools who walked out on March 11, as many East 
L.A. students missed school in preparation to attend the board meeting.  The board proved its 
willingness to listen to East L.A. students, as well as parents, community organizers, and 
students from other area schools seeking to contribute to the debate over educational inequality. 
However, in the immediate aftermath of the walkouts, Superintendent Crowther sought to 
reassert district control over students, developed new ways to stop the reoccurrence of 
demonstrations, and endorsed a strong alliance between school administrators and law 




procedures that created a web of culpability in cases of “disturbances or demonstrations on or 
adjacent to school sites caused by an individual or a group whether students or otherwise.”146  
The procedures mandated that law enforcement would “be in charge of all law enforcement 
aspects of the situation utilizing all appropriate means available,” and that “[s]chool employees, 
school or school related organizations, or community organizations shall not participate in or 
interfere with the operations of the law enforcement agency unless requested by the law 
enforcement agency and approved by the school administrator in charge.”147  The procedures also 
granted school administrators a great deal of discretion during emergencies. 
While the superintendent’s memo to administrators outlined a new student unrest policy, 
Crowther’s public announcement on March 11, 1968 called for an end to walkouts, warning that 
“further unauthorized absences will not be excused and that students who continue to leave their 
classes will be subject to appropriate disciplinary action before they can return to school.”148  The 
superintendent also threatened the students who dared to protest and/or be absent.  He asserted, 
“Starting from today, any student who leaves his classes goes with the knowledge and 
understanding that he or she must be ready to accept the consequences of appropriate 
disciplinary action.”149  Crowther also asked students to “persuade fellow students to remain in 
classes.”150  In short, the superintendent wanted to secure his, the school administrators’ and the 
board’s authority, now backed by law enforcement if necessary.  
 The superintendent targeted specific schools, thus scrutinizing all students attending these 
schools no matter their degree or lack of participation in the demonstrations.  His memo 
specified the affected schools: “Garfield, Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Wilson in East Los Angeles; 
Belmont in downtown Los Angeles; and Jefferson and Carver Junior High School in South 
Central Los Angeles.”151  By not implementing this policy across the district, Crowther singled 
out these minority schools as testing grounds for new policing measures.  On one hand, at the 
very least he endeavored to bring order to these schools.  On the other hand, Crowther’s singling 
out of these schools had the effect of punishing all the students who attended them.  These 
students were now under the scrutiny of law enforcement, school security, and school 
administrators.152  However, he sought to convince the student protesters that demonstrations 
were no longer necessary, and added, “Your viewpoint has now been heard—and has been made 




Increasing criticism against LACBE from outside the affected neighborhoods for 
listening to the student demonstrators continued after the March 11 meetings.  Some individuals 
disapproved of LACBE’s handling of the student unrest.154  Others blamed students and their 
parents for the unrest.155  Many white Angelenos erroneously linked the student demonstrations 
and the integration/busing debate as a part of a single minority movement, even though these 
issues were so far separate issues.156 
LACBE Appoints an African American Principal at Jefferson High School 
 The distinctive nature of the South-Central L.A. and East L.A. student demands 
compelled LACBE to try to resolve them separately.  On March 13, after Jefferson High School 
had been “closed for three days by a teacher walkout and student unrest,” according to the Los 
Angeles Times, the school “reopened peacefully Wednesday with three new administrators, all 
Negroes.”157  A Jefferson High School official reported that students appeared “jubilant” 
returning to classes.158  Reverend Jones’ promise to appoint an African American principal 
became a reality for Jefferson High School students.  The new principal Louis J. Johnson 
promised to institute necessary reforms but “not on a shotgun basis,” cautiously warning against 
any “rash decisions that we might later regret.”159  Though his appointment was directly 
attributable to the student unrest at Jefferson High School, Johnson opted to employ colorblind 
language to explain his appointment.  He argued, “I was taken from a list of qualified candidates 
in the regular way.  I feel that I can do the job, and I want to be here.”160  Councilman Thomas 
Bradley disagreed and believed that Johnson’s appointment was “in response to pressure.”161  
However, Bradley lamented, “Unfortunately (such pressure) was necessary to get the Board of 
Education to move.”162  He added, “We have reached a point (in history) where all kinds of 
methods are used to achieve results.”163 
Also on March 13, student activists from Jefferson defended themselves against attacks 
of unruliness and responded to LACBE fulfilling Reverend Jones’ promise to appoint an African 
American principal at Jefferson.  Jordan High School student demonstration leaders disputed 
accusations of behaving “unruly and violent” before LACBE.164  Floyd Benton, the courageous 
sixteen-year-old student who had spoken before LACBE on March 7, defended student activists 
against these charges, charged, “The news media, instead of dealing with the causes, jumped on 




new administration, asserting, “We’re behind not only the new principal, but anyone else willing 
to move ahead.”167  Another student organizer, Lawrence Bible, president of a student group 
called The Knights,168 claimed, “Some of the students here worked hard to make sure no trouble 
started.”169  By March 13, Jordan High School administrators reported “near normal” 
absenteeism.170 
A Supportive Minority Parent 
The correspondence to LACBE about the walkouts suggests that Angelenos across 
classes, and regions overwhelmingly opposed the walkouts.  However, some correspondence 
came from a small numerical minority that supported them.  Virginia Almaraz, who described 
herself as “the mother of seven children” from Gardena, California offered her personal 
experiences having been a student at Jordan High School in Watts.  In supporting the student 
demonstrations, she admitted, “I am the mother of seven children, so I’m no kid.  But, if I went 
to school today I would do the same thing as they are doing.”171  “When I went there [Jordan 
High School],” Almaraz recollected, “the teachers did not care if you knew the school work or 
not.  All they care about was if you were a good kid.  If you gave them no trouble you got an ‘A’, 
if you did, you got below a ‘C’.”172  Her unpleasant experiences at Jordan High School led her to 
enroll her children in parochial school.  “Because being Mexican-Americans, this way they have 
a better chance to get to college.  I know that if they went to a Los Angeles City School they 
would never have this chance,” she explained.173  She asserted that attending a Los Angeles 
public school would severely limit a Mexican American student’s chances of attending college.  
She reasoned that limited resources, indifferent teachers, explained why the students had 
protested for better educational opportunities. 
Almaraz empathized with the parents of the protesting students.  She offered insights into 
why parents had allowed their children to participate in the walkouts: 
Because they [the parents] remember when they went to school.  If they had gotten a 
better education, they would have better paying jobs today.  They would have better 
homes.  This is why they let them walk out.  They want something better for their own 
children.  They want them to have more than they ever had or will have.  Without an 
education you just can’t get ahead.174 
 
She believed that many of the parents of the student demonstrators had been subjected to the 




her generational analysis, Almaraz noted, “Our parents who moved here did not know what we 
were going through at school.  But we can see what our children feel.  In my case, what the 
students of East LA feel.”175  While her generation accepted and endured difficulties at school, 
her children’s generation did not remain quiet.  She concluded by asking: “How can you get a 
job, if you can’t read?” and “How can a person ever get to college if the schools don’t teach the 
children what they have to know?”176  Almaraz’s questions highlighted that Chicanos and other 
minorities sought middle-class respectability, attainable through quality education and a college 
degree leading to good-paying jobs.  Though living outside the central and east regions of Los 
Angeles, Almaraz sympathized with the demonstrators not only because she had a common 
heritage but also because she had experienced similar challenges in public school.  Her letter 
represented scant correspondence supportive of the East L.A. student protests.177 
East L.A. Teachers Debate Student Unrest 
Many faculty associations from throughout the city began to deluge LACBE with letters 
condemning the student unrest and LACBE’s response to the unrest.  While a majority of 
teachers at Jefferson High School had supported the students’ demands, including appointing an 
African American principal, teachers from Garfield High School argued over the East L.A. 
demonstrations.  Opposition to student activism came from the self-proclaimed “loyal members 
of the James A. Garfield Faculty.”  They charged, “The walkouts and demonstrations in a 
number of Eastside schools last week have caused almost irreparable damage to our school.”178  
More specifically, they assessed that “the damage to faculty and student morale was great.”179  
The faculty criticized student demonstrators, condemned their methods, and publicly disparaged 
the student protesters as low achievers.180  With their feelings clearly hurt, the faculty explained, 
“What has hurt even more, though, has been the refusal of the Board of Education to openly back 
the various administrations and faculties during the crisis.”181  The faculty therefore believed the 
board did not support teachers during the demonstrations.182 
Worried that the demonstrations would have a negative educational effect on students 
who did not participate, the faculty inquired, “Have the students who didn’t walk out been taught 
a lesson in negative education by the Board?  Will these students begin to be conditioned to the 
idea that you can get what you want even if you break the law?”183  Additionally, the Garfield 




Threatened by the possibilities of diminishing teacher authority, the Garfield faculty asked, “Has 
the very necessary relationship between teacher and student been changed?  That is, will the 
students be able now to subordinate themselves to the discipline and competence of the 
teacher?”184  The faculty interpreted the public student unrest as challenging teachers’ authority 
inside the classroom. 
The Garfield faculty chastised teachers who supported the students, and declared, 
“Probably the greatest emotional blow that this whole affair has caused touches upon the 
question of teacher loyalty.”185  Having “seen a few of our colleagues repeatedly violate this 
responsibility by openly advocating walkout to a virtually captive audience of students in the 
sanctuary of their classrooms,” the self-proclaimed “loyal members of the James A. Garfield 
Faculty” believed these particular teachers had “lied, exaggerated, and distorted information so 
that they could get the students out in the streets,” thus showing “no concern for the safety and 
welfare of the students.”186 
In particular, the Garfield faculty criticized Sal Castro who played a central role in 
helping the students organize the walkouts in East L.A. schools.  The Garfield faculty labeled 
Castro “the virtual general of the walkout and the author of many of the most radical of the 
demands made by the demonstrators.”187  Castro, according to the faculty, “dismissed the loss of 
class time by the students and the serious possibility of violence” as “unimportant.”188  Frustrated 
by a lack of punishment against Castro, the faculty noted that although high ranking officials of 
the Office of Urban Affairs, an arm of the Board, were “duty bound” to report this teacher, “the 
Board didn’t do anything about it.”189  “But as far as we do know,” the faculty elaborated, “this 
person is still free to use and influence young people either in or out of school.”190   
In closing, the “confused and upset” Garfield faculty expressed that it had been a victim 
of “abuse from radical elements in the community without the opportunity to defend ourselves 
and without the support of our own Board of Education.”191  The faculty further condemned the 
teachers siding with the student demonstrators and LACBE.192  These teachers may have enjoyed 
unquestioned authority over their students previously, but the protesters and teachers like Sal 
Castro had clearly threatened their way of life. 
 Mexican American teachers also had complex and passionate views about the student 
unrest and LACBE’s response.  Although identity politics played a major role in the student 




not translate to unqualified support for the protests.  The Garfield Mexican American faculty 
members responded more directly to the student protests but offered some very contradictory 
perspectives.  In its statement, the Garfield Mexican American faculty did not condone “the 
initial walk-out … at Garfield High School,” yet did not “condemn the intent behind it.”193  The 
Mexican American teachers praised the Garfield student body for handling itself “admirably” 
and the faculty members for being “open-minded and sensitive to the problems that existed 
during the ‘boycott.’”194 
 While their statements about the student walkouts were contradictory, the Mexican 
American teachers at Garfield offered a cultural criticism of the East L.A. community for its 
collective lack of emphasis on education.  They argued, “In general, the Mexican-American 
family does not emphasize education to the degree necessary for success in the entire society.  
This apathy, in turn, leads to many problems inherent in the high school years of the student.”195  
This student, the Garfield faculty summarized, would become an “EDUCATIONAL 
CRIPPLE.”196  While supporting every effort “to make certain that children of the future receive 
the necessary preparation prior to entering the kindergarten,” the Mexican American faculty 
members wanted Mexican Americans to develop a love of learning during early childhood so it 
that would translate to success in school later on in life.197 
 The Mexican American faculty at Garfield therefore believed that educational 
shortcomings in minority schools originated from a lack of family support.  To off-set this 
condition, they recommended improving Mexican American children’s early education, 
including: head start programs, pre-school to impart “[m]otivation, preparation, skills, love of 
learning, hunger for schooling.”198  They also introduced the idea of “nursery schools within the 
elementary school plant that will afford a conditioning process that some homes may not be able 
to give.”199  They called these ideas “preventative medicine” to combat educational apathy.  Yet, 
the faculty stressed that “the fundamental skill necessary to all pupils is reading.”200 
 The Mexican American Garfield faculty members addressed the demands of the Student 
Strike Committee of Garfield High School, the group of students responsible for the planning of 
the walkouts there.  The faculty often employed different wording or simply amended the 
students’ demands, possibly to differentiate their ideas slightly from those of the student 
protesters.  However, to some degree, they agreed with many of the students’ demands.201  For 




individual students, and a “team teaching approach,” the faculty supported an increase in the 
“assignment of more teaching assistants.”202  While the student protesters demanded that the 
“counselor/student” ratio be reduced “so as to enable the counselor to appropriately counsel his 
students” and that “[a]ll counselors should speak Spanish,” the Mexican American faculty 
members agreed with the reduction in student-to-counselor ratio, but scoffed at the idea that all 
counselors should speak Spanish.203  Rather, they proposed that counselors “should be 
encouraged to learn Spanish but not to make demands on them.”204 
The Mexican American students accused teachers of not understanding the Chicano 
students’ culture and the community’s challenges.  The Mexican American teachers from 
Garfield responded, “We only add that we should be more sensitive and understanding to these 
problems.”205  Implying that I.Q. tests were biased, ethnocentric, and ultimately obstructed the 
school system’s ability to accurately gauge the intelligence of students from minority 
communities, the students called for abolishing I.Q. tests and developing “valid student testing 
techniques.”  The Mexican American teachers at Garfield High School vehemently disagreed 
stating, “We do not agree that present I.Q. tests should be abolished.”206  On other important 
issues, including accessibility to restrooms, disallowing assigning students to janitorial services, 
and codifying school punishments, the Mexican American teachers at Garfield High School were 
largely sympathetic.207 
The Mexican American Garfield teachers’ nuanced revisions to the students’ demands 
revealed their status of middle-class professional and ideas about middle-class respectability 
different from the ideas from students’ Mexican American working-class background.  Though 
the members of both groups noted their Mexican American background, class proved a powerful 
signifier that influenced their worldviews.  These teachers sympathized with some of the student 
protesters’ demands, but they silenced or deemphasized their connections to their Mexican 
American community and culture, while seeking to reaffirm teacher control in schools. 
Community Activists Carry on the East L.A. Student Activists’ Struggle for Improved Education 
The East L.A. student demonstrations garnered the attention of LACBE members and the 
city, and in their aftermath, and, sensing an opportunity to effect many policy changes, adult East 
L.A. community activists continued calls for improved education in predominantly Mexican 




Hardy, Lincoln High School teacher Sal Castro addressed the board and presented a list of 
demands authored by the Educational Issues Committee (EIC), also known as the Educational 
Issues Coordinating Committee (EICC), that closely mirrored the East L.A. student demands 
based on Mexican American culture.  The EIC, a significant coalition of twenty-five Mexican 
American organizations headed by chairman Reverend Vahac Mardirosian, was closely aligned 
with Sal Castro and the Blowout Committee.208  According to Sal Castro, the EIC was the 
outcome of a transition in which adults took over the efforts of the student demonstrators.209  
Reverend Mardirosian declared, “But now it is up to the adults to take over.  We are not going to 
allow this situation to continue.  We are not going to let young people below the age of eighteen 
to do the work that belongs to us.”210 Having reformulated the student demands, the EIC outlined 
twenty-six policy demands to improve Mexican American schools.211 
The EIC categorized the demands according to the most pressing needs, namely 
academic issues, administrative issues, school facilities, and student rights.212  The EIC topped its 
list of demands with: “No student or teacher will be reprimanded or suspended for participating 
in any efforts which are executed for the purpose of improving or furthering the educational 
quality of our schools.”213  The EIC wanted to ensure that students and teachers could freely 
engage in future demonstrations for educational improvements.  In its second key demand, the 
EIC proposed mandatory bicultural and bilingual education in schools where Mexican 
Americans students constituted the numerical majority of the population.  The participation of 
non-Mexican American students in bicultural and bilingual education would be voluntary.  The 
proposal also asked “all staff” to be “proficient” in Spanish and to “increase their understanding 
of the history, traditions, and contributions of the Mexican culture.”214  The EIC asked school 
administrators to learn Spanish.215 
In a strong gesture to halt racism and to secure respect for Mexican American students 
and their community, the EIC demanded that administrators and teachers who showed any form 
of prejudice toward Mexican or Mexican American students, “including failure to recognize, 
understand, and appreciate Mexican culture and heritage, will be removed from East Los 
Angeles schools.”216  The EIC also recommended that only area superintendents could suspend 
students, thereby taking away authority from counselors and school principals.217  In addition, the 





Regarding academic issues, the EIC wanted to publicize a teacher’s “failure ratio” to 
make public school teachers more accountable for their students’ success or failure, and to avoid 
stigmatizing failing students.  The proposal outlined teacher repercussions, including: “Any 
teacher having a particularly high percentage of the total school dropouts in his classes shall be 
rated by the Citizens Review Board composed of members of the Educational Issues 
Committee.”218  This proposal placed responsibility of student success or failure upon the 
teachers. 
On student rights, the EIC advocated for open, unhindered student body elections; student 
surveys that would rank teachers and administrators; doing away with a student dress code; 
improving cafeteria food; providing students with access to restrooms and school buildings 
during school hours; and administering corporal punishment “according to State Law.”219 
In consideration of the students’ larger concerns, the EIC reframed student demands into 
more concrete and nuanced recommendations into discernible categories that would elicit a 
direct response from LACBE and the superintendent.220  Following the statements by student and 
community activists, Dr. Nava proposed a special meeting at Lincoln High School for Tuesday, 
March 26.221  Mr. Gardner seconded the motion, and the board agreed to hold the meeting.222 
On March 26, 1968, LABCE held a marathon four-hour special meeting at Lincoln High 
School, with Superintendent Crowther and his staff responding to a majority of EIC proposals 
that essentially represented the East L.A. student demands.223  The 1100-seat gym was filled to 
capacity and another thirty seats were added for the members of the media.  Facing the large 
crowd, six of the seven board members and Superintendent Crowther sat on the stage, with a 
dozen staff members sitting behind them.224  Lincoln High School teacher Sal Castro and EIC 
chairman Mardirosian attended the meeting.  Other EIC members in attendance included Oscar 
Acosta, an attorney; Juan Gomez, a graduate student from UCLA; and David Sanchez, professor 
of mathematics at UCLA.  Speaking before LACBE, Sal Castro asked that students, teachers, 
and the East L.A. community have the opportunity to request clarification for each of the 
Superintendent’s counter proposals.225  President Hardy indicated that Superintendent Crowther 
had responses to each of the thirty-six demands,226 and requested superintendent office staff 
members to read them aloud before the capacity crowd.227 
 On the EIC’s demand to appoint administrators of Mexican American descent at majority 




permitted the district to assign teachers to schools of the teacher’s choice.228  The 
superintendent’s office blamed Mexican American teachers for not choosing to work at 
predominantly Mexican American schools.  The superintendent office’s then connected their 
comments about Spanish-surname teachers with the EIC’s concern for a lack of Mexican 
American administrators, stating, “Likewise, there is an inadequate number of Spanish-surname 
teachers who hold administrative credentials and are eligible to move into administrative 
positions.”229  The superintendent’s office argued that existing policies and programs to promote 
increasing minority numbers in administrative positions already existed, and that their success or 
failure depended on teacher participation.230   
The superintendent’s office addressed the issue of bilingualism, an issue increasingly 
significant to the Mexican American community.  Student demonstrators and the EIC had 
demanded that “Mexican-American or Spanish speaking persons should be encouraged to 
become administrators, counselors, and Child Welfare and Attendance workers.”231  The 
superintendent’s office acknowledged this necessity, calling it “highly desirable,” but pointed to 
existing Spanish language programs, in which “some 2,000 teachers, administrators, child 
welfare and attendance workers, and classified employees” attended.232  The district also offered: 
workshops in conversational Spanish for highs school counselors, opportunities that had existed 
for the past three years and extra pay incentives for “bi-lingual ability for classified personnel.”233 
In addition to bilingual personnel, East L.A. students demanded mandatory bilingual and 
bicultural education “for Mexican-Americans in the Los Angeles School system where there is a 
majority of Mexican-American students.”234  The fairly sympathetic superintendent’s staff 
reported that it was “highly desirable” to offer some bilingual/bicultural education.235  The staff 
claimed that a recent change in state law the previous year made bilingual education possible if it 
was “educationally advantageous for the pupils.”236 
The LACBE meeting included important exchanges about free speech.  A student and 
EIC demand, that “[n]o teacher should be dismissed or transferred because of his political views 
and/or philosophical disagreements with administrators,” appeared to be an effort to shield 
supportive teachers, including Sal Castro, from retribution by the district, the superintendent, and 
LACBE.  The superintendent responded with contradictory language, initially acknowledging, 
“It is agreed that no teacher should be dismissed, transferred, or have his status affected in any 




“However,” the superintendent’s staff added that it was “contrary to Board policy for a teacher to 
air and espouse his personal views in the classroom or with pupil groups on campus.”238  The 
superintendent’s office concluded, “No teacher has the right to encourage students to violate 
school rules and regulations.”239  Therefore, the superintendent’s office did not rule out punishing 
any teachers supportive of the student demonstrations.  Finally on the issue of cultural 
sensitivity, the superintendent’s office agreed with the students and argued that the 
superintendent’s office had already developed and instituted programs to increase teacher 
cultural sensitivity. 
Sensing that he and others might become targets of punishment or dismissal by the 
district, and were susceptible to criminal charges, Sal Castro reiterated before LACBE that no 
student or teacher should be “reprimanded or suspended for participating” in the walkouts, and 
added that “charges should be dropped against any individual who was arrested by the police if 
the charges were in connection with the Blow-outs.”240  Superintendent Crowther offered an 
unapologetic response, which attempted to pit students and teachers against each other.  
“Teachers and students, in their efforts to secure improvement of school programs,” he said, 
“must recognize that other students and members of school staffs also have rights.”241  He 
explained, “Therefore, they should be fully aware of the need to express their opinions in a 
manner that will avoid disruptive situations and interference with the educational program of the 
schools.”242  Pointing out existing “established channels of communication,” he concluded, 
“Walkouts and other idsruptive [sic] acts have served their purpose.  No further useful purpose 
would be served by further similar disruptive acts.”243  In response to Castro’s call on the district 
to drop any criminal charges against demonstrators, Crowther indicated that police actions were 
“outside his authority.”244 
LACBE passed additional motions that essentially removed or limited LACBE and the 
school district from punishing student demonstrators and supportive teachers.245  LACBE passed 
a motion to refer the matter of the walkouts to the County Counsel.246  Dr. Nava proposed another 
motion declaring that LACBE did not have “any intention of assigning disciplinary action 
against students or teachers who were engaged in the walkout through March 11, 1968.”247  
LACBE carried it unanimously.  The board seemingly granted summary amnesty to students and 





 In response to Castro’s request “to drop charges against individuals arrested by the police 
if the charges were in connection with any of the walkouts,” Nava advised communicating the 
successful immunity motion to the District Attorney, Chief of Police, and County Sheriff to 
“possibly influence these agencies to drop charges against persons arrested.”248  After some 
discussion, board member Mr. Gardner instead proposed, “That the Superintendent … be 
directed to request from the District Attorney, the City Attorney, the Chief of Police, and the 
Sheriff information as to the charges currently filed against employees or school students which 
may have arisen out of actions connected with the walkouts.”249  This alternate motion passed 
unanimously.  Although LACBE was not considering disciplinary charges against student 
demonstrators and teachers, this did not indicate that the city of Los Angeles was not going to 
charge participants in the walkouts with criminal charges.  Community activists had convinced 
LACBE not to punish students and teachers.  Ultimately, the decision to charge any 
demonstrators criminally rested with the district attorney.  On May 31, 1968, the city of Los 
Angeles arrested and charged Castro with disturbing the peace.250  Subsequently, LACBE 
removed Sal Castro from his teaching position at Lincoln High School.251 
 The superintendent’s office agreed, sometimes partly and sometimes fully, with many of 
the student demands outlined by the EIC, and sometimes its recommendations were inconclusive.  
However, the student demonstrators clearly triumphed on a few issues.  The superintendent 
agreed with students who complained about paper and trash pick-up as a form of punishment.252  
The students had a partial victory on grading policies, as the superintendent’s office explained 
that they were reviewed “from time to time.”  Not coincidentally, a grade review was ongoing at 
the time of the meeting.  The superintendent also agreed with the student’s idea that teachers “of 
the non-English speaking should have adequate knowledge of Spanish.”253  In principle, the 
superintendent approved the student demand by promising compensatory reading programs to 
help students in both regular and remedial classes.   In response to students clamoring for full 
access to restroom facilities throughout the day, the superintendent argued that administrators 
had closed restrooms due to student misconduct, such as smoking, or plumbing problems.  
Nonetheless, he declared that students should have unrestricted access to restrooms, although 
with some adult supervision to ensure good behavior. 
 Overall, the students made some nominal gains as well as important tangible gains.  




potential of becoming policy contingent on LACBE approval.  The board and superintendent 
took the demonstrations seriously enough to have a meeting and a complete report that 
responded to each demand.  The shortcomings of the superintendent’s recommendations from 
the perspective of East L.A. activists were numerous because the superintendent’s office claimed 
that solutions were in progress or that any additional efforts were unnecessary.  Also, on some 
issues, the superintendent’s office placed the responsibility of implementing solutions solely on 
the local school and community, virtually absolving itself of any failures by the schools and 
community.254 
Political Divisions in East L.A. Emerge 
 Events during the March 26 meeting demonstrated political divisions within the East L.A. 
community – a fragmented community - with some students and parents expressing their 
displeasure with the walkouts.  These political divisions were based on a diversity of opinion 
about who better represented the East L.A. community, and essentially compelled LACBE to 
make a choice: either to acquiesce to the demands of the student demonstrators or to reject the 
activists’ calls for new policy changes.  Castro, EIC members, and other community activists 
attempted to control the discourse over who represented the East L.A. community, and expressed 
their discontent by walking out of the meeting after Superintendent Crowther’s office responded 
to several student and EIC demands.  When Georgiana Hardy offered others to speak before 
LACBE, according to the El Sereno Star, “Sanchez, Mardirosian, and others of the militants 
objected while Juan Gomez took the microphone and complained that some of the proposed 
speakers ‘no longer represent the community.’”255  Juan Montez, who described himself as “the 
minister of public relations for the Brown Berets,” demanded that a Citizen’s Review Board 
negotiate the “issues,” and called speakers unassociated with the student demonstrators “sell-
outs.”256 
The community activists continually relied on walkouts to emphasize their discontent.  
After an upset father complained that his daughter, a Garfield High School student, had been 
enrolled in French Four without ever taking a course in French, EIC member Oscar Acosta, the 
El Sereno Star reported, took him away from the microphone, and “there was a mass walkout of 




loudly at times.”257  After the majority of the attendees left, only about 200 people remained and 
LACBE readied “to hear the moderates complain about walkout tactics.”258 
The divisions within the East L.A. community became more apparent after activists 
walked out.  Naomi Quiñones, a high school student from Wilson High asserted, “I’m thankful 
the majority at Wilson are not with the blowout group.”259  She added: “They don’t want ot [sic] 
hear the other side.  I feel the Mexican-American culture should be a dignified culture.”260  A 
parent who identified himself as “a 1937 dropout,” and whose children all attended parochial 
schools, “scolded the students for their behavior and told them they ‘don’t make sense.’”261  The 
crowd booed him and called him a “sell-out.”262  The opponents of the walkouts claimed they, 
and not the community activists, represented the East L.A. community. 
Disagreements between East L.A. community activists and residents represented only one 
dimension of the political fragmentation in the community, with teachers at East L.A. schools 
representing another dimensions of this condition.  In March 28, 1968, LACBE’s regular 
meeting revealed this rift among teachers.  Teacher Carmen Terraza, from the Committee of 
Teachers from Theodore Roosevelt High School, a diverse teacher faculty of Spanish surname, 
English surname, and Japanese background, took a more drastic approach in her response to the 
walkouts.  She presented a petition for forty-nine transfers because “the Board had created a 
disruptive atmosphere greatly hindering efforts to teach classes.”263  In addition, twenty-two other 
teachers ineligible for transfers under board regulations signed a petition asking for transfers, 
also citing “the lack of support on the part of our Board” and “a disruptive atmosphere” in 
schools.264 
 At least 101 other teachers from Roosevelt High School signed a letter voicing their 
frustration over the board’s openness to the protesters’ demands, accusing LACBE of “not 
considering the welfare of the teachers or the vast majority of students.”265  The Roosevelt 
teachers clarified that “no teacher whose name appears on this petition wishes to leave 
Roosevelt” and that “this petition is intended to reflect our loyalty to our school and our deep 
concern for our students.”266  The letter focused on issues such as teacher morale, good 
citizenship on the part of students, and the effects of a “small radical faction” planning and 
participating in the student walkouts.267  The Roosevelt teachers also accused the Brown Berets 
of not being “good Americans” because they did not stand to salute the flag at a March 8 meeting 




 William Lambert, representing the 18,000 teachers of the Los Angeles Teachers Alliance 
and Affiliated Teachers Organization of Los Angeles (LATA-ATOLA),269 expressed teachers’ 
concerns about threats and intimidation for criticizing the walkouts, the lack of order within the 
teaching environment, continuing “class disruptions as a result of rumors of walkouts,” and the 
board’s “praise for students who have taken the law into their own hands.”270  Although he 
criticized the walkouts as “self-defeating,”271 Lambert proceeded to claim that many of the 
student demands were the same as those requested by teachers through their Negotiating 
Council.272  Lambert criticized the teachers who requested transfers because he believed that 
teachers and students should work together in addressing educational concerns.  Trying to reach 
a balance between the needs of students and teachers, Lambert asked, “What good will it do any 
child if irresponsible actions cause our best qualified teachers to transfer out of the affected 
schools?”273  “Without qualified teachers to put them into effect,” Lambert warned, “any reforms 
gained are meaningless.”274  He concluded with a conciliatory tone inviting the walkout leaders to 
“join with the teachers in seeking the answers to the problems.”275 
The fragmented views about the student walkouts at predominantly Mexican American 
schools naturally extended into the student bodies at these schools, and exposed that the walkout 
student activists did not have a monopoly on student activism.  On one side, the student activists 
who walked out of classes in early March and, on the other, students who believed the walkouts 
undermined education at Mexican American schools and undercut cultural pride, too clashed 
over who represented the Mexican American community.  An anti-Blowout student organization, 
C.A.S.T.R.O., which stood for Chicanos Against Student Teacher Radical Objectives, presented 
its own opinions about the walkouts.  C.A.S.T.R.O. distributed a pamphlet with a scathing anti-
Blowout message.  The group outlined the organization’s ideas: 
Chicanos Against Student Teacher Radical Objectives is a newly formed organization of 
concerned Mexican American students and young adults whose main objectives [sic] to 
combat the forces bent on mob rule, detrimental actions against our educational system, 
use of students to gain their personal ends, and general militancy which manifests itself 
into the outright breakdown of established order.  Our motto is … HELL NO WE 
WON’T GO!276 
 
In contrast to the student protesters and the Brown Berets who questioned authority, 




represented the Mexican American community and argued that the walkouts undermined 
education in their neighborhood schools. 
Another group of students submitted its own petitions to the board at the March 28 
meeting.  Theodore Roosevelt High School students collected an astounding 2171 signatures, 
roughly 68% of the student body, from a diverse student population opposing the student 
walkouts that included students of “Spanish surname,” and Chinese, Vietnamese and Japanese 
backgrounds.  The petition claimed that the true Mexican American majority had to voice its 
disagreement of the walkouts, its support for the school faculty, and its concerns over teachers 
seeking to transfer out of the affected schools.277  The students conveyed their disapproval the 
walkouts because they caused teacher transfer requests: 
 A large number of our school faculty has put in for transfers as a result of the 
mounting disturbances by a small militant faction.  We believe that this is causing more 
harm then [sic] good to the education quality of our schools.  Any further demonstrations 
by any militant group will cause devastating affects [sic] on our education.  Therefore, we 
stand firmly in opposition to any further walkouts or boycotts.278 
 
 The petition further alleged that the student demonstrators had “destroyed pupil morale 
and has succeeded in disrupting the atmosphere where teaching can take place.”279  “Are we 
going to allow this to happen?  Are we going to stand and wait for this movement to take its 
course and accept the distruction [sic] it will cause?” the petitioners asked.280  Claiming that the 
student demonstrators did not represent the numerical majority of the community, the petition 
read, “We believe that the true majority should be listened to by the Board of Education, the 
Administration, the community, and the News media.”281  “As a [numerical] majority we must 
voice our views and show our support for our faculty and our school.  We owe to our faculty the 
respect as professional educators and the support they deserve during this crucial time,” the 
petition read.282  Clearly at odds with the student activists’ tactics, 2171 Roosevelt students from 
diverse backgrounds challenged the walkout activists’ claims of representing the true educational 
needs of the East L.A. community. 
The Process of Implementing New Educational Policy 
 Although LACBE and the superintendent had previously offered responses to the East 
L.A. student demands and conveyed some openness to and in some cases agreement with them 




students had a new African American principal and courses in African American history were 
forthcoming.  Changes at Jefferson High School represented tangible changes in response to the 
African American student demands.  Weary of LACBE inaction, East L.A. community activists 
held mass rallies to pressure LACBE to enact new educational policy based on the East L.A. 
student demands. 
 In The Los Angeles Plaza: Sacred and Contested Space, William David Estrada 
recounted the history of Los Angeles, with a focus on the multiracial and multicultural roots of 
the Los Angeles Plaza (also known as La Placita and the Placita Olvera), and the location’s 
importance as a site of cultural and political importance.  In early April, La Placita again served 
as a place of political significance as the vocal grassroots organization of the Educational Issues 
Coordinating Committee led by Reverend Vahac Mardirosian gathered there to rally political 
pressure against LACBE to enact new educational policy to meet the East L.A. student demands.  
In a flyer in Spanish circulated by the EIC, the committee declared: “They continue to fool us … 
INSULTS!  LIES!  EMPTY PROMISES!  BUT NO DEEDS” (my translation).283 
 On April 1, LACBE began developing new educational policies by accepting, in part or 
in full, some student demands and rejecting others, in a gradual process that included deferring 
much responsibility to the superintendent’s office and external committees to study how to 
implement the new policy.284  The board’s April 1 meeting in many ways illustrated why the East 
L.A. community activists had resorted to some heavy-handed strategies to compel LACBE to 
implement new education policy to meet their demands instead of pursuing formal channels.  
The board collectively began to dissect the East L.A student demands, sometimes scrutinizing 
each sentence, which ensured that the board would not come to any decisive education policy 
promptly.  In circumstances when the board passed definite motions, the motions invariably 
expressed decisions undermining the student demands. 
 Many culturally based student demands centered not only on improving education for 
Mexican American students but also on issues that challenged unequal treatment of Mexican 
American students within the district.  The board addressed the student demand relating to 
Mexican American school administrators in two parts.  First, board member Richardson 
introduced a motion calling for all Mexican American administrators in schools with a majority 
of “Mexican-American descent students.”285  The board defeated the motion by a four to zero 




training programs that would provide a “cadre of Mexican-American administrators.”286  The 
board members relied on a plan presented in an earlier board meeting by Superintendent 
Crowther to create an administrative training program for minorities.  The board passed the 
following motion: “THAT the Superintendent be requested to report expeditiously and from time 
to time on the success of his announced program to train and recruit administrators of minority 
extraction.”287  Relying exclusively on the superintendent to develop and establish an 
administrative program for minorities, the board’s motion lacked enforcement.  LACBE did not 
give Crowther a timetable, and it assumed that the program would be a success without creating 
a mechanism to ensure its successful implementation.  
 The board agreed almost unconditionally on the students’ demand for bilingual 
personnel, but again deferred responsibility to the superintendent’s office to report on developing 
these programs.  Nava and other board members passed a motion that stated, “THAT the Board 
agrees with this request in principle and asks the Superintendent to make a report to the Board 
regarding the development of programs to this end.”288  Resembling the motion to grant 
Superintendent Crowther the power to develop and implement minority administration programs, 
this motion cleared the board of responsibility as well.  The superintendent’s office was again 
solely responsible for developing a program for bilingual personnel.  Again, the board did not 
create a mechanism to ensure the program’s timely and successful implementation.  
 The board passed a litany of motions that relegated analyses of several other student 
demands to outside committees.  On the issue of student assemblies, the board referred analysis 
to the Personnel and Schools Committee.  On other demands associated with bilingual 
instruction, the board referred them to the Educational Development Committee.  On the issues 
of a new building and building “rehabilitation,” the board referred the items to the Building 
Committee.  Splitting their responses on issues involving cafeteria food, the board referred to 
Superintendent Crowther the proposal of serving foods that catered to the tastes of students of 
Mexican descent, and referred to the Auxiliary Services Committee the concern of improving the 
quality and service of cafeteria food for students and teachers.  Finally, on the volatile issue of 
corporal punishment, the board referred the issue to the Personnel and Schools Committee.289 
On April 4, 1968, at the urging of board member Dr. Julian Nava, LACBE continued 
developing new policy related to the Blowouts.290  Free press was one of the major issues up for 




of print material from circulating on school premises.  Los Angeles Police Department Chief 
Reddin had hinted that print materials circulated in several high schools foreshadowed student 
unrest.  Others blamed print materials for fomenting student discontent.  LACBE member 
Richardson suggested calling on Superintendent Crowther to offer ways of implementing a 
policy that “increase[d] flexibility and freedom in the distribution and availability of printed 
materials on high school campuses.291  The motion passed with four ayes, and one abstention 
from Chambers. 
 Though the motion gave the impression that LACBE supported free press in the schools, 
a closer analysis reveals the snails-pace of the bureaucratic process leading to the 
implementation of any policy, frustrating student and community activists alike.  LACBE did not 
vote to grant unrestrained freedom of the press to student and activists on campuses.  Instead, it 
stated it “desires to increase” freedom in distribution and availability of materials.  Accordingly, 
the motion called on the superintendent to develop procedures and policy about free press that 
would then be referred to LACBE for a vote.  At that point, the policy would be at the mercy of 
board, whose members could further debate and even reject the superintendent’s 
recommendation.  The issue of closing restrooms as a form of punish against students offered a 
different example where LACBE could simply not vote on an issue.  Board members Nava and 
Gardner offered several motions responsive to the students who clamored for access to 
restrooms, which no other board member seconded.292  Dr. Nava warned the board that if he 
received any evidence showing that administrators used restroom closures as a way to punish 
students, he would bring up the issue for discussion and present evidence.293 
 LACBE demonstrated indifference to East L.A. student activists’ request to waive grade 
requirements in student body elections.  Nava offered to democratize the process by not 
restricting “candidacy for school offices according to grades,” however the rest of the board 
received the motion with apathy.  Board member Gardner went so far as to say that because each 
school’s constitution included qualifications for student offices “adopted by the student bodies,” 
he could see “no reason for publicly stating there is no Board policy on this issue.”294  He thereby 
deferred responsibility of student election guidelines to each school.  The meeting’s proceedings 
demonstrated the difficulties students and community activists faced in their struggles to change 




 The students’ efforts nonetheless made tangible progress.  On April 12, 1968, Max J. 
Barney, Clerk of the Board of Education, publicized a list of LACBE resolutions to nine student 
demands.295  LACBE members passed these motions with a necessary majority vote generally in 
agreement with some aspects of the student demands ranging from the makeup of the school 
administration to accessibility of free press on school campuses.  Afterwards, the board sent the 
agreed-upon motions to any of five school district committees to develop plans for 
implementation.296  After each committee developed a plan for implementation, LACBE would 
receive it, discuss it, and then either make changes to it or accept it.  Then, if necessary, the 
board would vote for or against implementing policy based on any revisions to any 
recommendations.  It was an arduous process, one vehemently criticized by activists and little 
understood by individuals who criticized the activists and asked them to make appeals through 
“legal” or “formal” channels.   The legal and formal channels were gradual, and highly 
impermeable to change.  If change occurred, it occurred at a snail’s pace, further activists. 
The student activists won some important victories during the April 15 LACBE meeting, 
however the board’s motions again often highlighted Superintendent Crowther’s responses to the 
student demands rather than crediting the students for raising the issues in the first place.  Many 
of the superintendent office’s responses often supported the student demands in varying degrees, 
and LACBE passed several motions enshrining the superintendent’s proposals as new education 
policy.  With this slight-of-hand, LACBE effectively nullified any recognition of the student 
activists’ influence and contributions, and instead credited Superintendent Crowther and his 
staff.  
LACBE agreed in principle with student activists who called for a reduction in class 
size.297  However, the board disagreed on the specific demand to reduce the student-teacher ratio 
to 20:1 based not only for a lack of funding but also on the difficulty of obtaining the necessary 
additional teachers and building construction.298  On the issue of cleanup policy, LACBE agreed 
with the “position statement reported by the Superintendent,” in which his office declared, 
“Custodians are school board employees assigned to the ‘housekeeping’ functions.  We agree 
that students should not be kept out of class and punished by being asked to pick up paper or 





 On community relations, LACBE agreed with both student activists and the 
superintendent when it voted unanimously in favor of the school district’s continuing efforts to 
provide workshops at the local and district-wide level to improve community relations.301  
LACBE again did not credit the student activists for raising the issue or for requesting 
workshops in which “certificated staff” learned about the “background, customs, cultures, and 
community around [minority] high school[s].”302  Nevertheless, students gained a worthwhile 
victory as LACBE and the superintendent agreed with and continued efforts to fulfill this goal.   
When the board members addressed the issue of student counseling, all but Jewel 
Chambers voted in support of the Superintendent Office propositions, which were 
wholeheartedly and unequivocally in agreement with the student activists.  The students’ demand 
regarding counselors included three components: 1) reducing the ratio of pupils to counselors; 2) 
providing clerical assistance to counselors; and 3) increasing efforts to recruit and train 
counselors.303  On this demand, the Superintendent responded, “It is agreed that all of the points 
in this section are extremely valid.  They are generally the same objectives which [the 
superintendent’s] staff has attempted to have implemented for the last several years.”304  The 
superintendent admitted, however, “Lack of funds has not made it possible to reduce the ratio of 
pupils to counselors, although federal funds have improved counseling programs at Garfield, 
Lincoln, and Roosevelt high schools during the last two years.”305  Student activists won at least a 
partial victory. 
The board also considered student activists’ request to review access to course electives 
as well as courses in general.  Students had argued that sometimes students were turned away 
from enrolling in courses.306  LACBE agreed with the superintendent’s response, which placed 
blame on limited “teacher and available physical facilities,”307 and promised to discuss the issue 
with school principals.  After LACBE discussed some of the demands and the corresponding 
responses from the Superintendent’s Office, President Hardy promised future discussions with a 
similar focus. 
 These discussions continued in earnest in late April addressing additional student 
demands, including a fair grading policy, a less restrictive grooming policy, and grouping.308  The 
board enacted particular policies based on the superintendent’s findings and did not schedule 
additional discussions on the issues.  On the volatile issue of free speech, however, the board 




issue to resolve.  Parents from East L.A. and teachers continued to flood the board with letters 
opposing free speech and free press on school grounds.309 
LACBE also addressed curriculum development and I.Q. testing.  The board passed a 
motion based on the superintendent’s response to a student demand calling for the inclusion of 
Chicano history and culture in the curriculum?).310  Superintendent Crowther reported that “the 
staff of Los Angeles City School [District] has long recognized the responsibility to make all 
students familiar and appreciative of the contributions of the various ethnic groups represented 
within the district.”311  By a six to one vote with one abstention by Chambers, LACBE passed a 
motion that virtually mirrored the student demand but was broadened to include the contributions 
of “various ethnic groups.”  Crowther blamed textbook publishers and a lack of funding for not 
having more racially and ethnically inclusive textbooks.  LACBE decided to direct the 
Superintendent’s Office to hire “someone … to write material to be made available across the 
district.”312  On I.Q. testing, LACBE voted in favor of the superintendent’s refusal of the student 
requests to revise I.Q. tests and to allow a “10 per cent leeway for students from communities 
with different knowledge material.”313 
During the May 13 board meeting, LACBE dealt with the students’ demand calling for 
counselors to permit and encourage students with “non-academic majors” to “take academic 
courses.”314  The Superintendent’s Office had argued that counselors were advised to encourage 
students to take challenging courses, but “it must be stressed that extreme caution must be 
exercised in not counselling [sic] students into subject areas which are beyond their learning 
capacities.”315  Nava disagreed with the notion that counselors should take “extreme caution” in 
counseling minority students to take academic courses, and countered by asserting that students 
discover their own learning potential.316  Hardy concurred with Nava and added that counseling 
must not be done on a racial basis.  She offered a fascinating anecdote, recalling a case in which 
counselors were “too protective” and tried “to save minority students from disappointments.”317  
Hardy explained that when she first ran for the school board in 1954, a counselor advised a 
Japanese student against preparing for law school.  “[The counselor] said nobody would hire a 
Japanese attorney so the youth should study horticulture and work on his father’s truck farm,” 
Hardy recounted.318  Board member Gardner did not think the counselor was being protective, 
and claimed the counselor should have been reprimanded for discouraging a student from 




instructing counselors “to encourage students to take courses which challenged their learning 
potential.319  On an issue related to biculturalism, by a six to zero vote with Chambers abstaining, 
LACBE voted that teachers “of the non-English, Spanish-speaking student should have adequate 
knowledge of Spanish.”320  On the issue of library facilities, LACBE committed to reviewing 
plans for a new Woodrow High School library, as well as “review of space, book, and staffing 
standards for all School District Libraries.”321  Therefore the board not only agreed with the 
students who asked for an expansion of library facilities in East L.A. high schools, it also 
broadened this request to the entire district. 
In late May 1968, LACBE continued to attempt to respond to additional student 
demands.  On the issue of prejudice against minority students, however, the board postponed an 
amended motion until all board members had an opportunity to review it.322  Regarding student 
body elections, the board endorsed the superintendent’s recommendation asking each school to 
develop its own eligibility rules.  LACBE and the Superintendent’s Office effectively rid 
themselves of any responsibility in developing standard, district-wide election rules for student 
offices.323  In the midst of LACBE’s review of the student demands and discussions about new 
educational policy, a LACBE-commissioned committee studied the East L.A. community’s 
views about the education in the community generally, and the student demonstrations and 
integration specifically.  Although LACBE did not grant the East Los Angeles Communications 
Task Force (ELACTF) enforcement powers, the timing of the study, in middle of discussion 
about new education based on the East L.A. student demands, at least suggested that LACBE 
would consider the committee’s recommendations seriously. 
Integrationists Intervene during Student Demonstration LACBE Hearings 
 During the May 13 LACBE meeting, integrationists, possibly seeing their political 
influenced diminished by LACBE’s focus on the student walkouts, spoke before the board and 
pressed it to halt its open transfer policy and attendance boundaries resulting in segregated 
schools.  These issues were obviously unrelated to the student demonstrations in East L.A. and 
South-Central L.A. but were central concerns of integrationists.  These speakers, according to the 
El Sereno Star, posed specific questions to LACBE over “permits and boundary problems” 
between Louis Pasteur Junior High School, at 5931 W. 18th Street in the Westside, and John 




charged that attendance permits under LACBE’s open enrollment policy allowed white parents 
to flee minority schools and enroll their children in segregated or increasingly segregated white 
schools, while minority schools became increasingly segregated minority schools.  One speaker, 
Howard Barsky, contended that, “permits to transfer ‘are a scape [sic] hatch’ used by white 
parents and their children to avoid integration.”324  A woman in the audience “shouted that the 
permit group was integrated.”325  Other audience members joined in the shouting.326  Another 
speaker, Seymour Robinson, also claimed that the permit system at Burroughs was used “to 
avoid the goal of integration.”327  However, Melville Nahim, a parent, rejected those criticisms 
claiming that he had camped out three days at Burroughs and noticed that the group waiting was 
“divided about equally among Caucasians, Oriental, and Negros.”328  He added that he did not 
believe in “discrimination in reverse” and asked LACBE to stand up to “pressure groups.”329  
Although four student demands were the focus during this board meeting, discussion about 
school integration refocused some attention on school segregation, LACBE’s open enrollment 
policy, and busing in Los Angeles. 
When addressing issues on integration, LACBE never contemplated that integration 
efforts could be combined with student demands calling for bilingual, culture-based, 
compensatory education programs.  Instead, LACBE viewed the integration efforts and student 
demonstrations as separate, at times pitting respective advocates against each other, especially 
when funding was at stake.  Unequal education lay at the root of both integration efforts and 
student demonstrations.  Nonetheless, LACBE opted to deal with these volatile issues separately, 
without realizing that improving education in minority neighborhoods would help mitigate 
integration battles, and student demands and protests. 
LACBE agreed to delay an integration policy vote until the following Monday in 
“consideration of four integration measures.”330  Instead, the board deliberated on tentative and 
precarious integration plans developed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Student Integration (AHC) 
and the Superintendent’s Office in March and April.  Two of the busing plans were voluntary 
and were limited to elementary school pupils.331  In one plan, the school district would transport 
students from overcrowded elementary schools in grades four, five, and six to “under-utilized” 
schools where most of the students were white.332  In the other plan, the school district would bus 
white students from a “cluster of elementary schools to one minority area school.”333  At least one 




“about 900 elementary school students and 1150 junior high school students could be bused from 
minority areas to ‘other white’ schools with available space.”334 Considering the hundreds of 
thousands of students in the Los Angeles school district, the estimates undoubtedly suggested 
that this plan was unlikely to end or mitigate school segregation.  The voluntary nature of these 
four integration plans restricted their potential success even further, and there was no guarantee 
that white parents would volunteer to participate in the programs. 
Some board members had argued to delay voting on the four busing plans until they 
knew the costs of busing and high school enrichment programs.  A LACBE staff executive 
reported that “no costs figures can be accurate until next fall” when the number of vacancies 
were identified.335  President Hardy favored a vote on the busing plans while Chambers “wanted 
a decision about financial priorities before he voted.”336   Hardy stressed, “Parents must have the 
perogative [sic] of determining whether their children will participate in any program which has 
integration as a primary thrust and which takes the child away from the home school.”337 
The East Los Angeles Communications Task Force 
 LACBE specifically commissioned the ELACTF to “present opinions, attitudes and 
major concerns which prevail in the East Los Angeles community concerning the schools.”338  
Among many of its findings, the task force found that the community supported many of the 
student demands and made recommendations to that effect, but it expanded its investigation 
further.  The committee researched the East L.A.’s community’s views on integration and busing 
and discovered that although the community as a whole did not support school integration, the 
student unrest led some parents to consider busing their children in order to pursue better 
educational opportunities.  Parents from East L.A. began contemplating expanding the 
educational experiences of their children by potentially at least partially disconnecting the 
cultural ties and transgressing the geographical boundaries in which they lived.  In effect, the 
attitudes of many African Americans and some of “Spanish surname” in L.A. began to converge 
on the issue of school integration by associating it with “better” education. 
 In June, the ELACTF submitted its findings to LACBE.    The task force called on 
LACBE to improve education in the neighborhood and to mitigate community concerns about 
education.  The task force studied many of the student demands and concurred with some of the 




that the East L.A. community backed the East L.A. student activists.  Such findings lent further 
credibility to student activists.  The task force reported: 
Citizens feel removed from school policy matters … therefore, direct appeal to the Board 
of Education is increasing … . The value of the democratic process is being debated.  
Gains from traditional social action are being compared to the gains of more militant, less 
responsible techniques.  For many, militancy seems to offer the new hope for social 
change.340 
 
To improve community involvement in educational policy making, the task force recommended 
establishing advisory councils at all elementary schools, training principals to work with the 
operation of advisory councils, developing advisory council handbooks, and reporting to school 
district divisions on the progress of the councils.341 
 On the issue of student participation in education politics, the task force found, “Some 
students are expressing … that they do not have enough voice in the decisions that affect the 
student body.”  The task force reported that some parents, “uncertain of school details, others 
deficient in language skills, and still others insecure in the techniques of parliamentary 
procedure,” deferred their opinions to their children.342  The ELACTF therefore recommended 
that principals find “areas of administration” in which students and parents could become 
involved in administrative decisions; that the college students involved in community leadership 
become involved in tutoring and counseling school children; and that students become part of 
school-advisory committees.343  The task force further credited college students for “filling the 
leadership vacuum in East Los Angeles” due to “the absence of a strong middle-class school 
leadership.”344  It identified the thriving United Mexican-American Students (UMAS) and 
Mexican-American Student Association (MASA), which the task force called “powerful,” yet 
divided politically “as to whether they should become totally militant and anti-establishment, or 
if they will continue to be service oriented and see traditional solutions.”345 
 In studying the merit of the Blowouts, the task force found that even before the walkouts, 
“responsible school and community people” had made demands comparable to those of the 
student demonstrators.346  The task force, in finding that the community agreed with some of the 
student demonstrators’ demands, recommended the adoption of these demands.  The task force 
acknowledged that the demonstrations were “in part a demand for a policy-making voice.”347  In 
an effort to understand the Blowouts, the task force classified student activists into two groups: 




group, of mostly students, that had “no dedication to except the excitement of the moment.”348  It 
classified the community response into three categories: 1) community leaders who saw the 
walkouts as a “political opportunity,” but whose involvement in them “with no malice intended,” 
gave credibility to the walkouts; 2) “community people” who disassociated themselves from the 
walkouts but believed in school changes and in many of the student demands; and 3) an 
uncommitted group recruited by all student and community groups.349 
Whereas student activists demanded bilingual education, Mexican and Chicano history 
courses, and Spanish language in the classroom, the task force studied a broader issue, 
“Curriculum Geared to the Mexican-American Student.”  The task force was surprised to find 
many programs set up for the Mexican American student, yet recommended that LACBE try out 
“ungraded curricula, home-school liaison techniques, original diagnostic devices, language and 
reading innovations.”350  On the issue of bilingualism, the task force alleged that “militant 
citizens” desired it “for its own sake,” while “nonmilitants look upon it as a bridge to the 
dominant culture.”351  The task force recommended nominal improvements: more research, and 
for the school district to remain informed about U.S. Senate Bill 428, a bill that would provide 
federal funding to school districts to establish education programs for students with limited 
English speaking skills, “so that money offered can be properly utilized.”352  Later in 1968, the 
bill, first introduced by Texas Democratic Senator Ralph Yarborough, became part of the 
Bilingual Education Act, also known as the Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA), 
which was part of the Great Society Programs aimed at improving education in minority 
neighborhoods.  This act demonstrated that East L.A. student activism was part of a broader 
social reform movement than extended beyond local educational politics.   
 Responding to student demands for Mexican history, the ELACTF force recommended 
planning the development and implementation of “Mexican culture” courses, as well as more 
care in the selection of textbooks.353  On the issue of counselors encouraging students to enroll in 
vocational instead of college prep courses, the task force asked that counselors encourage East 
L.A. students “with college potential” to take college prep courses.  Simultaneously, the task 
force suggested “updating industrial arts equipment,” continuing and expanding “skill centers 
and occupational centers,” and using “more instructional material” that “stresses the dignity and 




perspectives of the East L.A. community, the ELACTF made recommendations consistent, to 
varying degrees, with several of the student demands. 
The task force also made broad recommendations to the board endorsing open yet 
controlled communication between the community and LACBE.  The ELACTF suggested that 
the board keep the East L.A. community informed about its responses to student demands; 
publish a “master plan of future action” in response to the student demands; and assure the 
community that it will be heard by the board of education as long as they are submitted through 
“regular” channels.  In the last recommendation, the task force possibly hoped to preempt any 
calls for additional walkouts.355 
Significantly, the ELACTF examined the community’s perspective on integration, even 
though the East L.A. student activists and the community as a whole did not seek integration.  In 
its analysis, the task force differentiated between social integration and economic integration,356 
where the former involved school integration that affected students, and the latter referred to 
integration in employment in the public schools system and affecting administrators, teachers, 
aides, and staff.  The task force reported that the East L.A. community readily accepted 
“integration policies that would strengthen the opportunities for employment and advancement 
or that would improve understanding of the Mexican-American culture by the members of the 
majority Anglo-American culture.”357  The ELACTF explained, “On the other hand … the 
community is engaged in a struggle for self identification and would reject integration policies 
that would tend to fragment their culture.”358  The committee differentiated the East L.A. 
community from other neighborhoods, reporting, “Unlike many ghettos, East Los Angeles has a 
protective attitude about the area and geographical integration is not a major concern.359  
ELACTF’s findings suggested that Mexican Americans from East L.A. wanted to preserve their 
cultural identity and community, and at the same time wanted to attain middle-class status by 
achieving economic success ensured through fair employment practices that ameliorated 
discrimination. 
 Researching the community’s views on school integration and the controversial issue of 
busing, the ELACTF made additional fascinating findings.  The task force discovered that 
although the East L.A. community as a whole did not support school integration, the student 
unrest led some parents to support busing their children to schools away from their 




endorsement of bussing probably is an endorsement of what they believe is a superior education 
rather than integration.”360  Conversely, the task force asserted, “The recent walkouts and 
surrounding controversy have left many members of the community with the belief that schools 
in this area are inferior.”361  In effect, the attitudes of some East L.A. parents began to shift and 
converge with the attitudes of integrationists, as some began to associate busing with “better” 
educational opportunities.362 
 The East L.A. student demonstrations prompted some East L.A. parents to contemplate 
busing for the first time.  By contemplating “bussing” for their children, some East L.A. parents 
were willing to challenge school segregation by allowing their children to leave their racially 
isolated neighborhood minority schools to attend racially isolated predominantly white schools.  
Busing would expose their children to areas beyond the confines of the East L.A. community and 
to other cultures, a drastic change for a people deemed “insular and protective of its culture” by 
the task force. 
LACBE Explores More Student Demands 
 In late June and July, LACBE reconvened to discuss additional student demands after the 
ELACTF endorsed implementing several student demands.  The board held a pivotal meeting on 
June 24 when it finalized policy on the issue of prejudice.  LACBE developed a tentative motion 
expressly stating that the school district would not condone any acts of prejudice against 
students, parents, or employees, primarily seeking to improve “inter-personal and inter-cultural 
relationships among students, teachers, other staff, and the community.”363  LACBE amended the 
motion by emphasizing that LACBE rules provided “communication channels to air grievances 
relating to prejudice.”364  The complete, amended motion passed by a four to zero vote, with two 
abstentions.365 
 LACBE agreed with the superintendent and student demonstrators on the adequate access 
to restroom facilities.  The Superintendent Office called for adequate restroom facilities 
throughout the day, and acknowledged that a “restroom shall not be closed as a purely punitive 
measure due to the conduct of individuals.”366  Although LACBE agreed with the 
superintendent’s recommendations, this clearly represented a victory for student demonstrators. 
On the contentious issue of I.Q. testing, the East L.A. student activists had charged that 




reform, including the creation of unbiased tests as well as reevaluation of the scoring scale for 
ethnic and racial minorities.  At the meeting, LACBE members received reports and 
presentations from several school district divisions and more reports followed.367  The Guidance 
and Counseling Section of the Los Angeles City School Districts (LACSD) Division of 
Elementary Education described different tests administered to elementary school children.  It 
reported that test results were “useful” in identifying “the general academic level and the trends 
within a district”368 and helped teachers to determine “the present range of abilities, to select 
instructional materials of appropriate difficulty, to group pupils, and to identify rapid leaving and 
slow learning pupils, to diagnose specific weaknesses and learning difficulties, and to compare 
achievement level with ability level.”369  LACBE also received another report elaborating on the 
challenges in predicting “school achievement for pupils who are members of certain racial or 
ethnic minorities,” and in developing suitable tests for racial and ethnic minorities from the 
Measurement and Evaluation Section of the Auxiliary Services Divisions of LACSD.370  This 
division’s report included a caveat: “The word ‘certain’ is used advisedly, for the problem in Los 
Angeles is largely restricted to those pupils who are Negroes or Mexican-Americans.”371  The 
authors of the report added, “While these two are by no means the only racial or ethnic minority 
groups, the problem of prediction seems not to have aroused the same degree of contention with 
respect to other groups as it has with these.”372  The representatives from the several LACSD 
offices offered as many questions and reservations as they did answers on how to evaluate 
minority student testing, prompting the board to delay further discussion. 
By July 8, LACBE had responded to almost all student demands.  On the issue of teacher 
discipline, LACBE offered an ambiguous motion.  While LACBE agreed with the student 
demonstrators and the Superintendent that no teacher should be dismissed or transferred because 
of political views or disagreements with school administrators, it amended the motion by 
declaring that a teacher who expressed and “espouse[d] his political views and/or his 
philosophical views when these would compromise the discharge of his professional obligation 
in the classroom or on campus” undermined board policy.373  In effect, the vagueness of the 
policy, while protecting a teacher’s political views and expression, ensured that any teacher who 
expressed political views that undermined or broke board policy could be subject to disciplinary 
action.  On the student demand requiring an increase in Mexican American teachers and 




acknowledging the need to recruit minority teachers but recognized an ongoing program to 
increase the number of minority teachers.374  Generally speaking, both LACBE and the 
superintendent agreed with the student activists’ demand.  However, the new policy benefitted 
others and ensured that recruitment extended not only to Mexican Americans but also to other 
racial and ethnic groups. 
On July 15, LACBE finalized its responses to every East L.A. student demand.  For 
example, both LACBE and the superintendent’s office agreed with student demands calling for 
teachers to undergo training to understand the “Greater East Los Angeles” community, the 
Spanish language, and “the history, traditions, and contributions of the minority cultures,” for 
which they would be compensated.375   LACBE adopted a motion to this effect by a four to zero 
vote, with Chambers abstaining.  LACBE amended the motion urging the University of 
California, state colleges, and “private institutions” to offer courses that prepared teachers to 
teach “all our students,” presumably meaning the school district’s racially and ethnically diverse 
student population. 
LACBE addressed the need for vocational training as the last of thirty-six issues.  Student 
activists had called for a “revitalization” of the “Industrial Arts,” “up-to-date equipment,” and 
the most recent training techniques.376  While the superintendent’s office disagreed with the 
notion that deficiencies existed in industrial/vocational education training, it “recognized that up-
to-date” facilities were necessary and that a program to modernize facilities in certain school had 
already begun.  LACBE adopted the superintendent’s response by another 4-0 vote.  This 
secured another partial victory for the student activists.  Students from all around the district 
would benefit from the efforts of grassroots student activism in East L.A.377 
 By July 18, LACBE voted to commission the creation of a consolidated report of board 
responses to all thirty-six issues based on the student demands to the Office of Public 
Information. On July 25, 1968, after board members Nava and Chambers expressed 
disagreements over some of the majority votes, LACBE voted five to zero, with Chambers 
abstaining, to commission the report and to authorize the Clerk of the Board to distribute it.378  
The report included a tabulation of the board’s responses to the student demands.  According to 
this report, LACBE concurred with eighteen out of thirty-six of the Superintendent Office’s 
responses to student issues;379 agreed with only two of the thirty-six student issues, and disagreed 




deferred another, and referred another to a committee.381  LACBE asked the Superintendent’s 
Office for additional reports for twelve out of the thirty-six issues. 
Essentially, LACBE underreported the number of issues with which it agreed with 
student activists, and instead credited the superintendent with new education policy for East L.A. 
schools that would affect not only Mexican American students but other groups throughout the 
school district.  This reporting slight-of-hand effectively silenced any potential immediate 
recognition of the student activists and their supporters for their efforts to improve education in 
East L.A. and throughout the district.  A comparison of the tabulation, the superintendent office’s 
responses to the student demands, and the student demands themselves reveals that the board of 
education and the Superintendent Office agreed with the student demonstrators more often than 
the board reported, and more often than LACBE and the Superintendent’s Office acknowledged 
at the time.  The superintendent’s office agreed, to varying degrees, with most of the student 
demands, with LACBE at times amending the superintendent’s responses.  
 The East L.A. student demands were numerous, and after some LACBE modifications, 
some became policy. Overall, the demonstrators made moderate but important gains, after 
putting themselves in precarious situations, both within and outside school grounds.  The student 
unrest from South-Central L.A. and East L.A. garnered both criticism and support from within 
and outside their respective communities.  By the end of the walkouts, many white Angelenos in 
the L.A. metropolitan area erroneously began to link the student walkouts to the issues of school 
desegregation and busing and expressed their frustration about the success of the student.  This 
pointed to a broader historical shift in which efforts to secure civil rights for minorities began to 
meet resistance at the local level from many white Angelenos and increasingly traditional, law 
and order, conservative Chicanos. 
Reprisal against Demonstrators 
By late April, stirrings of administrative reprisals against teacher Sal Castro and student 
activists began.  David A. Sanchez of the EIC addressed the board “concerning alleged 
dismissals of students involved in recent walkouts” for “passing out leaflets concerning our 
march on the board.”382  Without naming Sal Castro specifically, Sanchez claimed “a specific 
teacher associated with the walkouts has been subjected to administrative harassment and the 




administrators to find reasonable solutions regarding student dismissals.  He also asked LACBE 
to respect the student marches and their goals, and informed LACBE that student had “passed 
out [leaflets] today informing the students of their rights regarding corporal punishment.”384  
Sanchez concluded by asking the board “to proceed with reason and respect in the efforts to give 
our Mexican-American youth their just share of the educational goals of this society.”385 
 The board’s openness to engage in a dialogue with student and community activists stood 
in stark contrast with the Los Angeles Police Department’s arrest of several demonstrators from 
the South-Central L.A. and East L.A. protests.  LACBE discovered that the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) arrested several students, community activists and other individuals.  By 
April 16, Superintendent Crowther had compiled a list of forty-three participants in the March 5-
8 student demonstrations who the LAPD subsequently arrested.  The list covered arrests at six 
schools, including six arrests from Garfield High School, two at Roosevelt High School, seven at 
Venice High School, ten at Belmont High School, two at Wilson High School, and sixteen at 
Carver Junior High School.386 
In early June 1968, the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office began to arrest thirteen 
individuals who had planned and taken part in the East L.A. Blowouts, and who were secretly 
indicted by a grand jury on charges of conspiracy to disturb the peace at East L.A. and 
downtown high schools.  By June 1, the police had arrested nine of the activists.  The indicted 
community activists, later known as the “LA 13,” included Carlos Muñoz, president of the 
California State University, Los Angeles chapter of United Mexican-American Student (UMAS), 
Cuban immigrant and editor of La Raza Eliezer Risco, and eleven members of the Brown 
Berets.387  The grand jury found enough evidence to indict all thirteen individuals on felony 
charges of conspiracy to disturb the peace.  The demonstrations themselves did not constitute a 
felony, but planning the demonstrations did, according to the district attorney and the grand jury.  
Their bail was set at $10,000, even though all had no criminal history.388 
 Political pressure from community activists and prominent politicians, and the LA 13’s 
lack of criminal history, helped to secure the release of many of the LA 13.  By June 3, Superior 
Court Judge George M. Dell reduced bail for nine arrested activists from $10,000 to $250.389  
Judge Dell even considered releasing everyone without bail.390  The rest of the plight of the L.A. 
13 is well documented.  After most secured their release on reduced bail, all were ultimately 




LA 13 was dismissed on July 24, 1970.  Garcia and Castro explained that the California Second 
Appellate Court ruled “that the indictments based on the conspiracy charges were illegal because 
they violated our First Amendment rights of free speech and the right of redress of grievances.”391  
Sal Castro endured an odyssey that included arrest, removal from Lincoln High School, 
conspiracy charges, State Board of Education efforts to invalidate his teaching credential, and 
reinstatement in 1973.392  His removal and reinstatement drew numerous letters either in support 
or in opposition that rivaled the number of letters for or against the student demonstrations.  
Forty years after the Blowouts, LACBE and the rest of the city of Los Angeles celebrated Sal 
Castro and the 1968 East L.A. student demonstrators; however, they did not highlight the 
significant contributions Jefferson High School students and other students from South-Central 
L.A. made.  This work is an effort with this aim. 
Tangible Gains for Minority Communities 
  Over time, Los Angeles’ minority communities saw tangible gains in response to the 
student unrest, notably the introduction of ethnic studies in public schools throughout the district 
inclusive of both African American and Mexican American experiences and contributions.  In a 
February 20, 1969 bulletin, the Public Information Office reported, “Numerous new classes and 
a variety of specially developed materials are being offered in Los Angeles City secondary 
schools this year as part of an ambitious attempt to further understanding and appreciation of 
Negro culture and history.”393  The school district offered courses in African American history 
and literature at many minority schools in South-Central L.A., schools on the Westside, as well 
as at several high schools in the San Fernando Valley.  However, the Mexican American 
community’s demands for bilingual as well as innovative and concerned teachers and 
administrators continued,394 even as the Los Angeles School District began implementing “In-
Service Training Programs” for teachers to develop “background materials and techniques for 
use in teaching classes in ethnic studies” and “aimed at enlarging understanding of minority 
group problems and contributions in United States history” began.395  In one example, the district 
offered an eight-week Mexican American history and culture course co-taught by Fred Sanchez 
and George Montez, teachers at Roosevelt and Lincoln High Schools, respectively. 
In April 1969, LACBE commissioned the Mexican-American Education Commission 




American students.  The commission consisted of forty members, including renowned Chicano 
Studies scholar Rudy Acuña, EIC chairman and East L.A. community activist Reverend 
Mardirosian, as well as parents, teachers, professors, students, and professionals.396  Notably, the 
commission did not include teacher Sal Castro, who on May 9, 1969, received a notice of 
“unsatisfactory service” while working at Lincoln High School.397  
MAEC garnered the support of an up-and-coming politician, Los Angeles Councilman 
and future Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley.  Bradley acknowledged that, “a major concern of 
the people of Los Angeles is equal education for Mexican Americans,” and expressed his “full 
support” for the commission.398  He described the members of the commission as “citizen 
representatives with bonafide [sic] credentials of community representation and resources to help 
define and structure the long needed programs for equitable educational changes.”399  Although 
Bradley did not clearly state whether he endorsed the student unrest, he evidently supported the 
commission’s formation and its goals. 
 Unequal education formed the basis of both the student demonstrations and integration 
efforts in Crawford.  The separate but overlapping South-Central L.A. and East L.A. student 
demonstrations had indelible effects on the integration debate, busing, and educational policy in 
the Los Angeles School District.  Stemming from unequal educational opportunities in racially 
isolated minority neighborhoods and a disregard of the contributions African Americans and 
Mexican Americans made to the American experience, students from South-Central L.A. and 
East L.A. took to the streets and to LACBE headquarters to change education policy to improve 
their racially isolated neighborhood schools.  Their goals contrasted with school integration, thus 
their efforts potentially could compete with the integrationists’ goals.  However, the student 
demonstrations transformed the integration debate from a discussion about integration and 
compensatory education, to a discussion over integration, compensatory education, and 
bilingual/bicultural education.  An unintended consequence developed out of the student unrest: 
an increased potential for cross-racial cooperation between African Americans and Mexican 
Americans in support of busing.  The prospect existed because some parents from East L.A. 
began to see consider busing as a way to improve their children’s educational opportunities, a 
vision that mainstream civil rights organizations and many African Americans had held for 





 Although the East L.A and South-Central L.A. students pursued some common goals, the 
resolutions would have the effect of reinforcing group cohesion.  While African American and 
East L.A. student demonstrators asked for the inclusion of culture in the curriculum, the 
resolution would reinforce community pride and unity.  African American and Mexican 
American student groups also wanted history courses to include the contributions African 
Americans and Mexican Americans made in American history.  By October 1971, the State 
Board of Education, by enacting State Code 9305, and LACBE agreed on common language to 
fulfill an aspect intimately connected to this demand: ‘“to give an accurate and correct portrayal 
of the role and contributions of minorities’ in state-adopted textbooks.”400  The inclusion of 
African Americans and Mexican American in American history textbooks further legitimized the 
demands of students from South-Central L.A. and East L.A. and reinforced community pride. 
 The Blowouts transformed education policy and the integration debate in Los Angeles, 
and simultaneously sparked interest in busing in the East L.A. community.  However, Sal Castro 
disagreed with the ACLU over integration, a disagreement that represented the debate in 
Crawford that would continue for more than a decade.  Firmly again busing, Sal Castro 
explained, “My feelings on busing ironically also caused me to oppose it … I saw myself as a 
liberal like the ACLU; in fact, I considered myself a socialist, but on this issue I disagreed with 
my liberal white friends.”401  Castro believed busing minority students out of their neighborhood 
schools caused “brain drain” and simultaneously undermined the bused Mexican American 
students’ potential.  He explained, “What I found was that more capable Chicano students would 
be bused to predominantly white schools, but that they would face even more alienation and 
segregation there.”402  Castro wanted Chicano children to continue attending minority 
neighborhood schools because “at least they could see successful role models among themselves.  
Chicanos … would be student body officers, including president.  Chicanos would win 
scholarships to college.  Chicanos would be in the AP … classes.”403  He concluded, “I didn’t kid 
myself.  The blowouts had only begun the process of reforming the Mexican schools, but overall 
Chicano students would still feel more comfortable there, and more importantly they would 
achieve more success than in the white schools.”404 Castro contended most “Mexican American 
parents agreed with me.  They didn’t want their kids all the way out by Santa Monica or way 




Preeminent Chicano Studies professor Rudy Acuña, in an interview with the Los Angeles 
Times’ Frank Del Olmo, stated that after the 1968 East L.A. demonstrations “there was no 
turn[in]g back.”406  Acuña explained that the Chicano community never went back to the “old hat 
in the hand routine.”407  He described the demonstrations as “epochal, a distinct clear break 
f[ro]m the past.”408  “[I] don’t think we got that much, but the students today [are] more 
socialized,” he declared.409  Yet Crawford remained unresolved.  Crawford could result in 
integration.  Or, Crawford could take into consideration the interests of Los Angeles’s 
increasingly diverse but racially segregated population, and result in an uneasy compromise. 
The student demonstrations of 1968 transformed the debate in Crawford from a debate 
about integration and compensatory education, to about addressing school segregation, 
compensatory education, and bilingual/bicultural education.  Crawford began in 1963 with 
African Americans and civil rights groups sparring with white Angelenos over desegregating the 
city’s schools.  By the end of the 1960s, the student demonstrations highlighted the increasingly 
complex political terrain of the desegregation debate, as African Americans and Mexican 
Americans were divided over how to pursue equal educational opportunities.  African Americans 
and Mexican Americans participated in Crawford, and at the same time, members from both 
communities also backed increased improvements to their racially isolated schools through 
compensatory education, and in Mexican American neighborhoods, adding bilingual education 
programs.  However, the student activists of East L.A. also prompted some East L.A. parents to 
consider busing their children to schools far away from their racially isolated neighborhood.  
Although some Mexican American parents claimed that integration was not the goal, 
nonetheless, their new perspective made them and their children suitable candidates for 
voluntary busing for integration. 
                                                 
1 LACBE, Special Meeting Minutes, 4 March 2008.  I personally received the board minutes commemorating the 
student protests in the mail from LACBE archivist Rachel Tucker.  In the school board meeting, leading district 
officials participated in a dramatization of the March 11, 1968 protests.  According to historian Mario T. Garcia and 
Sal Castro, in the late 1950s and early 1960s Castro recognized the problems affecting Mexican students including: 
low expectations by teachers, a stress on vocational instead of academic curriculum, high drop-out rates (50%), low 
reading scores, insensitive teachers and counselors, overcrowded classes, and lack of ethnic and cultural 
reinforcement.  See Mario T. Garcia and Sal Castro, Blowout!: Sal Castro and the Chicano Struggle for Educational 
Justice, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 3.  For detailed biographical information about 
Castro before the East L.A. Blowouts, see 3-4 and 27-109. 
2 A testimonio is a word in Spanish that translates to “ an oral history conducted by a subject and an interlocutor.”  
See Garcia and Castro, Blowout!, 19. 
